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Chapter I 
Tte Beginnings 
"Hy countrymen, ~ire," John Quincy Adams, United States minister to 
Russia, said to Alexander I, Tsar of all the Rus sias, "are so familiar-
ized with the ocean that they think not much more of crossing it than of 
going over a river."l The date was the eleventh of October, 1810, and 
Adams and Alexander, their paths having crossed on the mall in front of 
St. Petersburg's Admiralty building, had stopped to chat and had hit 
upon the subject of the amazing American bent for travel. ~ell might 
such a subject come to their lips; in that year more American vessels 
arrived at Kronstadt, the port of St. Petersburg, than vessels of any 
other nation, including Russia. 2 And in August of the following year, 
1811, Russians would stand amazed on the quays and piers of that sea-
port and stare out at one hundred vessels moored in their harbor flying 
the Stars and Stripes. 3 
But it was not just a bent for travel that brought Americans to 
Russia. It was a passion for trade. In the years just before the Amer-
ican and Russian wars of 1812 Russia was one of the most important mar-
kets of the United States. In 1811 the United States sent one tenth of 
1Adarns, Charles Francis (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. II 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 18~ p. 186. 
2Diplomatic Despatches from Russia, Vol. I, Department of State, Extract 
from St. Petersburg Gazette dated 6/18 Dec. 1810. 
3Ford, Worthington C. (ed.), iVritings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), p. 185. 
-' 
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of all her exports to the shores of Russia.4 (And, incredibly, our 1811 
exports to Russia exceeded our 1958 exports to the U.S.S.R. by approxi-
mately one and a half million dollars.) 5 
THE BEGINNINGS 
Although not of transcendent importance until the first decade of 
the Nineteenth Century, Russo-American trade began very early. Like so 
many other branches of colonial trade, the first page of its history is 
written on a leaf of Virginia tobacco. In the latter half of the Seven-
teenth Century Virginia's tobacco producers found themselves sinking 
into an economic slough with a modern-sounding name: over-production. 
In 1681 Governor Thomas Lord Culpeper of the colony wrote moaningly, 
"It is commonly said that there is tobacco enough in London now to last 
all England five years. . . . Our thriving is our undoing. . . . 11 An 
expansion of market would solve the problem, of course, but expansion 
where7 Governor Culpeper suggests "Free importation into Russia would 
revive our drooping spirits, for we want nothing but a vent. 11 6 
Sadly, however, tobacco was forbidden in Muscovy by both the 
government and the church. 7 The use of tobacco was creeping in, but 
4The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the 
Second Session of the Fifty-second Congress, 1892-93, Vol. XXVI (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1893), p. XVI; Pitkin, Timothy, 
A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America (New 
York: James Eastburn and Co., 1817), p. 36-37. 
5The New York Times, 5 July 1959, p. E5. 
6Fortescue, J.W. (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 
America and West Indies, 1681-1685 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
1898), p. 156. 
7~., 160. 
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like most other "westernisms 11 it was making little progress among the 
vast conservative and devout majority. It seemed that Virginia would 
have to look elsewhere for 11 a vent," unless Muscovy were turned upside 
down ... which is exactly what Peter the Great did in the decades around 
1700. 
Peter had a profound effect on trade between America and Russia. He 
encouraged Russians to trade with foreigners. He encouraged local indus-
try. He drove through the Swedes to the sea and gave Russia several good 
ports on the Baltic. The innovation of Peter's which was most immedi-
ately apparent to Americans was his admission - yea, even encouragement -
of tobacco importation. He had two motives. One was to raise more money 
for his expanding government, army and new navy. His father had briefly 
allowed the use of tobacco and had made the tobacco trade a state monopoly. 
This seemed a good money-making scheme to Peter, especially with the addi-
tion of an excise tax on tobacco. The second motive was to encourage the 
use of tobacco as a small detail of his life-long campaign to westernize 
Russia. If westerners shaved, God help the Muscovite whose beard caught 
the wildly roving eye of the Tsar. And if westerners enjoyed an occa-
sional pipe, then it would be best for all if Peter moved through a con-
stantly replenished haze of smoldering tobacco.a 
Consequently, a considerable trade in processed Virginia and Mary-
land tobacco to Russia came into being in the last twenty years of the 
Seventeenth Century.9 This trade became important enough for Americans 
8sumner, B.H., Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London: 
English Universities Press, Ltd., 1950), p. 45-46. 
9Gray, L.C., "The Market Surplus Problems of Colonial Tobacco," William 
and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine, 2d Series, VII (October, 
1927), p. 241. 
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quickly to protest to Queen Anne's government in 1705 at the news that 
Englishmen and English machines were going to Russia to process raw to-
bacco there. The Americans feared that the Russians, once in possession 
of the skills to transform tobacco from the raw leaf into a smokeable 
product, would use the nearby Circassian tobacco rather than the Ameri-
can.10 Queen Anne's government thought enough of the trade to order that 
all "Persons whatsoever forbear to send any persons into Muscovy versed 
in the mystery of spinning and rowling tobacco or any instruments or ma-
terials for the same ... as they'd tender her Majesty's displeasure 
and will answer the contrary at their perils."ll 
Later in our colonial era our exports of tobacco to Russia were 
supplemented by rice, indigo, tropical goods we picked up in the West 
Indies, and - incredibly - furs. In 1775 Russia, one of the greatest 
fur producers in the world, imported 46,460 American beaver skins and 
7,143 American otter skins through St. Petersburg. A contemporary Eng-
lish writer said that the motive for this strange Russian yen for Ameri-
can furs arose simply from the fact that they were "far-fetched and dear 
bought." 12 
In return for these goods, Russia sent us some of our most 
essential imports: iron, hemp. cordage, sailcloth and other finer linens. 
lOLibrary of Congress, Manuscript Division, transcript of British Public 
Records: Colonial Office 5, Vol. 1314, Part 2, No. 57, dated as received 
10 May 1705. 
ll"Virginia Tobacco in Russia," The virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, Vol. IV (July, 1896), p. 57. 
12Tooke, William, View of the Russian Empire During the Reign of Catherine 
the Second and to the Close of the Present Century (London: 1799), Vol. 
III, p. 567. 
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We will hear much more of these products later. In fact, this whole book 
will be something of a hymn of praise to Russia's iron, hemp and flax. 
This trade between Russia and colonial America was almost always 
carried on indirectly. An occasional vessel might travel between the 
two directly,l3 but the vast majority, whether sailing from a Russian or 
an American port, went to Britain and unloaded there. In Britain the 
tobacco or hemp would have added to its price the fees of the Englishmen 
who unloaded it, stored it in their warehouses, sold it, resold it, 
loaded it on other vessels and sent it on its ways. This was the object 
of England's navigation laws, which obliged the bulk of goods coming 
into any part of the empire or leaving it to pass through Britain on the 
way, thus brightening with a bit of gold England's outstretched palms 
before disappearing into the hands of a colonial or foreigner. 
Anyway, a Yankee in need of hemp for his ropewalks, or sails for 
his bare masts, or linen for his back or his wife's table, rarely wanted 
to sail directly to Russia. When he did, he usually had to do it as a 
smuggler, and although he was by no means averse to a bit of maritime 
skulking, smuggling all the way to Russia just wasn't worth the effort.l4 
When he got there he had little knowledge of the market, nor any con-
nections, nor anyone to give him credit. Moreover, the trade was prob-
ably not great enough before our revolution to sustain much direct com-
merce. To pay the acquisitive English merchant his due. England was the 
l~acPherson, David, Annals of Commerce (London: 1805), Vol. III, 
p. 474; Harrington, Virginia D., The New York Merchant on the Eve of the 
Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 198. 
14Harrington, The New York Merchant, p. 166, 198-99. 
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logic~l entrepot of trade between America and Russia. A typical Yankee 
way to get Russian products before the Revolution was to ship a cargo of 
fish to Spain, where good Catholics ate good Protestant fish every Fri-
day, and to remit part of the profits to London to pay for hemp, iron, 
duck and other Russian goods which had been or were to be shipped to 
America. Russian goods were typically part of the cargo of any ship ar-
riving from England.l5 
When the American farmers and the British soldiers exchanged deaths 
at Lexington and Concord, it appeared that the little contact we would 
have with Russia during the war would be with fixed bayonets. In 1775 
Catherine the Great seemed inclined to sell the services of some of her 
troops to George III for use in North America, and although she soon 
permanently rejected the idea, the rumor that Russian mercenaries were 
on their way to join the Hessians persisted among Americans.l6 
As it happens, however, Russia's influence on our revolution was 
much to our advantage. Britain, in her effort to destroy by naval block-
ade the ability of France and Spain to wage war, declared naval stores 
to be contraband, and, therefore, legally seizable. Russia, as Europe's 
chief producer of naval stores, was soon affected. In 1780 Catherine 
the Great announced that her navy would be used against any belligerent 
15Porter, K.W., ed., The Jacksons and the Lees, Two Generations of 
Massachusetts Merchants, 1765-1844 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1937), Vol. I, p. 12; Wharton, Francis, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1889}, Vol. V, p. 281, 782. 
16Fitzpatrick, John C., ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. X 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), n. 82. 
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who interfered with her neutral trade, and gathered together the chief 
neutrals of Europe into a League of Armed Neutrality to protect neutral 
rights on the high seas. This League obliged Great Britain to accept 
broader definitions of neutral rights, and thus weakened Britain·l:s block-
ade against her enemies. This, plus the fact that the every existence 
of the League informed Britons that even the neutrals were dangerously 
anglophobic, helped persuade Britain to accept a peace that left the 
United States independent. 17 
As a result of Catherine's actions of 1780 the fledgling United 
States put aside its distrust and decided to woo the Empress. In Decem-
ber of that year the Continental Congress appointed Francis Dana of 
Massachusetts as Minister Plenipotentiary to the court of Catherine the 
Great. 11 The great object of your negotiation,' 1 Congress instructed Dana, 
11 is to engage her Imperial Majesty to favor and support the sovereignty 
and independence of these United States. 11 Also, it would be awfully 
nice if Dana could persuade the Tsarina (who, Congress crooned, is al-
ways "attentive to the freedom of commerce and the rights of nations11 ) 
t d 't h U 't d St t . t th L fA d N 1' lS o a m1 t e n1 e a es 1n o e eague o rme eutra 1ty. Just 
how Congress expected the U.S., one of the leading belligerents and 
chief bone of contention of the whole vast war, to find a place in the 
world's chief organization of neutrals is hard to guess. 
Dana, already in vlest Europe on diplomatic duty, took the land 
route to St. Petersburg. His carriage was ''overthrown and broke to 
17Morris, Richard B.,(ed.), Encyclopedia of American History (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 102-103. 
18Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Vol. XVIII (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), p. 1166; '>J'harton, Revol-
utionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 201. 
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pieces between Leipzig and Be:·lin," but neither he nor teen-aged John 
Quincy Adams, whom he took along as secretary, were injured, and they 
arrived in good health at St. Petersburg on the twenty-seventh of Au-
19 gust, 1781. Here Dana was to suffer total frustration for two long 
years. The United States might glow with coltish ardor, but the experi-
enced Catherine would not even acknowledge the existence of her new ad-
mirer. She knew this act would bring her the enmity of Great Britain 
and the nations opposing Great Britain could offer in return little more 
than the gratitude of thirteen pseudo-nations half a world away. 
Catherine's government made extra special efforts to ignore Dana. 
~ben a portrait of George Washington was sent to Dana via the Russian 
minister at the Hague, it was returned to that minister by the Russian 
government with this curt statement, "With your despatch came a portrait 
of Washington to one Dina, an American agent here. But as this man is 
not known to her Imperial Majesty nor her ministers, you are commanded 
by her Majesty to return it to the source from which it reached the 
courier."20 
Dana realized Russia would never recognize the United States for 
altruistic reasons. He would have to show that it was to her advantage 
to do so. Being a Yankee, he naturally turned to the possibilities of 
commerce between Russia and the United States as a solution to his 
problem. "I wish this country had a more commercial turn, 11 he mused. 
"VVe should then soon see a direct commuLication between the two coun-
tries opened and established, to the great benefit of both."2l 
19wnarton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 679. 
20cresson, W.P., Francis Dana, a Puritan Diplomat at the Court of 
Catherine the Great (New York: 1930), p. 232. 
2lvfuarton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. V, p. 117. 
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The sagacity of Dana's lonely theorizing about future Russo-American 
trade amazes the historian who has the facts of that 1 future" before him. 
Dana knew that there would be an American demand for Russian goods be-
cause that demand was already over a hundred years old; 22 the difficulty 
would be in finding something to exchange for these goods. The Russians 
were now beginning to raise their own tobacco in the Ukraine,23 and -
anyhow - its import was at that time prohibited. 24 The only other na-
tive United States products that Russians coveted were rice and indigo,25 
but these would make too slim a base for any great trade. Dana recog-
nized that the backbone of America's colonial commerce, the triangular 
voyage from the continental colonies to tropical and sub-tropical Amer-
ica and thence to Europe, would also be the backbone of the future trade 
with Russia. The sugar, coffee and dye woods of the West Indies and 
Latin America would tempt the Russians where the timber and fish and 
grain of North America would not. " We must do it by circuitous 
voyages. .. ,n26 said the Yankee peddler come to the banks of the 
Neva. 
Also, this shrewd American noticed that, as mentioned above, the 
goods of the West Indies which were brought to Russia by the great mari-
time powers were, per mercantilistic dictates, first deposited in the 
respective mother countries. This meant a rise in price. Why. thought 
22 1 
.!12.!£., p. 28 . 
23Qddy, J. Jepson, European Commerce (London: 1805), p. 70. 
24wharton, Revolutiionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. V, p. 282. 
25Ibid. 
26~. 
.. 
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Dana, couldn't we bring these goods directly to Russia? "By such means 
might we not be able to furnish them here at a cheaper rate than any of 
the Europeans can do it, and nearly as cheap as if they were our own na-
tive productions ... ?"27 
In the spring of 1783, with England negotiating for peace, it 
appeared that Dana would be recognized by the Russian government. The 
United States had given up all thought of wheedling herself into the 
League of Armed Neutrality - what might have been a shield and buckler 
in war would only be an "entangling alliance" in peace - but was still 
interested in a commercial treaty with Russia which would give a legiti-
mate baptism to the trade that Dana foresaw. But all there was ever to 
be for Dana in Russia was bitter frustration. The British minister used 
all his considerable influence to assure that the U.S. would not be rec-
ognized till the final "i" was dotted on the final ratification of the 
peace treaties;28 Catherine was ignoring even urgent public business to 
sit at the bedside of her favorite, Lenskoi, who had destroyed his 
health with aphrodisiacs;29 and the Russian officials with whom Dana was 
trying to deal demanded enormous sums in semi-official bribes before 
they would negotiate.3° Dana was happy to receive instructions in a new 
tone from a Congress just beginning the century-long swing into isola-
tionism. Congress now decided it was not anxious to "engage extensively 
in commercial treaties till experience has shown the advantages or 
27Ibid., p. 841. 
28cresson, Dana, p. 284-85. 
29Ibid., p. 287. 
30Ibid., p. 300. 
disadvantages that may result from them," and that it would rather 
postpone any treaty with Russia than buy one at this time.31 Dana 
embarked for Boston in August, 1783. 32 
Leaving made him happier than had anything else for two years if 
what he had recently written John Adams is indicative: "I am sick, 
11 
sick to the heart of the delicacies and whims of European politics. n33 
Back home, the only delegations to Congress that mourned the end 
of the mission to Russia were, significantly, Massachusetts', as always 
interested {n naval stores for ships, and South Carolina's, looking for 
a Russian market for Southern rice.34 
31rbid., p. 301-302. 
32rbid., p. 317. 
33Ibid·., p. 288. 
34Hunt, Gaillard (ed.), The Writings of James Madison, Vol. I (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901), p. 469; or Journals of the Con-
tinental Congrees, 1774-1789, Vol. XXV, p. 966. 
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Chapter II 
Hemp, Flax and Iron: The American View 
Now, just as the first ships from the United States are warping up 
to Russian quays, is perhaps the moment to call a halt and discuss the 
products that lured ~ricans into the narrow waters that wash Russia's 
shores. These products were by no means exotic. From China came black 
and green tea and dazzling silks. From Java came wicked krises and 
spices worth the ransom of a dozen kings. From Russia came prosaic 
hemp, linens and iron. 
Pros aiel.? Yes, but also absolutely essential. Without thousands 
and thousands of tons of Russian goods every year, the sailing fleets of 
the United States could not have existed. Until the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century most of the transportation within the United 
States for more than a few miles, and all of the trans-oceanic trans-
portation was by sailing craft. Cotton moved from the wharfs of Savan-
nah to the spindles of Massachusetts, and the works of Fielding and 
Chateaubriand moved from the presses of Europe to the parlors of Balti-
more under pyramids of sail. Our sailing vessels were our strong backs 
and our eyes and ears. Without Russia's hempen hawsers and rope, her 
flax sails and fittings and fastening made from her iron, these vessels 
would have been immobile piles of lumber. 
Take as an example a forty-four gun frigate of the Constitution 
class, the only kind of large sailing vessel with which most of us are 
now at all familiar. She needed two suits of sails, each suit amounting 
13 
to about three-quarters of an acre in extent.l Fully rigged, she had one 
hundred tons of hemp rope aboard. Iron? Not counting the anchors or any 
of the cannon, muskets or ammunition, a ship of the Constitution class 
needed seventy-five tons of iron.2 
Not so vital, but considered necessary to a normally comfortable 
life, were the thousands of yards of Russia's finer linen textiles that 
streamed to the ports of America every year. Before our South and Eng-
land's Midlands taught the world to cast aside linen for cotton, Rus-
sia's linens - from rough ravensduck for a sailor's trousers to delicate 
diaper for the merchant-prince's silver~gleaming table - were common 
fabrics in America's ports. 
Hemp and flax, of course, grew all over the world, but it was 
Russia that produced more of each than any other nation.3 As for qual-
ity, no other hemp seemed quite so worthy in the eye of the sailor as 
Russian, and while - say - Silesian linen might be more noted for beauty 
of workmanship, all agreed that no flax was superior to Russia's and no 
linens sturdier than hers.4 Furthermore, just because a piece of linen 
had been manufactured outside Russia was no reason to believe that its 
flax hadn't once tossed its blue flowers in a Muscovite breeze. Rus-
sia's exports of raw flax supplied the linen industries of several Euro-
pean nations.S 
lsource is conversation with Michael King, professional Constitution 
expert and ship model builder of 22 Chestnut St., Charlestown, Mass. 
2American State Papers, Class IV Naval Affairs, Vol. I (Washington: 
Gales and Seaton, 1834), p. 400. 
3warden, Alex. J., The Linen Trade. Ancient and Modern (London: Long-
man, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1864), p. 319. 
4Ibid., p. 337; Tooke, View of the Russian Empire, Vol. III, p. 508. 
Swarden, The Linen Trade, p. 319. 
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Russia had no monopoly on the mining and manufacture of iron, 
either, but the great iron-producing ages of Western Europe and the 
United States were still in the dim future. So backward was Britain in 
iron production that, at the opening of the American Revolution, even 
the Thirteen Colonies were producing more iron than Britain. Britain 
had tried to encourage colonial American production of pig and bar iron 
for export to Britain, but the colonies used most of the little iron 
they produced themselves and no significant amounts reached the British 
Isles. 6 What iron Britain did produce herself was termed 11 coarse, hard, 
and brittle. 11 7 The British Empire, America included, got its quality 
iron from Sweden and Russia. These two produced the most and best iron 
in the world. 8 
The reasons for the dominance of this field by these two, usually 
thought of as on the periphery of the industrial revolution of the last 
decades of the Eighteenth Century, lie in the fact that the industrial 
revolution hadn't yet taken hold of iron making. Charcoal was still nee-
essary for the smelting of iron, and the primitive techniques then used 
would produce quality iron only from the very highest grade ore. These 
facts made it essential to have large forests near very rich mines if you 
6Binning, Arthur C., British Regulation of Colonial Iron Industry (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), p. 3, 122. 
7The Dictionary of Merchandise and Nomenclature in All Languages for Use 
of Counting-Houses (Philadelphia: James Humphreys, 1805), p. 198. 
8Ibid.; Binning, British Regulation of Colonial Iron Industry, p. 122; 
Heckscher, Eli F., An Economic History of Sweden (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), p. 177; Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence, Vol. V, p. 781. 
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wanted good iron in any quantity. Sweden and Russia were among the few 
places on earth that combined these two characteristics.9 
The American iron mines thus far discovered were near the seacoast, 
where all the forests had been razed, and their ore was not of high qual-
tty, anyway. And any American iron coming from the interior was hard put 
to compete with Baltic iron because of the appalling condition of Ameri-
can roads. They were so bad that Daniel Webster claimed, during the de-
bates about the tariff of 1824, that freight costs from Philadelphia to 
a point fifty miles inland were no less than from the Baltic to that 
port. He added that Russian and Swedish wages were very much lower than 
American wages, with the result that the price of their iron was low. 
All this meant that, for practical purposes, Philadelphia was fifty miles 
away from an area where she could buy iron cheaper than she could in the 
United States. 10 
As for the possibility of any great spurt in American iron mining 
in the near future, Francis Dana, in a statement presaging the Turner 
Thesis, predicted in 1782: 
"From the prodigious extent of our uncultivated territory, 
joined to the ease with which every inhabitant might make 
himself an independent proprietor of a sufficient portion 
of it, for the comfortable support of himself and a family, 
who in their turns might find in the same way the same fa-
cility of subsisting in an independent state of life; that 
it is not in the nature of things for men thus circumstanced 
to bury themselves in the bowels of the earth, and spend 
their lives and their labor for the profit of others."ll 
~Heckscher, Economic History of Sweden, p. 94-95; Mavor, James, An Eco-
nomic History of Russia (New York: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1925), 
Vol. I, p. 533. 
lOclark, VictorS., History of Manufactures in the United States (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1929), Vol. I, p. 299-300. 
llwharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. V, p. 782. 
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Cables woven of iron wire would in the 1880's replace rope for 
bracing American masts, but meanwhile these nautical steeples under 
which the peddler sons of Cotton Mather worshipped Mammon stood on 
straining angles of hemp. America was, for most purposes, completely 
dependent on Russia for this rope fiber. Manila fiber from the Phillip-
pines was not yet popular. In fact, even after the introduction of rna-
nila, Russian hemp - strong and inelastic - was nearly as common aboard 
our lofty clipper in the 1850's as on our dumpy merchantmen of the 
1780 1 s. 12 In any case, our early imports from the Phillippines were not 
rope fiber, but sugar, indigo and coffee. 13 
Hemp had become essential to Great Britain as early as the Sixteenth 
Century, and, as she never raised enough for her own use, she had ex-
pected her colonies to supply her with it. At the establishment of 
Jamestown, hemp was in the list of goods recommended for production 
there. In New Plymouth in 1639 a law was passed requiring each house-
holder to plant a minimum amount of hemp. 14 In 1681 when our Governor 
Culpeper complained of tobacco overproduction in Virginia, the British 
government suggested he encourage the growth of hemp instead.l5 All in 
all, the British government and ten of our thirteen colonies offered, at 
one time or another, bounties for every ton of American hemp, but even 
at the time when the bounties were most tempting little hemp went from 
12Morison, Samuel Eliot, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-
1860 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), p. 294-95. 
13Reinoehl, John H. (ed.), "Some Remarks on the American Trade: Jacob 
Crowninshield to James Madison, 1806," William and Mary Quarterly, 
Vol. XVI (January, 1959), p. 104n. 
14Hopkins, James F., A History of the Hemp Industry in Kentucky 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1951), p. 6-7. 
lSFortescue, Calendar of State Papers 3 Colonial. 1681-85, p. 160. 
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America to Britain. On the contrary, the colonies were importing hemp 
from abroad. 16 Hemp, a crop that requires considerable labor in harvest-
ing and preliminary preparation of the stalks by the farmer, was too 
time-consuming in labor-hungry America. 17 Per man hour, grain or rice or 
tobacco brought in more profit. 
In the decades following the Revolution some Americans thought they 
might be able to raise their own hemp and perhaps even undersell the 
Russians on the world market, but this remained an idle dream.l8 Hemp 
imports (all cordage imports aside) amounted to about 3400 tons a year 
before 1800 and rose to a peru< of 5000 tons a year in the 1820's and 
30's. 19 Americans making rope for maritime use employed Russian hemp 
nearly exclusively until long after the War of 1812.20 
Hemp used in rope manufacturing in Salem, Massachusetts, was so 
exclusively Russian that Duncan Phillips, the Salem historian, tells us 
the possibly apocryphal but indicative (and beautifully fey) story that 
in that port: 
nst. Catherine's Day, the twenty-fifth of November, was the 
gala day of the rope makers. They knew little of Roman 
Catholic saints, but the idea that St. Catherine was the 
saint of spinsters, and that Catherine was Empress of Russia 
where most of hemp came from. got all mixed up. Russian and 
16clark, History of Manufactures in U.S., Vol. I, p. 24; Hopkins, 
History of Hemp History in Kentucky, p. 11. 
17Hutchins, John, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 
1789-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 125. 
18Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. I, p. 63; Pitkin, Statistical 
View of U.S., p. 235. 
19clark, History of Manufactures in U.S., Vol. I., p. 326. 
20American State Papers. Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 39; Morison, Samuel 
Eliot, The Ropemakers of Plymouth; A History of the Plymouth Cordage 
Company. 1824-1949 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 8. 
American flags were hung out, a procession paraded around 
the Common . . . where the rope makers celebrated with food 
and drink late into night."21 
Our dependence on Russia did not stem from an inability to raise 
18 
hemp in the United States. Hemp could be grown practically anywhere in 
America, and the strands of American hemp were potentially as strong and 
durable as Russian. 22 But when Congress asked the Secretary of the Navy 
in 1824 why our navy didn't use more American hemp, the Secretary an-
swered bluntly that "cables and cordage manufactured from it ... are 
inferior in color, strength and durability to those manufactured from 
imported hemp, and consequently are not as safe or proper for use in the 
navy.n23 
Experiments on board the U.S. Constellation in the 1820's proved 
that, at best, American hemp was perhaps as good as Russian for rigging, 
but similar experiments with two cables {or hawsers),made of American 
hemp aboard the U.S. North Carolina showed that common opinion was cor-
rect, that American hemp exposed to water did quickly lose a frightening 
proportion of its strength. ~en first brought on board these cables 
were as strong or stronger than equivalent Russian cables. And after 
eighteen months the two cables looked sound, 11 but, on unlaying the rope 
and drawing the yarns," it was found, after trying twenty yarns of each 
separ-ately, "that the yarns of American hemp would not withstand on 
21Phillips, James Duncan, "The Salem Shipbuilding Industry Before 1812," 
The American Neptune, Vol. II (October, 1942), p. 287-88. 
22American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 27-28, 29. 
23Ibid., Vol. II, p. 27. 
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average a pull of over eighteen pounds apiece, although, when new, the 
yarns of either would have suspended at least 125 pounds.l!24 
American hemp was of poor quality because of the way it was 
processed. In hemp the valuable fibers are bound to each other and to 
the woody core of the stalk by a viscous gum, which must be dissolved 
before the fibers can be removed. 25 In Kentucky, where most of Ameri-
can hemp was raised, and nearly everywhere else in the United States, 
this gum was removed by dew-retting. In Russia hemp was water-retted 
(as, incidentally, it was in Connecticut, where - alas - only 
insignificant amounts were raised). 26 
In dew-retting the hemp stalks, as soon as they are harvested, are 
spread on the ground thinly, and left there three or four weeks, untended 
except for an occasional turning, exposed to all the vagaries of the 
weather. This does evaporate and leach away the objectionable gum, but 
it also weakens the hemp fibers and leaves them in a state that prevents 
effective impregnation of yarns made from them with tar. Ineffectively 
water-proofed rope is of little use and dangerously untrustworthy for 
maritime use. Dew-retting also leaves the staple rough, whi~h slows its 
manufacture into rope. To these negative qualities was added the slov-
enly and unsorted state in which the Kentucky farmers sent their hemp to 
market.27 
24Ibid., Vol. III, p. 89-90. 
25Ibid., Vol. I., p. 246; Hopkins, History of Hemp Industry in Kentucky, 
p. 53. 
26American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 29-30, 38. 
27Ibid., Vol. II, p. 28, 38. 
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Protectionists put a tariff on imported hemp in 1769 and later, led 
by that Kentucky hemp farmer, Henry Clay, raised it as high as sixty dol-
lars a ton, but seafarers were not persuaded to settle for American 
hemp28 (and the attitude characterized by such tariffs kept the states' 
rights pot bubbling in New England until she turned from shipping to 
manufacturing for her main livelihood). In answering the Congressional 
inquiry mentioned above about American hemp, the Navy Department quoted 
"a gentleman of experience" as saying, "I would not use cordage made 
from Kentucky yarn or hemp, even if I could procure it at one half the 
price of cordage made from Russia. 11 29 
In Russia the harvested hemp was treated with great deference. Even 
in drying immediately after harvesting the stalks were not permitted to 
lie on the ground, but were hung on racks. After two days, unless the 
weather was warm enough to dry the stalks with no artificial help, the 
stalks were placed in a kiln. In either case, after three days the 
stalks were placed to ret or steep in a stream or pond, with weighted 
frames on top to insure that they would stay completely immersed. The 
clearer the water, the brighter and silkier would be the hemp. 
After sufficient retting - about three weeks in warm water and five 
weeks or more in cold - the hemp was taken out and dried for no less 
than two weeks, followed by twenty-four hours in the kiln, or for as long 
as a whole winter, depending on the kind of finished product desired. 
Then the stalks were broken on a hand mill, the husk beaten off, and the 
28Hopkins, History of Hemp Industry in Kentucky, p. 21, 80, 90; Hutchins, 
American Maritime Industries, p. 125. 
29American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 28. 
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remainder drawn through a wooden comb to unravel the fibers. The hemp 
was then stored in sheds, ready to be sorted. 
The Russian processing of hemp was so slow and meticulous that much 
of it didn't reach the Russian ports to await ~-Jest European customers 
until two years after it was sown.30 Russia's two great resources were 
cheap labor and patience. 
Why didn't the Kentuckians try to compete with the Russians? Water-
retting certainly wasn't too intricate a technique, and the difference 
between the price of American dew-retted and Russian water-retted hemp 
must have been provocative.31 Of course, water-retting in ponds and 
streams killed all the fish and any livestock that might drink there. 
And the steep water did stink like rotten eggs, which was considered un-
healthy for slaves and twice as bad for whites. But the main explana-
tion is probably that there just wasn't any demand for American water-
retted hemp. Most American hemp went for rope to bind cotton bales. 
Since dew-retted hemp was good enough for this, Southern planters would 
certainly pay no more for water-retted. As for producing water-retted 
hemp for the maritime market, sailors preferred Russian hemp to any and 
all American hemp, a centuries-old habit which would have taken unprofit-
ably long to break.32 
If Russia's hemp could perhaps be called the sinews and nerves of 
America's ships, then Russia's linen sails, which caught and held the 
energy of the wind that was the life-breath of the fleets, were their 
indispensable and untiring lungs. The colonial history of flax in 
30Ibid., Vol. II, p. 29-30. 
31Ibid., Vol. II, p. 36. 
32Hopkins, History of Hemp Industry in Kentucky, p. 57-58. 
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America and its manufacture into sailcloth (duck) is similar to that of 
hemp. The cultivation of both was artificially stimulated. In 1639 in 
New Plymouth the raising of flax, as well as of hemp, was required. And 
Governor Culpeper was urged to raise flax as well as hemp, also.33 
In maritime-minded New England, the manufacture of flax into sail• 
cloth was greatly desired. For instance, in 1734 Connecticut promised a 
bounty of twenty shillings for every bolt of "well-wrought canvas or duck, 
fit for use ... made of well-dressed, water-retted hemp or flax."* The 
colonial production of canvas, however, was never of any importance.34 
Soon after the Revolution New England was again trying to subsidize 
the domestic production of sailcloth, but with no more than the usual 
results. A Boston canvas manufactory in 1791 did not earn one per cent 
profit above the bounty received from the state. Similar factories ex-
isted about this time in Exeter, Haverhill, Salem, Yarmouth, Stratford, 
Stamford and Springfield in New England, but they all, Boston's included, 
*Hemp was occasionally used to make duck, but this was rare. Sailcloth 
was almost always made of flax (American State Papers, Naval Affairs, 
Vol. II, p. 28). This was nearly exclusively the case until, starting 
in the times of interrupted trade immediately before the War of 1812, 
cotton*duck came into use. The first cotton duck factory in the United 
States was established' by Seth Bemis of Watertown, Mass., in 1809, but 
it wasn't until the second quarter of the century that cotton supplanted 
flaxen duck in America's merchant marine (Hutchins, American Maritime 
Industries, p. 123-24). The U.S. Navy, however, still conservatively 
clung to flaxen canvas as superior, and continued buying it from Baxter 
Brothers of Dundee until 1914 (Parkinson, C.N., The Trade Winds, a Study 
of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 
george Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), p. 92). 
33Ibid., p. 6-7; Fortescue, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1681-85, 
p. 160. 
34clark, History of Manufactures in U.S., Vol. I, p. 35. 
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had failed by 1795. Not for another generation would there be a viable 
American sailcloth industry.35 
The inability of the United States to produce its own duck and 
other linen textiles stemmed chiefly from the poor quality of its flax. 
Americans processed their flax in the same way as their hemp, separating 
the useful fibers from the gumminess of the stalk by dew-retting.36 
When American flax was water-retted, again as in parts of Connecticut, 
its quality was equal to the best water-retted from abroad. Such meth-
ods, however, were the rare exception in the United States. When the 
Navy Department inquired why more American flax wasn't used in the mak-
ing of its sails, it was told that "It appears to be the universal opin-
ion of experienced men that the process of dew-retting flax diminishes 
its value and its weight, injures its color, and impairs its quality 
and strength." 3 7 
All of which left Americans importing their duck and finer linens. 
The young nation's clumsy processing of its flax served to reinforce the 
century and a half old habit of buying its linens overseas. 
America's greatest source of linen was Russia. For example, in 
1801 she imported from St. Petersburg alone 32,997 pieces of duck, 33,820 
pieces of ravensduck, 34,224 pieces of flem and 860 pieces of drill.38 
Of the other goods imported from Russia, cordage, especially the 
great cables half a foot and more in diameter, was the most important. 
35Ibid., Vol. I, p. 373, 531, 549. 
36Ibid., p. 289; American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 28. 
37American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 28. 
38Pitkin, Statistical View of U.S., p. 272. 
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In 1800, for instance, we imported 11,883 hundredweight of cordage from 
Russia, 39 an amount impressive enough to imply that America was signif-
icantly dependent on Russia for finished cordage. Another important 
product brought from Russia was tallow and tallow candles. In the dec-
ade before the War of 1812 American tallow and soap makers used 600,000 
pounds of foreign tallow a year. Between 1820 and 1830 imports of tal-
low rose to 1,100,000 pounds yearly. Tallow candles made in Russia and 
candles made in America from Russian tallow formed a noticeable part of 
our own exports. Yet another significant import from Russia was bris-
tles. The hogs of Russia were the main foreign source of raw material 
for our brush makers. In the 1820's our importation of bristles aver-
aged 100,000 pounds a year, and rose to 500,000 pounds a year in the 
1850's.40 
Other common entries in the manifests of ships returning from Russia 
were feathers to stuff the pillows of the wealthy; mats woven of the bark 
of the lime tree; eiderdown gathered by fishermen from what they called 
the Down Islands off the coasts of Greenland and Nova Zembla; animal 
skins; linseed oil; etc.41 
Young America, more than we have ever realized, was economically 
tied to Russia. In 1800 the average American blacksmith used either 
Swedish or Russian iron if called on to make anything much finer or 
stronger than horseshoes or andirons; and the American sailor. possibly 
39American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation (Washington: Gales and 
Seaton, 1832-1861), Vol. I, p. 269-482. 
40clark, History of Manufactures in u.s., Vol. I, p. 301, 327, 492. 
41 Bacon, Joseph V., Memorandum Book, 1810-11, Peabody Museum MSS, Salem, 
Massachusetts, p. 137, 140. 
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t~e most important individual in our young economy, thought twice - and 
twice again - before he took any craft without Russian rigging, cables 
and sails beyond the harbor mouth. To an appreciable extent, the Ameri-
can economy survived and prospered because it had access to the unending 
labor and rough skill of the Russian muzhik. 
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Chapter III 
Hemp, Flax and Iron: The Russian View 
Three generations or so of West European historians whose minds never 
cross the Oder have given most of us the impression that Russia was as 
hermetically sealed before Napoleon broke in as Japan before Perry. We 
picture Russia before 1812 as a dim region where peoples sat with hands 
in lap or wandered listlessly, except when tortured into violent activity 
by demons like Ivan the Terrible or Stephen Razin, who bestirred them-
selves every three or four generations in order to prevent everyone from 
vegetating completely. 
Now, it cannet be claimed that Russia under Catherine the Great was 
as full of innovation and vitality as England under George III, but it 
certainly was not somnolent. Before the industrial revolution caught ·west 
Europe and hurtled her forward at an unprecedented velocity, East Europe 
was in the vanguard in many ways. In the 1840's Russia's Uralian iron 
mines and iron works would still be unfamiliar with the steam engine, but 
in 1800 Russia was producing better iron than Britain,l 
Nor was Russia isolated from the rest of creation. She was 
inextricably knotted into the skein of world trade. By the end of the 
Eighteenth Century the total of her imports and exports was in the vicin-
ity of 100,000,000 rubles a year.2 Her exports went all over the world. 
2Ronimois, H.E., Russia's Foreign Trade and the Baltic Sea (London: 
Boreas Publishing Co., Ltd.), p. 11. 
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She exported about 60,000 tons of hemp annually.3 One third of her flax 
and linen cloth went abroad. 4 Her grain was standard fare for those who 
dwelled to her west. Her forests supplied West Europe's navies with their 
timber, masts and spars, and with pitch to calk their seams.5 Isinglass, 
beeswax, bristles, tallow, soap, linseed and hempseed and their oils, and 
even tobacco p0ured out of Russia to the world. 6 
Most of Russia's industries producing for export had been midwifed 
by Peter the Great. Some of them had already been born by his time, but 
it was he who spanked them into breathing and funnelled nourishing subsi-
dies down their throats.7 One of his most successful ventures was the ex-
ploitation of the iron deposits in the Urals. As early as 1718 he had 
boosted Russia's production of iron as high as 6,641,000 poods.8 Peter 
also introduced modern techniques of manufacture of duck and other linens 
from Holland.9 Peter was Stalin's worthy ancestor in the sanguinary art 
of teaching a backward people to industrialize. 
3oddy, European Commerce, p. 80. 
4Mavor, Economic History of Russia, Vol. I, p. 532; Warden, The Linen 
Trade, p. 319. 
5Albion, Robert G., Forests and Sea Power, the Timber Problem of the 
Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 
passim. 
6oddy, European Commerce, p. 70. 
7Lyashchenko, History of Economy of Russia, p. 296. 
8Mavor, Economic History of Russia, Vol. I, p. 533. 
90ddy, European Commerce, p. 84. 
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Probably Peter's expulsion of the Swedes from the eastern coast of 
the Baltic was his greatest contribution to bringing Russia into world 
trade. Previously ships could only reach Muscovy through semi-arctic 
Archangel, which looked out on a sea called ¥mite for the very good rea-
son that it was full of ice for not less than half the year. Now foreign 
vessels had Reval, Narva, Riga and St. Petersburg to trade with. These 
ports were icebound two months or so less a year than Archangel,lO had 
many more docks, warehouses and other facilities for traders, and also had 
the advantage of' being hundreds of miles closer to both Nest Europe 1 s and 
Russia's economic centers of gravity. By 1800 seventy per cent of Russia's 
foreign trade went on through her Baltic ports.ll 
The most important of the cities of this newly Russian coast was St. 
Petersburg. In 1703 Peter founded it and in 1721 he ordered that the fac-
tories of the foreign merchants be established there.l2 His ambitions for 
his city to be Russia's greatest port were well founded, and as St. Peters-
burg approached one hundred years of age it was handling half of all Rus-
sia's foreign trade.l3 However, St. Petersburg's growth as a seaport was 
not easily managed. At the site of St. Petersburg, where the Neva River 
flows into the Gulf of Finland, the shore is low (which made for wet eel-
lars in that city) and the water shallow. This is typical of the east 
Baltic coast, and the Neva is typical of rivers flowing into that sector 
of the Baltic - in fact, typical of any large river flowing into a shdllew 
sea. It piles up at its mouth a nice permanent sand or mud bar. In our 
loibid., p. 106. 
llRonimois, Russia's Foreign Trade, p. 11. 
12oddy, European Commerce, p. 114. 
l3Ronimois, Russia's Foreign Trade, p.ll. 
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period this bar prevented all vessels that drew more than seven or eight 
feet of water from coming up to St. Petersburg.l4 Thus, though Tsars 
might order St. Petersburg to become a great and magnificent city, which 
it did, they could never make it into a proper seaport. 
The solution to the problem was Kronstadt, which played Piraeus to St. 
Petersburg's Athens. Some twenty miles down the gulf from St. Petersburg, 
on the other side of the bar, is the island of Retusari. On this island 
was built the port of Kronstadt, and at this port moored practically all 
vessels which came to trade with St. Petersburg. Between Kronstadt and 
St. Petersburg shuttled a constant procession of shallow-drafted, cargo-
laden galliots, permitting the foreigner and the merchant of St. Petersburg 
to deal with one another, although, as in marriage by proxy, direct 
consumnation of the affair was impossible.l5 
One of the features most attractive to traders about St. Petersburg 
and the other Russian ports was bracking. Bracking was the official in-
spection and sorting into different grades of the goods for export. To be 
noted for honest and efficient bracking was a great advantage to a port. 
As each bracker inspected and graded merchandise, he guaranteed his honesty 
and judgment by affixing his name to the inspected articles: the casks of 
tallow or oil by stamping, the flax by a lead tally attached with a string, 
the hemp by a wooden tally placed inside the bale. Thus, if a bracker let 
some inferior merchandise slip by or rated some as of higher quality than 
14oddy, .European Cormnerce, p. 116; Worcester, J.E., A Geographical Diction-
ary or Universal Gazetteer (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1823), Vol. 
II, p. 310. 
15oddy, European Cormnerce, p. 116; Worcester, A Geographical Dictionary, 
p. 459. 
it truly was, he could be brought to answer. If the charges against 
him were proven, he would be liable to severe punishment.l6 
The goods that St. Petersburg and her sister ports sent to the 
west came from every part of European Russia and even from Siberia. 
Hemp growing was widespread, but this fiber was chiefly raised in the 
Ukraine and the provinces to its immediate east.l7 Flax, which was 
hemp's only peer for value and quantity as a Russian export, was also 
widely cultivated, but came mainly from north-central European Russia: 
the area around Novgorod, Carelia, Polotzk, Vologda, Viatka, Yaroslav, 
and Kostroma. Concentrated in that area was, logically, the manufactur-
ing of the flax into cloth, although - in a fashion reconunended for driv-
ing economic historians mad - it was also sprinkled elsewhere. Duck man-
ufacturing was, of course, typical of the seaports.l8 Historically, the 
weaving of linen had been done in the households of the peasants, but of 
late the merchants were setting up factories. By 1804 there were 285 of 
these. 19 The old domestic production went right on, however. Joseph V. 
Bacon, an American in Archangel just before the War of 1812, mentions 
that diaper, a kind of linen usually white and having a simple pattern, 
came "Not from the regular manufactory workmanship ••• " but "from the 
country people ••• "20 
16oddy, European Commerce, p. 195. 
l7commerce of Rhode Island, 1726-1800, Vol. II 1775-1800, (Boston: 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929), p. 338; Lyashchenko, History of 
Economy of Russia, p. 344; Oddy, Europ~an CollUilerce, p. 81-82. 
l8oddy, European Commerce, p. 80, 83-4; Tooke, View of Russian Empire, 
Vol. III, p. 279, 507-509; Warden, Linen Trade, p. 322-23, 326. 
19Lyashchenko, History of Economy of Russia, p. 298, 331-32; Mavor, Eco-
nomic History of Russia, Vol. I, p. 532; Oddy, European Commerce, p. 84. 
20Bacon, Memo Book, p. 142. 
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Iron, the other big American import from Russia in our period, came 
chiefly from the Ural Mountains, the farthest march of Europe and the 
rough forested edge of central Asia. These Urals supplied Russia with 
one of her most important articles for trade. By 1800 Russia was send-
ing out through the Baltic and White Seas about 40,000 tons of iron a 
year. 2l 
Russian iron came not in ingots, but - like Swedish - in variegated 
forms: handy small flat pieces of various conformations, different 
lengths of bar iron or several shapes. Our friend Bacon says the usual 
bar was three inches broad, half an inch thick and varied in length from 
eight to twelve feet, but also mentions some square, round and octagonal 
in cross-section, and some as long as twenty-four feet. 22 Having all 
these various sizes and shapes of iron available was a great convenience 
for the blacksmith, which you can appreciate if you imagine yourself 
given a choice between making a wagon wheel rim from a long bar half an 
inch thick or from an ingot. 
Of the other goods with which Russia supplied the west, the oak and 
the fir and the tall straight trunks that carried Europe's sails to the 
ends of the earth were originally cut on the shores of the Baltic, and, 
when the best trees there had been razed, from farther and farther west 
and south. 23 Grain and bristles came largely from the southern steppes, 
though of course wheat and hogs were raised all over Russia. 24 Cattle, 
2loddy, Eurepean Commerce, p. 73. 
22Bacon, Memo Book, p. 116-18; Dictionary of Merchandise, p. 198; Oddy, 
European Commerce, p. 299. 
23Albion, Forests and Sea Power, p. 139; Oddy, European Commerce, p. 75. 
24Lyashchenko, History of Economy of Russia, p. 344; Oddy, European 
Commerce, p. 89. 
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whose slaughter supplied Russia with hides, tallow, salted beef, glue 
and even bones for export, were especially plentiful in the Ukraine. 
From the Ukraine great cattle herds were annually driven to Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Reval and Riga. 25 Although Russia has been happily too busy 
with her Tolstoys and Dostoyevskys to spawn a Zane Gray to celebrate her 
Chisholm Trails, cowboys, cowtowns, rustlers and stampedes, she never-
theless had them all. 
Russia's main commercial problem was, as it was with contemporary 
America, one of internal transportation: cattle could walk to market, 
but how to transport goods like hemp, flax and iron, whose wei~ht and 
bulk are so great in proportion to their value, across the practically 
interstellar distances of Russia? It was done as it had been done for 
a thousand years and probably ten times that: by taking advantage of 
Russia's rivers, her lack of mountain chains, and her plentiful cheap 
labor. The Dnieper, Don, Volga, Dvina, Volkhov were the arteries of Rus-
sia and - to strain an analogy - caravans of wagons and sledges were her 
capillaries. By the utilization of these, goods were carried amazing 
distances from producer to customer. An example came to the incredulous 
notice of British merchants trading British woolens to China for tea 
when they discovered that they were in competition with fellow Britons 
shipping woolens to St. Petersburg. These woolens were being landed at 
St. Petersburg, then carried to Moscow to Tobolsk to Irkutsk to Kiakta 
and exchanged there for Chinese tea, which traveled to St. Petersburg 
by the same route.26 
25oddy, European C~mmerce, p. 89. 
26rbid., p. 136; "Report Relative to the Trade with the East Indies and 
Chrna-from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, appointed to In-
quire into the Means of Extending and Securing the Foreign Trade of the 
Country ••• , 11 Parliamentary Papers: 1821, Vol. VII, p. 86. 
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In the winter Russia was alive with lines of horse or cattle-drawn 
sledges sliding and crunching along the hard white highways nature had 
provided. These caravans distributed imports throughout the interior 
and carried @GOds to be exported either to the ports or to places on the 
rivers called pristans, where freight was gathered in the winter to be 
floated down to the ports in the spring.27 George Coggeshall, captain 
of an American vessel frozen in at Riga for the winter of 1810-11, des-
cribed these caravans as being composed of twenty or thirty one-horse 
or one-"steer" (cow? ox?) conveyances, with one man and a boy in charge 
11 of the whole caravan; the man rides and drives the leading 
horse, all the others follow in a direct line, while the boy 
brings up the rear, and so they follow another by night and 
day; the drivers clothes in sheepskins and nestled in straw 
••• The price of horned cattle and horses is extremely low, 
while the wages of the peasants and working classes are 
merely nominal; consequently, the transportation of goods 
from place to place, even at a great distance, must be very 
reasonable.n28 
Reasonable, indeed! It was less expensive, for example, to ship freight 
by t~ese sledges from Moscow to the Baltic than the equivalent distance 
by sea.29 Compare this with the cost of freighting by land in the United 
States, as described above by Daniel Webster. 
Yihen spring freed the rivers frgm ice the traffic to the sea began. 
Hemp, flax, tallow, timber cam floating down (or painfully up) the great 
rivers. The most impressive is the thousand-mile journey of iron from 
the Urals to the Baltic. From the mines and shops in the mountains it 
27commerce of Rhode Island, Vol. II, p. 348; Oddy, European Commerce, 
p. 69. 
28coggeshal1, George, Second Series of Vo a es to Various Parts of the 
World Made Between the Years 1802 and 1811 New York: D. Appleton and 
Co., 1852), p. 98. 
290ddy, European Commerce, p. 70. 
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has been dragged, slid, rolled and generally roughnecked to the banks 
of the Kama River. It is loaded on barks (we would call them barges) 
and floated down the Kama to the Volga, then up the Volga. (Tow several 
tons of iron up a river by the strength of your back, and the dreary 
chant of "The Volga Boatmen" becomes much more meaningful.) Where the 
Volga forks in its upper reaches, the iron-laden barks are towed into the 
Vishney Volotshok Canal. Once through this canal, the need for constant 
towing ceases, for the river system is all downhill to Lake Ladoga, from 
which the Neva flows to St. Petersburg and the sea. 30 
This Canal of Vishney Volotshok, similar in its importance and 
geographical position to the Erie Canal of Jacksonian America, was the 
pivot point of Russia's internal waterways. By means of this canal goods 
could pass from the Caspian to the Baltic without a single portage. 31 
Through it passed the principal part of the trade of the Empire.32 It 
was cut through the low crest from which the flat lands that are ~uro-
pean Russia fall away toward the oceans. South and East of that crest 
the vast expanse of Russia's grasslands tilt almost imperceptibly toward 
the Black and Caspian Seas, and all the rivers flow inevitably into those 
two. To the north and west the land slips down toward the Baltic and 
Arctic Seas, and all rivers, no matter how they may twist or hide them-
selves in swamps, flow toward waters where western ships await cargoes. 
Those who think that Russia was locked in sleep in the Eighteenth 
Century will, we hope, forgive a few dry statistics: in 1797 through 
30rbid., p. 67. 
31Ibid., p. 63. 
32Ibid., p. 68. 
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the Vishney Volotshok Canal passed 3,958 barks, 382 half-barks, 248 
one-masted vessels, and 1,676 floats (rafts7), laden with 8,403,014 
poods, 1,618,819 chetwerts and 12,23~ barrels. Tolls for that year 
amounted to 34,194 rubles. 33 
The ubiquitous vessel of the Vishney-Volotshok and the river systems 
which it joined was the bark. Perfectly flat bottomed and sometimes of 
great length, and usually no more in depth than four feet, it was con-
structed to carry one hundred to four hundred tons, and yet it very 
rarely drew more than thirty inches of water. The rudder was simply a 
long tree trunk used like an oar. The bark was constructed of the long-
est fir planks available and braced with timbers crudely fashioned from 
boughs and roots whose curves suited them to such use. the bark was 
created with little care and little expense - one hundred to three hun-
dred rubles - because its life was short. After the long trip to St. 
Petersburg or Riga or Archangel, it was usually broken·up and sold for 
firewood, seldom bringing mere than twenty or thirty rubles.34 
When Americans finally won the Mississippi Basin from the Spanish, 
French, British, Indians and wilderness, they found themselves with the 
same transportation problem as the Russians. Until the coming of steam-
boats and railroads, nature dictated to Midwesterners (then Farwestern-
ers) the same solution as she had to Russians. Farmers in the region of 
Pittsburgh, for instance, who wanted to send their produce out to the 
world market built themselves a kind of rough barge or raft, put aboard 
their goods and a crew of two or three adolescents and maybe one or two 
33Ibid., P• 68. 
34rbid., p. 69. 
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men who had made the trip before, pushed the whole ramshackle 
conglomeration of barge, wheat, flour, pork and gangling sons into the 
waters of the Ohio, and waved goodbye. Four to six weeks and 1,950 
miles later, if all went well, the barge reached New Orleans, where its 
contents were sold and the barge itself broken up and peddled as lumbe~35 
As a young man Abraham Lincoln made two such trips to New Orleans, one 
from Indiana and one from Illinois.36 At that time he would have felt 
much more comfortable aboard a Volga bark than on one of those new 
spark-spitting steam boats. 
Of all the great nations of Europe, Russia probably could have best 
survived if all foreign trade had been cut off. Russian society was a 
vast ocean of serfs in which a tiny number of aristocrats and bourgeoi-
sie sported like tadpoles who have wandered dangerously far from their 
natal pool. To the serf foreign trade meant little. He probably had 
never seen, much less consumed coffee, tea, or sugar. Money meant little 
to him. That which he ate and the rough garments he wore were the prod-
ucts of his own labor and that of his fellow peasants. If all the world 
outside Russia had been suddenly cut off, it would have brought no over-
whelming change to his life. He would have had to give up hemp and flax 
as major crops because the market for them would have disappeared, and 
this dislocation might have brought, let us say, three rather than two 
famines in his lifetime, but nothing to which he wasn't already inured. 
Like most things that live in and of the soil - like rabbits and grass 
and bears - he had a high survival quotient. 
35Taylor, George Rogers, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New 
York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1951), p. 56-57. 
36charnwood, Lord, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1956), 
p. 5. 
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On the other hand, foreign trade made a world of difference to the 
nobility, who, after all, did run Russia. It probably made an even 
greater difference to the bourgeoisie, but they - a few merchants in a 
society still medieval - had influence only insofar as they could catch 
a noble's ear. To the Russian noble trade with the west was essential 
because it was the only means he knew to maintain the kind of life he 
had come to consider as normal. The Russian noble wore English woolens, 
drank coffee from South America sweetened with sugar from Jamaica, dyed 
his kerchiefs with indigo from South Carolina, savored his meals with 
spices from Batavia and wines from France, and read Voltaire and Rous-
seau in the original. All these things came to him by foreign trade, 
and for these things he had to exchange his hemp, flax, iron, timber, 
etc., or hard cash brought to his coffers by trading in such goods. A 
cultured and comfortable nobility existed in Russia because the muzhik 
raised enough hemp and flax and cattle, cut down enough trees and 
scraped enough iron from the thews of the Urals to pay for its keep. 
The balance of trade was enormously in favor of Russia. Between 
1793 and 1903 the balance in favor of Russia averaged about 400,000 
pounds a year.37 The chief source of this favorable balance was Rus-
sia's chief customer, Great Britain.* Great Britain, whose need for 
*In 1792 st. Petersburg exported 701,450 poods of tallow, of which 
Britain took 527,480. In 1784 Russia exported 50,000 tons of iron 
through the White and Baltic Seas, of which Britain took 40,000. In 
the years around 1800, Russia usually exported about 60,000 tons of 
hemp a year, of which Britain took from 35,000 to 40,000 tons. In 
1803 Russia exported about 15,000 tons of flax, of which nearly 10,000 
~ent to Britain. (Oddy, European Commerce, p. 73, 80, 90, 120.) 
37warden, The Linen Trade, p. 321. 
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naval stores was insatiable, usually took from one half to two thirds of 
the whole export of St. Petersburg and this was probably true of the oth-
er Russian Baltic and White Sea ports, also.38 More often than not, 
Britain did not come to trade but simply to buy. In 1802, for instance, 
of the 971 British ships that cleared Russian ports that year, only thir-
ty-nine left unladen.39 And Britain, standing her usual mercantilist 
policy on its head, made up in hard cash the vast difference in value be-
tween what she brought and what she took away. It was this specie from 
Britain, to a very great extent, that kept the Russian noble in compar-
ative luxury. 
Britain's crucial need for naval stores ~nd Russia's sybaritic need 
for gold would always bring them together despite all political differ-
ences, like lust drawing together two sensualists despite disparate back-
grounds and mutual dislike. 
380ddy, European Commerce, p. 120. 
39Ibid., P• 201. 
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Chapter IV 
A New Flag for the Old Trade 
As the spring of 1783 unshackled Russia's rivers and eased the 
salt ice collars off the pilings of the wharfs at Kronstadt and Riga, 
the war in America was drawing to a close. Yankee ships could now sail 
the Atlantic without fear of the omnipotent and omnivorous British navy. 
Francis Dana, at this time still in St. Petersburg, confidently awaited 
the first arrival from the United States.l 
During the later years of our Revolution a few American vessels, 
hagridden by the fear that every sail on the horizon might be a Brit-
ish frigate, slipped across the Atlantic to Sweden (and possibly Den-
mark), took on board hemp, iron and linens, and returned home by the 
same scary route. The Scandinavians were, of course, happy to replace 
the British as middlemen between America and Russia. Dana, writing in 
1781, mentioned that the Swedes were making considerable profits by 
selling us Russian products.2 Surprisingly, no American captain thought 
it worth his while to venture to Russia itself. 
On the twelfth of June in 1783 a ship of 500 tons sailed into the 
harbor of Riga and dropped anchor. As the tide pivoted her around her 
mooring, the Russians on the waterfront could see clearly the banner 
that she flew - a strange device of stars and horizontal red and white 
stripes. 
!Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. VI, p. 249. 
2cresson, Dana, p. 244; Hedges, James B., The Browns of Providence Plan-
tations, COlOnial Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 
p. 218. 
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She was a Boston ship come up from Lisbon with a cargo of salt, 
rice, sugar, chests of fruit and a few hogsheads of brandy. Hers had 
been a triangular voyage and, exoep,ting the salt and brandy, she came 
loaded with tropical goods. Her captain, Daniel McNeil, only lately 
shifted from privateering to trading, grasped the principles of the em-
bryonic Russian trade as well as did Francis Dana. 
The name of McNeil's ship is now unknown. Where she went after 
Riga is also a mystery. She loaded with hemp and sailed off, but The 
Boston Gazette contains no mention of her ever arriving home, and the 
Danish Sound records, though they mention her passage to Russia, do not 
record that she ever returned.3 Did she never return to Boston but 
spend the rest of her life in other ports and in foreign seas? Did some 
Danish scribe, heavy-lidded with the boredom of his job, accidentally 
omit her name from the lists of those who passed west through the 
Sound? Or did a sudden gale drive her onto some rock in the Baltic, 
and did she slide to the bottom, her sailors cursing the seabirds that 
lifted from her pitching spars into the safety of the wind? 
If the latter melodrama did take place, the ship did nothing so 
romantic as to sink with all hands. Daniel McNeil survived long after 
1783, commanding u.s. naval vessels in the quasi-war with France of the 
late 1790's and in the Tripolian War that followed shortly after. His 
latter decades he spent on shore and when he died in 1833 he was more 
noted for shrewd real estate investments than for marine derring-do. 
3united States National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, 
89. Letters of J. Jay, F.W. Dana, Vol. II, Francis Dana to Robert Liv-
ingston, St. Petersburg, 13 June 1783, O.S.; Rigsarkivet, Rigsdagsgar-
den, Copenhagen, Denmark, Sundtoldreg 1783, 1. bd. 2, p. 357r. 
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At his funeral, no one, apparently, rose to eulogize him as the seaman 
who, fifty years before, had first unfurled the flag of the United 
States in a Russian port.4 
McNeil commanded the first United States vessel to go to Russia, 
but was by no means the first United States citizen to arrive in Russia 
looking for a chance to turn a dollar. Mr. Jeremiah Allen, a merchant 
of Boston, arrived in 1783 when the ground was still soggy with melt-
ing snow. He disembarked at Riga in May and came up to St. Petersburg 
in the middle of June,5 full of initiative, ambition and Yankee acquis-
itiveness. He apparently had the proper letters of credit and appears 
to have favorably impressed the proper people, because when the ship 
Kingston, under Captain Norwood,6 cleared Kronstadt in that year, she 
was loaded with goods under his name. The Kingston reached Boston on 
the twentieth of December, 1783, (possibly with both Allen and Francis 
Dana aboard*) and unloaded a cargo of linens, cables and cordage, hemp 
and iron. 7 
*Boston Gazette 15 Dec. 1783, says Dana and Allen returned on ship Em-
press of Russia. Cresson's biography of Dana says Dana returned on--
Kingston. (Cresson, Dana, p. 318). Boston Gazette, 27 Jan. 1784, says, 
"Jeremiah Allen has brought with him in the ship Kingston. • • ", which 
would seem to indicate that he came on Kingston. 
4uDaniel McNeil, 11 Dictionary of American Biography, ed. Malone, Dumas, 
Vol. XII (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), p. 149-50. 
5Massachusetts Historical Society, Dana Papers, F~ancis Dana to Robert 
Livingston, St. Petersburg, 19 May 1783 0. S.; Papers of Con. Cong. , 89, 
Vol. II, Dana to Livingston, St. Petersburg, 13 June 1783 O.S. 
6nespite the English or American ring to the names "Kingston" and "Nor-
wood," her port of registry was St. Petersburg. She was probably an 
English ship operating under a Russian flag. Rigsarkivet, Rigsdagsgar-
den, Copenhagen, Denmark, Sundtolreg, 2. Vol. 2, p. 28v, no. 292. 
7Boston Gazette, 22 Dec. 1783, 27 Jan. 1784. 
Jeremiah Allen bought space in The Boston Gazette of the following 
twenty-seventh of January to advertise the goods he had brou6ht back 
from Russia. (Those interested were invited to come to a location with 
the simple address "the stone house above the chapel." Ah, how sweetly 
uncomplicated was Boston then!) At the end of the ad Allen mentioned, 
with a touch of wholesome pride, that he had friends in St. Petersburg. 
He offered "every possible information ••• if any gentleman inclines 
to send a ship that way ••• '' More than one gentleman would so incline. 
The year 1783 had been one of small beginnings. Only two vessels 
sailed from St. Petersburg for America, 8 and if any other American ves-
sels than McNeil's arrived in Russia, the information is well hidden 
from the historian's spade. In 1784 a few more decided to chance the 
unfamiliar markets and waters of the Baltic. In June, three American 
vessels passed through the Danish Sound on their way to Russia, one 
from Boston by way of Amsterdam, one from Philadelphia via Cadiz, and 
one direct from Salem. Their cargoes were typical of those America 
would be sending to Russia for the next three-quarters of a century: 
sugar, indigo, rice, dyewood and, less significantly, a few pipes of 
wine and hogsheads of rum. 9 
Far behind these three vessels came the American bark Light Horse, 
not passing Elsinore on the Danish Sound until the seventeenth of 
July. 10 Salem, Massachusetts, was her home port and Nehemiah Buffing-
ton her captain. She was the property of Elias Hasket Derby, who 
8Pitkin, A Statistical View, p. 271. 
9Rigsarkivet, Rigsdagsgarden, Copenhagen, Denmark, Sundtolreg, 1704, 
nr. 2, 1. bind, p. 248r, 366v. 
lOEssex Institute, Salem, Mass., Derby Mss., Vol. XIII, Letters 1769-
1788, N. Fenwick to E.H. Derby, Elsinore, 19 July 1784. 
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before his death was to become Salem's and one of America's richest 
citizens. It isn't known whether Derby discussed plans for this voyage 
with Jeremiah Allen or not. It is certainly likely that they knew each 
other. In any case, in mid-June Derby dispatched the Light Horse, 
loaded with sugar, out of Salem harbor for St. Petersburg. With cargo 
she was worth eight thousand pounds - a pretty hostage to give to the 
wind and seas and the wiles of St. Petersburg's merchants. 11 She sur-
vived the wind and waves with ease, but the intricacies and fluctuations 
of the market in Russia were too much for her. The Light Horse returned 
home with a profitable cargo of hemp, duck and iron, but the market for 
sugar in Russia had been limited and she had been obliged to sell her 
cargo at a loss. Salem marked this voyage as a partially successful and 
provocative experiment, and probably never noticed that it was the first 
direct and unbroken voyage by a United States vessel to and from Russiat2 
(Or at leas"t the first we know about.) 
Commerce between the United States and Russia had completed its 
humble and uncertain debut. No more were foreigners to monopolize that 
trade, although they would, of course, continue to take part in it. In 
the 1780's, when America was weak and not yet free economically from Eng-
land's apron strings, England played quite an important part in this 
trade.l3 Scandinavia would continue in its role as the logical halfway 
11Hunt, Freeman, Lives of American Merchants (New York: Office of 
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 1856), Vol. II, p. 52. 
l2Phillips, Ja.mes D., "Salem Opens American Trade with Russia," New Eng-
land Quarterly, Vol. XIV (December, 1941), p. 686. 
13Johnson, Emory R. et al., History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 
1915), Vol. I, p. 126. 
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~ouse for Russo-American trade. Swedish and Danish vessels with 
Russian goods aboard would be common arrivals in our ports. For the 
rest of the Eighteenth Century most American vessels would find it more 
convenient to stop in Gothenburg and Copenhagen and trade for Russian 
goods there. 14 The market for the products we were peddling was surer 
in Scandinavia than in Russia, and Russian goods were nearly as plenti-
ful there as in the country of their origin. 
But Russo-American trade had irrevocably begun. Merchants -
Muscovite and Yankee - had met, eyed each other's jib and politely 
sounded the depth of each other's purse. And they had agreed to do busi-
ness. Wars, depressions, revolutions and great mountainous upheavals of 
ideology have thrust between them since, but they have yet to renounce 
that first mercenary handshake. 
l 4Phillips, New England Quarterly, Vol. XIV (December, 1941), p. 688. 
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Chapter V 
Making and Learning the Rules 
The 1780's were not a golden age for American merchants. Great 
Britain, delighted at the prospect of devouring her young, subjected 
the thirteen United States to the grinding commercial competition 
they had hitherto avoided by being part of her empire. So outclassed 
was America in such a contest that John Adams wrote from burope in 
1785, "The Britons boast, that all the prophecies of the loss of the 
American trade from the independence of the United States, h~ve proved 
false ••• : that Britain has monopolized our trade beyond 
credibility.nl 
Adams had been listening to the likes of Lord Sheffield, who 
advised Britain that she co~_;ld completely absorb America's trade with 
the Baltic if she wanted. America, he said, produced nothing to sell 
to the countries of the Baltic, and therefore -by allowing drawbacks 
on tariffs on goods from that area which were to be re-exported - Brit-
ain could give Americans a better deal on Baltic iron, hemp and linens 
than could the original producers.2 
The greedy lord was correct in guessing that Britain was still 
the natural emporium for American trade with the Baltic and Russia. A 
large proportion of Russian goods coming into the United States in the 
1The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from 
the Signing of the Definitive Treat of Peace, lOth September 1783, to 
the Adoption of the Constitution, March 4, 1789 City of Washington: 
Francis Prestion Blair, 1833-34), Vol. 2, p. 175. 
2Johnson, Emory R. et al., History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 
1915), Vol. 1, p. 126. 
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eighties came through Britain or c~ne in British bottoms. But a narrow 
file of American vessels continued to keep direct Russo-American trade 
alive, broaching tides of competition every bit as challenging as those 
of the North Atlantic. These American ships never plied Russian waters 
in great numbers in the eighties, but as the decade passed their number 
increased rather than decreased.3 
The men who manned these ships performed the essential but not 
necessarily profitable task of pioneering the trade, of discovering 
which mercantile houses were the most trustworthy, which goods were the 
easiest to peddle. These pioneers performed this task so well that by 
1790 the general outlines of the trade were already firmly sketched. 
For the next half century Americans in the trade with Russia wo'Jld fol-
low the patterns and techniques discovered by the McNeils and 
Buffingtons. 
The first task of these pathfinders had been to discover products 
that would appeal to Russian tastes. John Paul Jones, now in the ser-
vice of Catherine the Great, wrote from her man-o-war Wolodimer to the 
Marquis de La Fayette in 1788 that the United States could increase its 
trade with Russia by offering whale oil, dried fish, spermaceti and 
rice. 4 Luckily, American merchants relied on their own calculations 
rather than on the wisdom exchanged between such fierce and unbusiness-
like warriors. Of Jones' list, only rice had a good market in Russia. 
A solution to the problem of catering to the tastes of Russians 
had already been reached on paper by Francis Dana. Ship them tropical 
3Pitkin, View of Commerce of u.s., p. 271. 
4Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S., 1783-89, Vol. VII, p. 383. 
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goods, he said. The experiments of the 1780's confirmed Dana's 
theorizing. In 1787 Anto. Fr. Thiringk, a St. Petersburg merchant whose 
knowledge of trade exceeded his knowledge of English, wrote to an oppo-
site number in Rhode Island, "The most properest articles ••• suitable 
at this market, are St. Domingo sugars of a bright and white grain that's 
substantial, also small blue beand coffee and best St. Domingo indigo, 
which sells readily here. . . . Rice is also made use of here. u5 
Of these goods, rice and indigo alone were grown in the United 
States. Cotton was the only other domestic product that Americans 
would sell Russians in significant amounts before the War of 1812, and 
that product hardly figured at all in the trade before 1809.6 The oth-
ers on Thiringk's list, plus dyewoods, another item popular in the 
trade, were native to the tropics and semi-tropics. The great bulk of 
our shipments to Russia, therefore, were of foreign origin. In 1805, 
for example, we sent Russia only $12,044 worth of domestic products as 
compared with $59,328 of articles of foreign origin. 7 
The chief source of these products was the West Indies (Thiringk's 
"St. Domingo"), the pivot point of so much of our overseas trade. To 
be sure, many of the articles exported by the United States to Russia 
came from elsewhere - pepper from the East Indies, tea and nankeens from 
China, gums and drugs from Arabia, spices and dyestuffs from India8 -
5commerce of R.I., Vol. II, p. 335. 
6Pitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., p. 233. 
7Ibid., p. 233. 
Bcoggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 80; Phillips, "Salem Opens 
'rrade with Russia," New England Quarterly, XIV, p. 689; Porter, The 
Jacksons and the Lees, Vol. I, p. 38; Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass:; 
Account book of the ship John, 1811-12, kept by Francis Boardman. 
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but the great bulk of the staples of the trade came from the islands 
that shield the Caribbean from the Atlantic. 
Beyond stating the crucial importance of West Indian products, it 
is difficult to generalize about Russo-American commerce. Average and 
typical are dangerous words to apply to any part of that labyrinthine 
intercourse. For instance, any given American vessels that cleared 
for Russia on a triangular voyage usually stopped to pick up a cargo 
in the West Indies, but the snow Vigilant went to Russia via the Isle 
of France in the Indian Ocean on a voyage in the mid-l790's. 9 Any 
given vessel returning from Russia might possibly put into a North Euro-
pean port for a few days, but otherwise would sail directly home. In a 
voyage in 1811-12, the ship John returned to Salem from Archangel via 
Lisbon, Pernambuco and Bahia.lO 
Typically defiant of classification is the cargo of the brig 
Hopewell that cleared Salem for Russia in 1798. The vessel carried 
coffee from Santo Domingo, Dutch Guiana, the Isle of France and Java, 
and sugar from Calcutta. Two barks, five brigs, two schooners and one 
ketch had sailed to those far reaches of the world and back in order to 
make up the cargo of the Ropewe11. 11 (In order that the Tsar of all 
the Russias might relieve the daily round of protocol with a gooci, hot, 
sweet cup of coffee.) 
At least as numerous as the sources of our exports to Russia were 
the destinations of those goods we brought back from Russia and exported 
9Essex Institute, Salem, Mass., Log of the snow Vigilant, 1798-94. 
lOpeabody Museum, Se~,lem, il/1ass., Log of the ship John, 1811-12. 
llcustom House, Salem, Mass., Debenture Book, 1798-1800. 
49 
as our own property. Russian iron, linens, cordage, tallow, candles -
essential items in any clime - were standard entries in bills of lading 
of American vessels bound for every and any quarter of the world.12 
A small portion of our Russian re-exports went back across the At-
lantic to such Southern European ports as Lisbon and Bilbao. ~~'lost went 
to the world outside Europe. Madeira Island was glad to exchange her 
wine for Russian cloth. The Cape of Good Hope was almost always a good 
market for iron, duck, ravensduck and cordage. The same was true of the 
Isle of France and Bourbon, eight hundred leagues or so beyond the Cape 
on the way to the Far East. Madras and Calcutta took lots of iron and an 
assortment of other Russian products. America sent tons and tons of Swed-
ish and Russian iron to China. Batavia, the great port of Java, was such 
a good market for iron, and, to a lesser extent, cordage and duck, that 
America's East India merchants characteristically carried on trade with 
Russia as well, so as to reduce payments to the middlemen.l3 
l2American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 694-95, 737, 
868, 891, 964. 
l3sources for: 
Lisbon and Bilbao -Salem Custom House, Debenture Book. 
Madeira - Ibid. 
Cape of Good Hope- Ibid.; Peabody ~mseum, John Bryant Notebook, 
1806; Gray, Edward:-«flliam Gray of Salem, Merchant (Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p. 13. 
Isle of France and Bourbon - Salem Custom House, Debenture Book; 
Peabody Museum, Clifford Crowninshield Invoice Book, 1791-96; 
Reinoehl, John H., (ed.), "Some Remarks on the American Trade: 
Jacob Crowninshield to J8IIles Madison, 1806, H -~¥illiam and Mary 
Quarterly, XVI (Jan., 1959), p. 107. 
India -Salem Custom House, Debenture Book; Porter, 
Jacksons and Lees, p. 671, 681; Reinhoel (ed.), "Remarks on Amer-
ican Trade," William and Mary Quarterly, XVI, p. 110. 
China - Salem Custom House, Debenture Book; Weeden, 
William, "Early Oriental Commerce in Providence," Proceedings of 
the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1907-08, 3d Series, Vol. I 
(Vol. 41), p. 824-25; American State Papers, Commerce and Navi-
gation, Vol. II, p. 99. 
East Indies -Ibid.; Os~ood, Chas. S. and Batchelder, H. M., 
Historical Sketch or-s-alem (.Salem, Essex Institute, 1879), 187-
88; Reinhoel, filliam and Mary Quarterly, XVI, p. 103. 
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The Yvest Indies, as always of crucial importance in any kind of 
American overseas commerce, took great quantities of our Russian goods: 
iron, cordage, candles, tallow and all types of linens from sailcloth 
to bed ticks. The cargo of the ship Fanny, Captain Viellman, that cleared 
Salem for Havanna in December, 1797, is as typical as any. The Fanny 
had in her hold nine cables, 113 coils of cordage, twenty bales of mer-
chandise (linens?), 150 bars of iron, two featherbeds, ten casks of oil 
(probably linseed or hemp oil), one box of hair powder, and ten packs 
of sheeting - all products of Russian manufacture. The Fanny herself' 
had brought all but the sheeting from Russia.14 
The same vessel that had brought from Russia that extra sheeting, 
brought another ten bales of the same which were shipped to Boston to 
fill out the cargo of the ship Eliza, Captain Rowan. This vessel sailed 
from Boston in 1798 to trade with the Indians on the Northwest coast of 
America, the area now comprising Oregon, Washington and British Colum-
bia.l5 The arrival of the Eliza off that coast thus gave the Nootka 
Indian the choice of trading his sea otter skins for Russian cloth 
brought around the Horn by Captain Rowan - or for Russian sheeting 
brought across the marches of Siberia, over the Bering Straits into 
Alaska and down the coast by Russian traders who were extending Russi~'s 
empire into America in those years. 
Meanwhile, at St. Petersburg, the other geographical and social 
extreme of the Russian Empire (where the Tsar's coffee has been growing 
14American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. II, p. 99; Por-
ter, Jacksons and Lees, Vol. II, p. 873; Salem Custom House, Debenture 
Book. 
15Ibid. 
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cold), Americans were still improvising solutions to the chronic 
problent of our trade with Russia: what had we to offer in exchange for 
Russia's products? Very, very few Russians had even one hundredth of 
the income of the Tsar or his taste for coffee and sugar or any of the 
other goods Americans could bring. Thomas ivard, a Yankee trading at 
Kronstadt in 1802, judged that the inhabitants of that city lived 
"chiefly on black bread and salt, except officers and merchants.ul6 A 
decade later John Quincy Adams wrote from Russia that the consumption 
of "colonial (i.e. tropical) merchandise in this country is very small, 
and scarcely sufficient to afford a market for fifty vessels a year."l7 
Elias Basket Derby's seminal experiment of sending the Light Horse 
out to Russia in 1784 freighted with sugar had established the truth of 
Adams' statement thirty years before the statement was made. The Rus-
sian market for sugar had been too dull for Derby to turn a profit on 
the cargo. If he and his fellows were to make extensive purchases in 
Kronstadt and Riga, most of them would have to find something more suited 
to the Russian market than colonial goods. Otherwise, Russo-American 
trade would be simply an exercise in communal bankruptcy. 
There were innumerable ways which Americans improvised to skin this 
particular cat. For instance, Martin Page, master and supercargo of the 
ship Arthur, cleared Providence for St. Petersburg on 8 June 1804 with a 
cargo of beef and flour. Twenty-six days later he anchored in Lisbon 
and exchanged his foodstuffs for Spanish dollars, and then sailed to 
l6Peabody Museum, Thomas W. Ward 1 s Journal of voyage of Pallas to 
Kronstadt, 1801-02. 
17Ford, (ed.), Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, p. 323. 
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St. Petersburg. 18 Specie was never a glut on even Russia's finicky 
market. 
A more typical solution - in fact, the standard solution to the 
problem- was yet another variety of the Yankee's favorite mercantile 
technique, triangular trade. The Yankee made Russia the far apex of a 
triangle (or a. square, or a pentagon, or a. ••• ) which had as an inter-
mediate point some North European port. In the ten years preceding 
1807 about one hundred American vessels a year passed through the Dan-
ish Sound and into the Baltic. Of these about fifty per cent had first 
discharged their cargoes at ports on the North Sea.l9 
For any given American vessel bound for Russia the intermediate 
port might be French or Dutch, or perhaps London, Bristol or Falmouth. 
Hamburg was more likely. Sweden's Gothenburg or Denmark's Copenhagen 
were more likely still. Unlike Kronstadt and Riga, all these ports had 
hinterlands populated by folk many of whom had the income and taste for 
products of the New World. At these North European ports the Americans 
would trade their cargoes for letters of credit of mercantile houses 
known and respected by the merchants of Russia. Typical of sailing or-
ders written by American merchants to their captains bound for Russia 
was that of Christopher Champlin of Newport to Captain Bailey in 1792: 
"You being the master of my brig Bayonne, are to observe 
the following instructions. Proceed with all dispatch to 
Copenhagen, when you arrive, deliver your cargo into the 
hands of Messrs. Ryberg and Company merchants there, to 
whom you are consigned. Balast your vessel with dispatch, 
and proceed to St. Petersburg, taking with you 1'1essrs. 
18weeden, ''Early Oriental Commerce in Providence," M.H.S., Vol. 41, 
p. 274. 
19united States National Archives, Diplomatic Despatches -Denmark, 
Vol. I, Erving to Secretary of State, Copenhagen, 12 Feb. 1812. 
Ryberg and Company letter of credit upon the Rouse of 
Messrs. Edward James Smith and Company to furnish you 
on my account with Russian goods. • "20 
Often Americans, come as far as the edge of the Baltic seeking 
Russian goods, went no further. Gothenburg and Copenhagen were good 
markets for our sugar, coffee, rice and tobacco. Sweden could offer 
hemp, sailcloth and linens of her own growth and manufacture as vvell 
as quantities of these goods imported from Russia. More important, 
she could offer Swedish iron, which was at least equal in quality to 
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Russia's, and reputed by many to be superior.* Copenhagen, one of the 
great entrepots of the world, could supply American buyers with iron, 
hemp, duck, ravensduck, cordage, flems, tallow, etc., almost as readily 
as could Kronstadt or Riga. Some of the linen was of Danish manufac-
ture. All else was imported from Sweden, Prussia, Russia and elsewhere 
in central and eastern Europe.2 1 
*The women of Sweden were, by themselves, enough to attract Americans 
to that port. In 1811, at the age of forty-four, John Quincy Adams re-
membered his trip through Sweden on the way back from Russia in 1782, 
and mused uncharacteristically, " ••• To me it was truely the 'land of 
beautiful dames' and to this hour I have never forgotten the palpita-
tions of heart which some of them cost me and of which they never knew." 
(Microfilms of the Adams Papers owned by the Adams Manuscript Trust and 
deposited in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Part II, 135, John 
Quincy Adams, Letterbook, To Alexander Everett, St. Petersburg, 19 Aug. 
1811, p. 405.) 
20commerce of R.I., Vol. II, p. 453. 
21American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 469-82, 
675-86, etc.; Jennings, i'V.VV., The American Embargo, 1807-09 (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa, 1921), p. 17-18; Niles, H., (ed.), Weekly Register, 
Vol. I (26 Oct. 1811), p. 130; Oddy, European Commerce, p. 310; 115-16; 
Pitkin, Commerce of U.S., p. 237; Rees, Abraham, (ed.), The Cyclopedia; 
or, Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Literature (Philadel-
phia: Samuel F. Bradford and Murray, Fairman and Co., First American 
Edition), Vol. XII, "Denmark, 11 Vol. XXXVI, "Sweden." (no pagination); 
United States National Archives, Consular Letters - Gothenburg, Vol. I, 
Gardiner to Secretary of State, Gothenburg, ll September 1803. 
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Those American vessels that persevered and sailed on to buy 
Russian goods at their source rather than haggle with Scandinavian mid-
dlemen were quite courteously received - and no wonder. Britain was 
Russia's best customer, but by the first decade of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury few other nations could top the United States' claim to be Russia's 
second best customer. For instance, in 1803 United States vessels took 
from St. Petersburg 315,452 poods of clean hemp, little enough compared 
with the 1,313,912 poods with which British vessels sailed off. How-
ever, all the purchases of clean hemp of all the other nations that 
traded with St. Petersburg that year only amounted to 239,268 poods~ A 
similar, or even more spectacular, situation existed in the distribu-
tion of some of St. Petersburg's other important exports: 
1803 
Exported in 
British ships 
Exported in 
U.S. ships 
Exported in 
ships of all 
other nations 
Iron, 
poods 
1,665,496 
413,822 
117,216 
Ravensduck, 
pieces 
85,943 
10,651 
11,048 
Sailcloth, Broad Diaper, 
pieces Arsheens 
160 75,976 
32,653 239,365 
27,228 7,087 
The United States took none at all of certain of Russia's leading ex-
ports - in 1803 British ships took 1,982,454 deals of lumber from St. 
Petersburg and American vessels took not one stick - but there can be 
no doubt that the arrival of ships from the United States had become 
by 1803 a very important detail in Russia's economy.22 
22united States National Archives, Consular Despatches -St. Petersburg, 
Vol. I, 111i:xtract from Account of Exports from St. Petersburg in 1803," 
inclosed with letter from Harris to Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 
5/17 November 1803; similar figures for 1804 can be found in Oddy, 
European Commerce, p. 127. 
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American buyers were desired in Russia not alone because of the 
size of their purchases but also because of the fashion in which they 
paid for them. As we have already seen, Americans habitually did their 
selling somewhere else and came to Russia only to buy. In 1804 sixty-
six American vessels arrived at St. Petersburg, of which only eighteen 
were fully loaded, nine were not quite fully loaded, and thirty-nine 
were but partially loaded or completely in ballast.23 The United States 
was just the sort of trading partner most dear to the heart of the Rus-
sian mercantilist, who - like all mercantilists - lusted after a favor-
able balance of trade. In 1795, to pick an average year, America sent 
$69,221 worth of goods to Russia ••• and received in exchange $1,168,715 
wortht24 
Carrying on a commerce that far from being simple barter called for 
rather complicated financial transactions. The fact that several dif-
ferent nationalities using several different and fluctuating currencies 
participated in this commerce snarled the tangled skein of its transac-
tions. just that much more. American merchants, strictly small fry in 
the field of international finance, conducted their business with Russia 
through the medium of the great banking and mercantile institutions of· 
Europe. The houses of John Parish and Company of Hamburg and Messrs. 
Ryb~rg and Company of Copenhagen played important roles as brokers of 
Russo-American trade. Of ever-increasing importance in that trade were 
such powerful British institutions as the House of Baring.25 London was 
23Qddy, European Commerce, p. 133. 
24Pitkin, Commerce of U.S., p. 232-33. 
25Forbes, J.D., Israel Thorndike, Federalist Financier (New York: Ex-
position Press, 1953), p. 39; Hidy, Ralph W., The House of Baring in 
American Trade and F'inance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 
21-22. 
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building herself into the international banking capitol of the world 
in those years. 
The anglophilic tendencies of our trade with Russia were 
reinforced by the presence of Englishmen in influential positions in 
the ports of Russia herself. Russians, having neither capital nor mer-
cantile experience, depended to a great extent on foreigners to conduct 
their overseas trade for them.26 As England was the greatest maritime 
trader of the world and Russia's best customer, most of these foreign-
ers were Englishmen,27 which explains why Americans come to Kronstadt 
to buy Russian goods found themselves dealing with mercantile houses 
with such un-Slavic names as Blandow and Company, Edward James Smith and 
Company, Cramp and Company, and Gale, Hill, Cazalet and Company.28 
Examples of British prominence in the trade of the Baltic can be 
found in every year and in every port. Elias Hasket Derby was told by 
agents in St. Petersburg in 1784 that drafts on London were the most ac-
ceptable medium of purchase there.29 In 1813, when Britain and all of 
Europe and the United States were at war, John March, an American in 
Gothenburg trying to send home remittances for American property sold in 
that port, made use of a London house to do so because, "I know of no 
other means by which remittances can be made ••• but by bills on London. 
26worcester, Geographical Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 310. 
27consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, Harris to Secretary of 
State, St. Petersburg, 18/30 Aug. 1805. 
28commerce of R.I., Vol. II, p. 453; Forbes, Thorndike, p. 39; Essex 
Institute, Derby Papers, Vol. XIII, letters 1769-1788, Cramp and Co. to 
Derby, St. Petersburg, 24 July 1786, Gale, Hill, Cazalet and Co. to 
Derby, St. Petersburg, 17 July 1786. 
29Phillips, "Salem Opens Trade with Russia," New England Quarterly, Vol. 
XIV, p. 686. 
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.n30 Like many Europeans, Americans must have sometimes felt that 
Britain was making up for her losses in the American Revolution by lay-
ing the commerce and coastlines of the world under tribute. 
Still and all, there was enough profit left after the English had 
pared off fees for services and rental of capital to keep United States 
vessels coming to Russia. There must have been, because the men who 
owned those vessels and manned them were among the shrewdest traders in 
American history. Most of them were Yankees, a race still known for its 
cognizance of the worth of a dollar. Of the thirty American vessels 
that cleared St. Petersburg in 1793, twenty-one had New England ports 
for destinations: ten for Boston, five for Salem, three for Providence, 
two for Newburyport, and one for Gloucester. The remaining nine com-
prised seven for Philadelphia and two for New York.31 In 1810 there 
were sixty American vessels in the port of Archangel. Fifteen of these 
were from New York - more than from any other single port - but a full 
half of the aixty came from the hundred miles of coast between Boston 
and Portland.32 
Massachusetts led all the states involved in the trade with Russia. 
She did so not because of the predominance of one port, such as Boston, 
but because the broken coastline of Massachusetts and Maine (part of Mas-
sachusetts until 1820)contained many inlets, which, in that day of small 
and shallow-drafted vessels, sent ships all over the world, including 
Russia. Plymouth and Marblehead considered themselves blue water ports. 
30Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass., Letterbook of John 
March, Gothenburg, 1811-13, March to Wm. Bartlet, Gothenburg, 15 March 
1813. 
31Essex Institute, "Exported by the American Ships in 1793," a printed 
sheet signed in handwriting, "From Messrs. John Matthew Bulkeley and 
Company of St. Petersburg." 
32Albion, Robert G., and Pope, Jennie B., Sea Lanes in Wartime, The A-
merican Experience, 1775-1942 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1942), p. 
107-8. 
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Salem was one of the great ports of North America. Even Kennebunk, 
which today seems a proper size for lobsterboats and nothing larger, 
sent a vessel to Archangel in 1811 - the brig Eliza, commanded by 
Captain Lathrop.33 
Practically none of the men involved in this commerce with Russia 
came from outside our Northeastern states. In 1811 John Quincy Adams, 
who had been in St. Petersburg for two years, wrote home about the "con-
tinual succession" of men he had met off the American vessels then ar-
riving in great numbers. "Some of them, 11 he said, 11 are naturalized 
Americans, but the greatest number are natives of the northern and east-
ern states as far as Virginia, inclusive. Of the states south and west 
of that, I think I have not seen a native since I have been in Russia.11 34 
For the first century of United States history, the merchants of St. 
Petersburg probably had a conception of American customs and geography 
very similar to that of any normal Bostonian. 
Perhaps a fitting coda to this chapter is to follow, knot by knot, 
an average voyage from the United States to Russia. This account will 
be laced with quotations from logs and diaries of American voyages to 
Russia and the Baltic. 
Our home port is Salem. It could be any of the ports on the North-
east coast, but - as Salem is at her peak in the decadss between the Rev-
olution and the War of 1812 - let us ship aboard one of her vessels. Our 
vessel is a brig. A ship, bark, schooner or even a ketch would do, but 
33peabody Museum, Bacon's Memo Book, p. 35. 
34Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, p. 137-38. 
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brigs seem most popular in the Baltic trade. 35 This means that our 
home for the next half year displaces something like, oh, 150 tons -
quite big enough for a voyage across the Atlantic. Our crew is eight 
or ten in number - quite numerous enough to handle such a craft.36 
If we were going to Russia directly, fear of storms and ice in the 
North Atlantic and Baltic would keep us in port until March at the ear-
liest. Log of Ship Rubicon, 31 March 1816 - At one A.M. while handling 
M.T.G. sail the ship struck an island of ice about the size of the long 
boat and stove in the starboard bow and stem and started the butts on 
both sides. The ship making much water got the boats ready.37 We, how-
ever, are -more typically - first going to warmer climes for a cargo. 
We can embark in January, if we wish. Whether we sail directly or in-
directly to Russia, we want to clear early in the year in order to take 
advantage of a full spring and surr~er of good weather at sea.38 
Perhaps the ovmer leaves his coffers and account books to see us 
to the harbor's mouth. Log of Ship Astrea, 26 May -~787 .::_~~- _ei_~~~ A.M. 
Mr. Derby_~~ ~n- _b_?ar_d_,_g_o_t_ -~~e_-~ip underway and beat out the harbor • 
. . • At eleven o'clock he left us ••• with the wind at south bound to 
Russia.39 With luck, we may have one more look at faces from home. ~ 
35Peabody Museum, Hitchings, F., Digest of Duties from 1789 to 1851: 
The Amount of Duties Paid into the Salem Custom House from August 15, 
1789, to April 7, 1851, passim. 
36salem Custom House, Entry Book, 7 Oct. 1792, Brig Betsy, 132 tons, 8 
men, enters from Gothenburg. 
37Essex Institute, Log of ship Rubicon, 1816. 
38phillips, "Salem OpensTrade with Russia," New England Quarterly, Vol. 
XIV, p. 688. 
39Essex,l.Og'cfship Astrea, 1787. 
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of Ship Janus, 30 May 1816 - When abreast of Cape Ann a boat crune_~off 
full of lads and lasses, passed near ~s and gave thr~e cheers. Answered 
them and honored them with a gun.40 And then Massachusetts is only a 
smudge on the horizon astern and then the horizon is clean and keen as 
the edge of a blue knife. 
Our course is south to Guadaloupe. Guadaloupeans, being typical 
Viest Indians, are too busy raising sugar to grow foodstuffs, raise live-
stock, or manufacture the standard paraphernalia of life. They depend 
on North America for such. Our cargo consists of, let us say: furniture, 
cider, candles, potatoes, onions, fish, bacon, beef, bales of sheeting, 
bundles of hoops, empty casks and hogsheads, butter and lard.4l 
We have a good run and drop anchor in the lee of Guadaloupe' s green 
hills in eighteen days. Five knots, you know, is good speed for aves-
sel of our era on a deep water voyage. 42 With adverse winds, it could 
have taken over a month to get this far. 
After exchanging our variegated cargo for sugar and coffee we bid 
adieu to the waving palms and azure skies of sunny Guadaloupe and our 
captain lays a northeast course. Settle down for a long voyage. We are 
roughly 6000 miles from Kronstadt and 5000 from the entrance of the Bal-
tic. Yankee captains are good navigators and sublimely skilful seamen, 
but they fully appreciate the breadth of the Atlantic. Log of Ship Mes-
senger, 8 April 1810 - I take my departure bound for Gothenburg. May it 
40Essex, Log of ship Janus, 1816. 
41Actual cargo of brig Rebecca that sailed from Salem to Havanna to 
Kronstadt, (Essex, Log of brig Rebecca, 1821). 
42Parkinson, (ed.), The Trade Winds, p. 87. 
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please God to send us in safety to our desired p~rt. 43 Even riding the 
Gulf Stream, it may be two months before we see the Baltic. 
With luck and good weather, monotony will be our only enemy for 
the next few weeks. Life at sea is, at its best, not easy, however, 
and not even the keeper of the log is always an enthusiastic sailor. 
Log of Ship Friendship, Sunday, 12 May 1811 - There is no day in the 
seven, that I think as much of home as on this day. Ah, I am quite 
homesick •. Let thy name be peace and it was called Salem. 21 May 1811 
- The life of a sailor and a jailor - ah, how much alike. Only differ-
ence the form of one letter.44 The iron men who manned New England's 
wooden ships were not always made of iron unalloyed. Log of Brig Cos-
sack, 16 June 1815 - This evening the moon shone with resp~~ndent 1~-
tre. Not a cloud to be seen. I cannot help adding the following piece 
of poetry •••• And I felt such an exquisite wildness of sorrow 
As I gazed at the tremulous glow of the deep 
That I longed to prevent the intrusion of morrow 
And stay there forever to wonder and weep.45 
But the Atlantic in the spring is not always calm and sometimes staying 
"there forever" seems disturbingly possible. Adventure is an unpleas-
ant companion when the nearest land is a vertical mile of black water 
away. Log of Ship Eclipse, 21 May 1843 - Squall •••• At eight parted 
starboard fore topsail sheet. At nine carried away flyin~-~~-· 22 May 
1843 - The ship steers very badly. Make a course about so~. 
43Essex, Log of ship Messenger, 1810. 
44Essex, Log of ship Friendship, 1811-12. 
45Essex, Log of brig Cossack, 1815. 
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••• 23 May 1842 - Mr. Higgi~son thinks it will b~ a miracle if he gets 
safe across. Midnight bad weather and plenty rain. 46 
The Atlantic in spring is usually a benign monster, however, and, 
with Yankee luck, our log is a boring succession of daily Commences 
brisk breezes and fine weather •••• Terminates with breezes and fine 
weather. The first landfall is the Orkney Islands. (Despite one's 
Mercatoria! pre-conceptions, the shortest sea route from the .Vest Indies 
to the Baltic runs north of Scotland;) 
The captain steers east for Norway. His navigation is good and the 
first sight we have of her is the Naze, her southernmost tip. Continu-
ing west, we come into the Kattegat. l1J.ore and more sails can be seen. 
The fleets of the world rub elbows here in the anteroom of the Baltic. 
Gothenburg would be a good port for our sugar and coffee, but the 
owner thinks the market for such stronger at Copenhagen - or at least he 
thought so last winter when he wrote his instructions to our captain and 
supercargo. Besides, the owner has connections with the House of Ryberg 
of Copenhagen. Ryberg will take our sugar and coffee and give us the 
latest information on the state of the market in Russia. 
The distance between the mainlands of Denmark and Sweden is never 
less than several score miles, but between the two is lodged the great 
island of Zealand. In order to get to Copenhagen, which is on the east 
side of that island, the captain plots a course which will take us 
through the narrow Danish Sound between Sweden and Zealand. Even if he 
had no intention of pausing at Copenhagen but simply wanted to get 
through to the Baltic, we would take the Sound route. The other routes 
46Essex, Log of ship Eclipse, 1843. 
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around Zealand -the Great and Little Belts - are broader, but are 
longer and the channel through their islands and shallows is elusive. 
The Sound is narrow, but its channel is deep and comparatively straight.47 
At the entrance of the Sound the island of Zealand and Sweden are a 
bare four miles apart and the channel runs close to the Danish town of 
Elsinore. The most prominent feature of Elsinore is Gronberg Castle, 
and we must sail beneath its guns. About the castle's ramparts passes, 
not the indecisive Hamlet, but the doughty collector of the Sound dues. 
For hundreds of years the kings of Denmark have manned this turnstile 
between the North and Baltic Seas and exacted a toll of each vessel 
passing through. 
As our brig nears Gronberg Castle, the captain orders our topsails 
lowered - a required salute the omission of which would bring a cannon 
shot across our bow. We come to for the first time in two months. 'l'he 
captain goes ashore with the papers of our vessel and cargo, pays the 
toll and returns. He may also have had to show a bill of health signed 
by the Danish, Russian, Prussian or Swedish consul of our last port. 
'rhe Baltic peoples are sensitive about the arrival of American ships 
with Yellow Jack aboard. 
We weigh anchor and get underway, carefully hoisting our colors as 
we pass the guardship that supplements the Castle's surveillance of the 
entrance of the Sound. Failure to proffer that salute would also earn 
us cannon balls.48 All the courtesies now completed, the captain can 
return to the engrossing business of sailing. 
470ddy, European Commerce, p. 356. 
48National Archives, Consular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. I, "A New 
and Correct Tariff or Book of Rates and Duties on Goods Passing the 
Sound at Elsinore in Denmark" by John ·white. 
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These waters hereabouts are too narrow for the captain's taste. 
The shores on either sid8, although several miles away, seem to deep 
water sailors to be grazing our gunwales. The current here where the 
Baltic forces itself through the nozzle of the Sound is disturbingly 
swift. On all sides we can see other sailing craft. If' the wind holds 
true, all are safe. If it dies and leaves us to the mercy of' the cur-
rent, or if a squall springs up •••• Diary of John Quincy Adams on 
board the ship Horace, 26 September 1809 - about three in the afternoon 
she began to drift again, when we threw out the third and last anchor, 
a very heavy one. We had drifted within the ship's length of a large 
brig, whose bowsprit threatened our cabin windows all afternoon and eve-
ning: and we were within a quarter of a mile of the shore and a reef 
of rocks.49 
We, however, have the law of averages on our side. Thousands of 
vessels pass through the Sound every year and few come to any harm. 
With a good breeze at our backs we run through the Sound. in a matter of 
hours and come to anchor before dark in the deep safe harbor of 
Copenhagen. 
Copenhagen is one of the great ports of the world. If we are 
arriving in 1799 we will find her population to be 83,063. 50 (In 1790 
the population of Philadelphia, the biggest city in the United States, 
was 42,444.) 51 The harbor is capable of accommodating five hundred 
49Adams, (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. II, p. 29. 
500ddy, European Commerce, p. 358. 
51Morris, Encyclopedia of American History, p. 442. 
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ships at one time. 52 Our brig, accustomed to whole oceans of privacy, 
is surrounded by scores of moored vessels. 
In the morning, the captain and supercargo take the ship's papers 
ashore to be inspected by the port authorities and to see Mr. Ryberg. 
When they return we warp into position beside one of the quays. For 
the next few days Danish lumpers unload the hogsheads of sugar and bar-
rels of coffee while our crew makes minor repairs to the rigging 1s;rid 
sails. When our vessel is empty and floating so high that the gangplank 
is more like a ladder than a stairway, the lumpers turn to shoveling 
sand into our hold for ballast. 
We clear for Kronstadt with a cargo of sand in our hold and 
Ryberg's letters of credit safe in the supercargo's chest. Steering 
south and then west we round the last tip of Sweden and enter the Baltic 
Sea. The Baltic is a northern sea and never warm: the Gulf of Finland, 
that arm of the Baltic leading to St. Petersburg, is in the same general 
latitude as the southern cape of Greenland. He who ventures into the 
Gulf too early in the year will see more ice than any sailor ever wants 
to see. Log of Ship Pallas, 23 April 1802 -At four P.M. saw ice on 
the lee bow and spoke an English bark who informed us that the Gulf was 
full of ice. 29 April 1802 - Surrounded by ice. 
Our owner, Lord praise him, has so arranged our voyage that we are 
entering the Baltic in summer, which leaves us only the numerous islands, 
rocks, shoals and general shallowness of that sea to worry about. With 
any sort of luck we should make Kronstadt in a week or ten days. 
52Rees, Cyclopedia, Vol. X, "Copenhagen." 
53Peabody, Log of ship Pallas, 1801-02. 
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The first indication the landlubber has that we are nearing our 
destination is a thickenin6 of the horizons on either side of our ves-
sel as Finland and Estonia draw toward each other ~;;~.s we stret!!!h out 
for Kronstadt. 
On the fourth of July - an appropriate day - our brig drops anchor 
in the harbor of Kronstadt. We could, of course, have gone to Riga or 
Reval or any other of Russia's Baltic ports, but like the great major-
ity of Americans, to us St. Petersburg-Kronstadt is the only Russian 
port.54 On the starboard are two or three other vessels flying Amari-
can colors, and there are probably others that we cannot see. Other 
owners are as shrewd about wind and weather as ours is, and more than 
half of the vessels that will come from America to Kronstadt this year 
have already arrived,55 
Shoveling out the ballast takes only a few days, but negotiating 
through Edward James Smith and Company - the St. Petersburg house to 
which our owner and Ryberg have directed us - for the best cargo at the 
lowest price, stowing the cumbersome Russian goods, and preparing our 
brig for the long journey home through the North Atlantic will take a 
month or more. Time never lags, however. The crew - officers and men 
alike - are busy. We, the drones, follow the supercargo ashore and 
spend our time sightseeing. 
54or the 85 American vessels that came to Russia in 1803, 84 went to 
Kronstadt. Of the 66 that came in 1804, all but one went to Kronstadt. 
Oddy, European Commerce, p. 133, 204; Consular Despatches - St. Peters-
burg, Vol. I, Harris to Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 18/30 Nov. 
1804. 
55of the 65 American vessels that arrived at Kronstadt in 1804, 40 ar-
rived before 24 June. Oddy, European Commerce, p. 133; Consular Des-
patches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, Harris to Secretary of State, St. 
Petersburg, 12/24 June 1804. 
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Kronstadt, although its fortifications and waterfront cilia of 
masts make it an impressive sight from a distance, proves to be a strag-
gling town with many poor wooden buildings and vacant areas. Its in-
habitants, upwards of 30i000 in number, are not in the business of im-
pressing visitors. Commerce is this city's whole reason for existing, 
and indicative of this are the thousands of sailors we see jostling in 
her streets. 56 
In contrast, one of St. Petersburg's main reasons for existing is 
to impress visitors. The Tsars have made her into one of the great 
cities of the world. The many magnificent stone buildings, the spacious 
open squares, the long and die-straight boulevards, the canals, the crys-
tal Neva River with its bridges and sumptuous embankments quite awe the 
American bumpkin. Even the candid Londoner and Parisian will admit that 
there is nothing at home like this crown city of all the Russias. 
The simple size of St. Petersburg would suffice to impress, even if 
all else about the city failed to do so. Her population is close to a 
quarter of a million. (As of 1790 Salem's population was 7,921.)57 The 
cosmopolitan nature of St. Petersburg's crowds emphasizes to us her im-
portance as Russia's cultural and commercial window to the west. Stand 
on one of her street corners and count the foreigners: English, Germans, 
Swedes, Dutch, Spanish, *~ricans. etc,58 
56Rees, Cyclopedia, Vol. XI, "Kronsta.dt;" Worcester, Geographical Dic-
tionary, Vol. I, p. 458. 
57Robotti, F.D., Chronicles of Old Salem (Salem: Newcomb and Gauss 
Co., 1948), p. 46. 
58Rees, Cyclopedia, Vol. .XXVIII, "St. Petersburg; 11 Worcester, Geographi-
cal Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 310. 
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We have had to do most of our sight-seeing without a guide. The 
supercargo has been a busy man, for his employer, the owner of the brig 
and cargo, has only tenuous connections here. The trade with Russia is 
not, after all, one of the main branches of United States commerce. 
Our owner didn't instruct Messrs. Edward James Smith and Company to re-
serve a cargo for us last winter when the demand and prices were low. 
Thus the supercargo has to pay the Kronstadt merchants their price or 
condemn the brig to sail home dead freighted. An 8nglish buyer tells 
us half petulantly, half contemptuously, "None, in general, have been 
the cause of raising the prices, or suffered more from it than the Amer-
icans •••• 1159 (Americans, apparently, are already developing their 
eternal reputation for having more money than brains.) 
Still and all, we made a profit at Copenhagen, and our cargo of 
Russian goods will bring a profit on the Junerican market. Our cargo is 
completed and Russian stevedores and our crew are straining, sweating, 
and swearing in two different languages, and stowing the goods into the 
hold. The cargo consists of 2319 bars of iron, 272 bundles of hoop 
iron, forty-five packs of flems and ravensduck, ninety-eight coils of 
cordage, ninety-eight and a half bundles of hemp and six casks of 
tallow. 60 
The captain sniffs autumn in the August breeze and is anxious to 
clear for home. Winter can pounce like an angry bear in these 
59oddy, European Commerce, p. 202. 
60Actual cargo of snow Hind, Capt. Putnam, which returned to Salem from 
St. Petersburg in 1793.--salem Custom House, Entry Book, 1792-1794. 
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latitudes. 61 But it isn't ice that he fears. Not yet, at least. 
What sets him to yelling at the stevedores for more speed are the equi-
noctial storms that can make the Baltic a sailor's nightmare in the 
autumn. If he has to weather a gale, he says, he wants to do so with 
no lee shore within a thousand miles. Being caught in the Baltic by 
a good gale is like being shut up in a closet with a famished wolf.62 
Before August is two weeks old we are tacking out through the 
roads of Kronstadt. The sun that is rising in Asia throws wavering 
shadows of our masts on the choppy water ahead like uncertain compass 
needles pointing toward Salem and home. 
The Baltic's winds are not so docile as during the outward voyage 
and it is nearly two weeks before we pass und,~r "the dreadful summit 
of the cliff that beetles o'er his base into the sea" at Elsinore. Yet 
by summer's end we have beat our way through the North Sea and are in 
the Atlantic with the Faroe Islands the nearest dry land. The weather, 
habitually foul, forces our seamen to muster every bit of the seacraft 
they know. It is hurricane season in the North Atlantic. Log of Br~g 
Independence, 23 September 1811 - Fresh gales until four P.M. when it 
came on to blow a very severe equinoctial gale and continued a tremen-
dous gale throughout with a very dangerous sea •••• 4 October 1811 -
Strong gales from NW. Spoke with Schooner Industry of Yarmouth 
61In the fall of 1809 an unseasonable west wind pinned the late ships 
against the Russian coast of the Baltic while an early frost froze them 
in. Ninety vessels were frozen in at Kronstadt, eighteen of them Amer-
ican. Peabody, Letterbook of Capt. Thomas B. Osgood, 1809-11, Letter 
to Pickman and Derby, St. Petersburg, 5 Dec. 1809; Diplomatic Despatches 
-Russia, Vol. I, Translated extract from Gazette of St. Petersburg, 
dated 27 Jan. 1910, o.s. 
62 oddy, European Commerce, p. 105. 
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which has lost bowsprit. Supply her with twine, needles and a spar.63 
The violent rolling and pitching of the vessel and the strength of the 
seas that sometimes sweep across our decks often make survival a mat-
ter of having a good grip on the nearest upright. Log of Brig Belle 
Isle, 9 November 1810 -Heavy gales. • At four P .iVI. lost John Fel-
lows overboard without being able to give him the least assistance •• 
64 
. . 
On the morning of the first of November, seventy-odd days out of 
Kronstadt, the mate clumps below in his heavy boots and announces a 
landfall. We scramble up on deck to gaze at the low misty streak that 
is the first glimpse of Massachusetts we have had in something like 
seven months.65 By afternoon the green shoulder of Marblehead Point 
is clearly visible, then the vessels in the harbor, and finally - lying 
in the soft hills like a pillow on a tired man's bed -the small white 
village of Salem. 
63Essex, Log of brig Independence, 1810-ll. 
64Essex, Log of brig Belle Isle, 1810-11. 
65phillips, "Salem Opens Trade with Russia, 11 New England Quarterly, Vol. 
XIV, p. 688; Phillips, James D., "Salem Ocean-Borne Conrrnerce from the 
Close of the Revolution to the Establishment of the Constitution, 11 
Essex Institute Coll., LXXV (July, 1939), p. 251, 253. 
. . 
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Chapter VI 
The Gods Quarrel and the Mice Learn to Scramble 
In 1788 John Paul Jones presented Catherine the Great with a copy 
of the spanking new Constitution of the United States of 1~erica. Dur-
ing the conversation that followed, the Tsarina expressed the opinion 
that 11 the American revolution cannot fail to bring about others, and to 
influence every other government. 11 1 
If Catherine remembered that prophecy a year later, it must have 
been with a mixture of-pride and distaste, pride at her own prescience 
and distaste at what was happening in France. Louis XVI, desperately 
seeking a cure for his government's chronic indebtedness, had called the 
gstates General. A Parisian mob had stormed the Bastille and raised on 
pike the first bloody head of the revolution. 
The French Revolution had an all-pervading influence on the young 
United States of America. The Revolution gave Hamilton and Jefferson 
something upon which to disagree so violently that they founded America's 
first political parties. Militarily, it bestowed two wars on us, one un-
declared and one declared. Economically, it gave us our opportunity to 
shake loose from the depression that seemed to be the gloomy familiar of 
our new independcmce. 
When the United States emerged as a free nation in 1783, it 
discovered that it had exchanged for independence all the privileges it 
had had as part of a world-wide empire. Prior to our revolution one of 
the great sources of wealth for New England and the Middle Colonies had 
been the trade between the West Indian possessions of the great colonial 
!Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S., 1783-89, Vol. VII, p. 382. 
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empires and the European motherlands of those empires. In 1783 when 
Americans sailed forth in search of peacetime profits, they discovered 
that American vessels were excluded from this carrying trade. Great 
Britain, as always, reserved that trade strictly for ships of her own 
empire. The other powers in the West Indies - France, Holland, Denmark 
and Spain - no longer interested in cajoling America into matricide, did 
the same. Until American vessels were admitted to that trade again, 
American sailors and merchants would have to content themselves with 
meager incomes. 2 
In April of 1794 the Yankee snow Vigilant, come up from the isle 
of France on its way to Russia, put into Ostend to deliver a cargo of c· 
coffee, sugar and cotton to aM. Keef of that port. On the eleventh of 
May, two days before the snow cleared for Kronstadt, it was noted in the 
log that "we have heard the French and English cannonading for the last 
three days. 11 3 The accelerating violence of France's revolution and the 
increasing tendency of that nation to consider her revolution an item 
for export had brought a British expeditionary force across the Channel 
the year before to defend the Lowlands. What the crew of the Vigilant 
was hearing was the sound of Carmot's ragged conscripts hustling the 
armies of Britain and her allies out of Flanders. The following winter 
French hussars would ride triumphantly into Amsterdam on the ice. 4 
2Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, p. 67. 
3Essex Institute, Log of snow Vigilant, 1793-94. 
4Lunt, W.E., History of England (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), 
p. 601; Palmer, R.R., A History of the Western World (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1957), p. 362. 
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The war between Great Britain and France, begun so inauspiciously 
for the British, was to continue practically unbroken until Napoleon's 
exile to St. Helena in 1815. For its first fifteen years that war was 
the making of America's fortune. The United States was the only maritime 
power which wasn't habitually at war with half or more of the great trad-
ing nations of Europe. British ships were considered worse than plague 
carriers by the governments of France and her allies, and Britain's navy 
scoured the vessels of France and her allies from the face of the oceans. 
By the process of eli~~nation, a huge proportion of the carrying trade 
of the Atlantic community fell into American hands. The 11 long haul" from 
the West Indies to Europe became the special province of the American 
merchant m~rine. In 1792, on the eve of the wars of the French revolu-
tion, our re-exports of sugar and coffee were only 1,176,156 pounds and 
2,134,742 respectively. In 1807 these figures were 143,136,905 and 
42,122,573 pounds respectively. 5 ·American sailors had become panderers 
to the sugar and coffee habits of the whole ~uropean continent. 
All in all, between 1792 and 1807 the value of America's re-exports 
climbed from $2,000,000 to nearly $60,000,000. 6 This had an electric ef-
feet on our whole economy. In that fifteen years the value of American 
imports leaped 300% and exports 400%. The total tonnage of our shipping 
rose from 564 million to 1,268 million tons, and the percentage of ton-
nage arriving in U.S. ports which was owned and registered in America 
rose from an anemic 63% to a glowingly healt~y92~. 7 The American sailor 
5Pitkin, View of Commerce of u.s., p. 167. 
6Reinhoel, John H., "Post-Embargo Trade and Merchant Prosperity: 
Experiences of the Crowninshield Family, 1809-1812, 11 Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XLII, No. 2 (September, 1955), p. 230. 
7Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, p. 70. 
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and merchant, and the myriads whose livelihood depended on the 
prosperity of those two - the shipbuilder, lumberman, fisherman, steve-
dore, coastal and piedmont farmer, silversmith, etc - experienced the 
greatest fortune they had ever known. The ill wind that scorched and 
shriveled a whole generation in Europe carried the United States into 
the sunny latitudes of its first boom. 
Being a war profiteer, however, is not a life of joy unalloyed. 
There was always the danger that we would be sucked into the war. In 
a time when even a hermit would have found it difficult to remain neu .. ,· 
tral, the United States was a peddler hawking his wares in every port 
in the world. George Washington tried to save his country from any in-
volvement by declaring our neutrality in 1793 and forbidding any Ameri-
can to carry to any belligerent "those articles which are deemed con-
traband by the modern usage of nations ••• ,"8 but, of course, the dif-
ficulty was, who is to define contraband? If two men are trying to 
strangle each other, then the very air becomes contraband. 
Very early in the war, Britain, in an effort to strangle the 
economy of the French empire, began to seize American vessels bound to 
and from the ports of France and her colonies on the slightest pretext. 
The aggravation of these seizures, added to the chronically annoying 
and illegal presence of British troops in the forts of our Northwest, 
might well have brought us into the war on the side of France if the 
Washington administration hadn't been so unshakeably dedicated to neu-
trality. John Jay was sent to England to settle the differences between 
8commager, Henrys., (ed.), Documents of American History (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), Vol. I, p. 163. 
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Britain and the United States by negotiation. The treaty that he 
signed, which came into effect in 1796, did prevent war between the two 
English-speaking powers, but it did so at the expense of much of Ameri-
ca's self-respect. For instance, impressment - already an issue be-
tween the United States and Britain -was not even mentioned, and Jay 
accepted the British definition of contraband. This meant that we 
agreed not to ship naval stores nor any timber but pine plank to the 
ports of France or her allies. 9 At this point the Jay Treaty impinged 
on the commercial relationship between Russia ru1d America. France, 
which had already counted us as an ally and which, at the very least, 
expected our vessels to bring to her naval stores from the Baltics, con-
sidered herself betrayed. 
The government of France, following the revolutionary's standard 
creed that "anyone not for me is against me" informed her navy and pri-
vateers that Americru1 vessels and cargoes were fair game. According to 
our Secretary of State, by June of 1797 the French had captured over 
three hundred of our vessels.lO For all practical purpose, a naval war 
existed between France and America. 
This undeclared quasi-war naturally had a profound effect on our 
overseas trade, especially our trade to the Baltic. Our exports, which 
had climbed steeply in value every year since the beginning of the wars 
in Europe, dropped from $67 million in 1796 to below *57 million in 
1797. 11 In 1796 169 American vessels had passed the Danish Sound. In 
9Albion, Forests and Sea Power, p. 188. 
lOMorison, S.E. and Commager, H.S., The Growth of the American Republic 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 370. 
llPitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., p. 36-37. 
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1797 that number plunged to 81. 12 War, almost always an Indian giver, 
was taking away the prosperity it had given the United States. 
The United States, however, did not supinely accept French 
depredation, and soon was taking measures to return the favor. Con-
grass created the Navy Department and revived our moribund navy. The 
frigates Constitution, Constellation and United States rigged for com-
bat and soon demonstrated to France and the world that the eagle had 
talons as well as a scream. 13 American mer hants and captains armed 
their vessels and prepared to supplement their pleas of neutrality with 
ball, chain, grape, pike and cutlass. For instance, the ship Lucy, re-
turning home from the Baltic in 1798, belied her femininity by taking 
on board ten cannon and "a number of men extraordinary" at Copenhagen.l4 
Before the end of the quasi-war America armed a thousand of her 
merchantmen.l5 
Americans, also, made full use of the convoy system, sometimes 
being shepherded by men-o-war of their own navy - our Captain McNeil, 
now a naval officer, conducted convoys in the waters off Surinaml6 -
and occasionally by men-o-war of other nations, particularly Britain.17 
Outside the Caribbean area, the main theatre of the war, American mer-
chantmen often lacked a friendly warship to cosy up to, and sometimes 
12oddy, European C9mmerce, p. 369. 
13Morison and Commager, Growth of American Republic, Vol. I, p. 373. 
l4Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War Between the United States 
and France. Naval Operations from November, 1798 to March, 1799, 
(vlashington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 176. 
15Naval Documents of Quasi-War, 1797-1798, p. VI. 
16Allen, Gardner W., Our Naval War with France (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1909), p. 125; Boston Columbian Centinel, 5 June 1799. 
17Boston Columbian Centinel, 9 January 1799; Boston Gazette, 1 January 
1798; Naval Documents of Quasi-War, 1798-1799, p. 437. 
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of necessity formed a convoy exclusively from their own number. The 
theory was that the sum of their individually meager armrunents would 
be great enough to discourage all but the more heavily armed French 
vessels. Such was the case with a convoy of nine armed American mer-
chantmen that sailed home from St. Petersburg in 1798 undar the command 
of Commodore Thorndike in the Sally of Beverly, Mass. 18 Probably a 
single French frigate could have blown the ~orrunodore's whole fleet to 
Kingdom Come, but such a convoy would be too tough a nut for a priva-
teer to try to crack. Privateers, after all, were out for profit, not 
for Victory or Death. 
In 1798 American commerce started to recover. Exports climbed 
five million dollars in value above the previous year's figures.l9 The 
improvement was the result of America's increased ability to protect her 
vessels and cargoes, and of our use of new channels of trade to replace 
those that had led to the ports of France. We renewed our contacts with 
the markets of the Continent through the ports of North Europe. Prior 
to 1798 the greatest runount we had ever exported to Denmark in a single 
year was worth $421,779. In the year ending 30 September 1798* we sent 
$1,400,258 worth to Denmark and in 1799 ~951,577 worth. Prior to 1798 
the greatest amount we had ever exported to the ports of the Germanies 
in a single year was approximately nine and a half million dollars 
worth. In the year ending 30 September 1798 we sent them ~14,563,343 
*Throughout the first decades of our history the official year of the 
United States customs service ended on 30 September. 
l8Naval Documents of·Quasi-War, 1798-1799, p. 163, 183, 188. 
19Pitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., p. 36-37. 
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worth and in the following year $17,866,493 worth.20 In those two 
years one quarter of our exports to the world went to Denmark and the 
Germanies~21 The vagaries of war had made Copenhagen and Hamburg the 
most important markets for tropical goods on the continent of Europe. 
Our trade with Russia was, also, drastically affected by our war 
with France. Our exports to Russia shrank to a paltry $3,450 in value 
in 1797, and only twenty-six vessels cleared St. Petersburg for Ameri-
can ports, in sharp contrast to fifty-nine the year before. But in 
1798 this annual number of vessels resumed its rise. In that year it 
rose to thirty-nine, and in 1799 to sixty-two, higher than ever before.22 
It was during these years that Russia experienced her first twinge 
of ardor for America. The United States was giving a good account of 
herself in her quasi-war with France, which helped to establish a good 
reputation for the United States among the anti-French aristocracy of 
Russia. Also, the United States was becoming one of Russia's most de-
pendable customers. The American flag was becoming an everyday sight 
in the Baltic during the shipping season. 
In November of 1798 Count Woronzow (or Vorontsov), the Russian 
ambassador to Britain, spoke to Rufus King, the American minister to 
Britain, about the possibility of a commercial treaty between Russia and 
the United States. In February of 1799 President Adams appointed King 
as a special minister to negotiate such a treaty with Russia. The whole 
2~isc. Documents of the House of Representatives, 1892-93, Vol. XXVI, 
p. XIII, XIV. 
2lconsular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copen-
hagen, 10 Oct. 1798. 
22Pitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., p. 232-33, 271-72. 
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scheme was killed in embryo by a relaxation in America's relations with 
France in 1799 which destroyed the Russian misconception that America 
might be coaxed into being a permanent enemy of France, but the aborted 
negotiations had brought into being one of the minor but recurring 
themes of Russian and American foreign policies for the next few decades. 
Whenever war and distortion of normal trade patterns troubled Europe, 
Russia and the United States would seek each other's friendship. 23 
The continuance and expansion of Russo-American trade during our 
war with France must be credited to the perseverance and skill of the 
British navy. Britain's man of war kept most French vessels close to 
home. The approaches of the Baltic would be dangerous waters for Ameri-
cans. French privateers plying the North Sea in 1799 captured the 
American schooner Little John on the Dogger Banks returning from Bremen, 
beat her captain "in a savage manner peculiar to the French," and only 
by Providence did the armed ship Camilla of Boston come along to re-
capture the Little John and save her captain and crew from a French 
prison. 24 But American vessels heading for Russia usually sailed only 
through the far northern reaches of the North Sea and then coasted down 
Norway to the Sound. It seems that the only American bound to or from 
the Baltic who fell victim to the French was Captain Joseph 1\'Iossby of 
the ship Enterprise of Salem who "was unfortunately killed by a pri-
vateer firing about twenty musket shot before she boarded his vessel. n25 
The ship herself was allowed to continue to Copenhagen. 
23Hildt, J.C., Earl Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with 
Russia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1906 , p. 31-32, 35. 
24Boston Columbian Centinel, 25 September 1799. 
25Nava.l Documents of Quasi-War, April 1799-July 1799, p. 226. 
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However, it must not be thought that the voyage to Russia was one 
on which the watch dared catch a nap when the captain or mate was not 
about. The insurance underwriters of Philadelphia, a very knowledgeable 
and hardheaded group of men, thought otherwise. At one period during 
the war they demanded a whopping twenty-two and a half per cent to insure 
a voyage to Russiat26 
Despite the forebodings of gloomy und~rwriters, American traders 
obviously continued to seek the ports of Russia. One effective method 
of avoiding French capture on the way to Russia was simply to keep as 
far away from France as possible. During the quasi-war America sent its 
first ships in any numbers (and probably its first ships, period) to 
A,rchangel. That boreal port is better acquainted with ice than water, 
and American sailors were more familiar with the Celebes Sea than the 
White Sea, and the most southerly course to Archangel took them three 
hundred miles north of the Arctic Circle - but then war has always h~en 
a maniacal navigator. )fe know f~w d-:tails about the opening of the trade 
with Archangel beyond the fact that there were four American vessels 
there in September of 1798. two of them being the ship Financier, Captain 
Clark, of Boston, and the ship Perseverance, Captain Wheatland, of' 
Salem.2 7 
In 1800 the war was dwindling to a close. France, not wanting to 
have the United States as a permanent enemy, formalized the end of the 
war by settling the most peremptory of her differences with us in the 
Treaty of Morfontaine. signed 30 September, 1800.28 A war that was never 
26American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. I • p. 69. 
27Naval Documents of Quasi-War, 1798-1799, p. 166. 
28Morris, (ed.), Encyclopedia of American History, p. 129. 
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declared cannot technically come to an end, but, at any rate, in 1800 
American and French seamen stopped shooting at each other. 
1800 was also the year in which American exports to Russia sank to 
absolute zero, fewer American vessels passed the Sound than in any year 
since 1790, and only twenty-three ships cleared Kronstadt for America·,, 
fewer than in any year since 1791.29 American commerce with Russia was 
obviously being distorted by some new and very powerful influence, some 
monstrous Pluto swinging in the dark beyond the ken of orthodox American 
historiography. 
It is necessary to go back four years. In 1796 Catherine the Great 
died and was succeeded by her son, Paul I, a man haunted by the memory 
of his murdered father and so afflicted with wild eccentricity that many 
historians have called him mad. 
Paul, an autocrat, naturally detested French radicalism, but he 
kept out of the war against France until her forces seized the island of 
Malta and invaded Egypt in 1798. Malta was the home of the Knights of 
St. John, who chose Paul as their Grand Master. (That Paul, arch-layman 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, should be the chief of a Roman Catholic 
order is somehow typical of his reign.) Egypt was part of the Ottoman 
Empire, which Russia felt to be exclusively her whipping boy.30 Also 
contributing to his decision was France's demand that Denmark close her 
Sound to all ships carrying English commodities .. This was a move to con-
strict Russia~s economic jugular, and Paul reacted by sending part of his 
fleet to keep the Sound open.31 
29oddy, European Commerce, p. 369; Pitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., 
p. 271-72. 
30tobanov-Rostovsky, Andrei A., Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, (Durham; 
Duke University Press, 1947), p. 19-22. 
31Boston Gazette, 13 August 1798. ' 
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Although Russia maintained a squadron of men-o-war in English 
waters (commanded, by the way, by Admiral Tate of ••• Massachusetts!),32 
her significant contribution to the Second Coalition against France was 
all on land. Paul sent his armies deep into ~urope, where they were d@-
feated, Paul angrily blaming their failure on the cowardice and treach-
ery of the other members of the Coalition. Napoleon, now First Consul, 
sensed the weakness in the Coalition and bent his efforts to tempting 
Paul into the French camp - or, at least, into neutrality. Napoleon 
freed his Russian prisoners and offered Malta to Paul. As the French on 
Malta were now isolated by the British navy and bound eventua!ly to sur-
render to the attack the British were launching on them, Napoleon's gener-
osity was perhaps questionable. His offer was a perfect "bait on purpose 
laid to make the taker mad" because Paul's ally, Britain, would no more 
tolerate a Russian Malta than a French. Britain fancied the Mediter-
ranean a British lake, which meant she claimed Malta for herself.33 
Britain further assisted Napoleon's courtship of Paul by acting her 
customary role on the high seas, where she apparently felt she ruled by 
divine right. As usual in wartime, she took it upon herself to investi-
gate the papers and cargo of every neutral vessel her cruisers could 
overhaul. Neutrals, the United States included, objected. Denmark par-
ticularly objected to British search of Danish merchantmen under convoy 
by Danish men of war. Such impugned the honor of the Danish government. 
In December of 1799 and July of 1800 British and Danish men of war 
32Boston Columbian Centinel, 26 January 1799. 
33Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and 
Empire, 1793-1812 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,.l892), Vol. II, 
p. 26, 32-33. 
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clashed over this question. In the latter encounter, blood was shed 
and the British captured a Danish frigate. 
Thus the affairs of North Burope stood in July of 1800, the year 
of the unexplained diminishment of Russo-American trade. At one end of 
the Baltic Russia was lending a ready ear to Napoleon, and at the other 
end Denmark and Britain seemed on the brink of war. 
Events hurried toward a crude resolution. Britain, too busy to be 
delicate with little Denmark, sent an ambassador to Copenhagen with an 
entourage of nine ships of the line and several bomb vessels. As Nel-
son was to say on his way to Copenhagen the following year, "A fleet of 
British men-of-war are the best negotiators in the world.n34 A large 
number of merchant sail went along, too, using the ambassador's task 
force as an impromptu convoy to the Baltic. Among them were American 
1 f · · h th r· t f P 'd 35 vesse s, one o whJ..c was e ~ep une o rov1. ence. Americans would 
be on hand to witness all three English violations of Copenhagen. 
This first was only really a rehearsal. The Danes were easily 
intimidated and the British had no wish unnecessarily to create allies 
for Napoleon. On 29 August of 1800 the two nations signed an agreement 
to refer the question of the right of search to future negotiations. 
Denmark suspended her convoys and the British released the Danish 
f . t 36 r1.ga e. 
Britain's blatant use of its naval might to oblige a neutral to 
change its policy aroused all the latent fear and hatred of the weaker 
340man, Carola, Nelson (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1946), p. 435. 
35Boston Columbian Centinel, l Oct. 1800. 
36Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 26-27. 
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sea powers for "perfidious Albion." In Russia rumors that the English 
had taken Elsinore and were bombarding Copenhagen sprang up like weeds 
in rich soil.37 All this fitted perfectly into Napoleon's scheme to 
unite Northern Europe against Britain. 
Paul I, hypnotized by Napoleon's military prowess and offer of 
Malta, had long since withdrawn his forces from the armies of the 
Second Coalition. For some months he had been looking for a pretext to 
seize English property in Russia and to revive his mother's anglophobic 
League of Armed Neutrality. As early as the beginning of July it was 
bruited about in Paris that these delicious schemes had already been 
consummated.38 Paris, anticipating the embraces of her hesitant Rus-
sian lover, ran to the door every time a carriage passed. 
On the twenty-ninth of August, 1800, when - unknown to Russia -
Denmark and Britain were signing their agreement at Copenhagen, Paul 
used Britain's actions against Denmark as an excuse to sequester all 
British property in Russia. On the tenth of September his government 
issued another order, directing a concentration of Russian troops and 
announcing that the Tsar felt that "a rupture of friendship with Eng-
land may ensue." Paul drew back from Napoleon's primrose path once 
more, removimg the sequestration on 22 September, but when he learned 
that the British had taken Malta from the French on 5 September, he re-
vived the sequestration. About three hundred English ships and their 
crews were seized, along with all other English property in Russia. 
The Tsar announced the embargo on trade with the British would continue 
until Britain acknowledged his claims to Malta. 
37Boston Columbian Centinel, 29 Oct. 1800. 
38Ibid., 3 September 1800. 
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On the sixteenth of December, 1800, Russia and Sweden signed an 
agreement reviving the League of Armed Neutrality of 1780. They were 
joined shortly after by Denmark and Prussia. Catherine the Great's old 
pronouncements that the neutrality of a vessel renders its cargo neutral, 
that naval stores are not contraband, and that paper blockades are il-
legal were again presented to Britain on the point of a bayonet.39 The 
difference was that this time Russia and the League were throwing their 
weight not on the side of the less aggressive of the two great powers of 
western ~urope but on the side of the most aggressive. In Boston, Massa-
chusetts, the Columbian Centinel reacted by stating what has often again 
" been America's view of Russia and her followers, Unfortunately, from 
that quarter no assertion can be disproved from its own anomalies or ab-
surdity. It is rather the precise case to believe things because they 
are incredible, and to admit whatever is monstrous and absurd!~0 
Throughout 1800 the sea lanes to Russia reverberated with the rude 
cacophony of rattling swords, of English bo'-suns drilling and cursing 
their gun crews into greater swiftness and accuracy, of Russians, Danes, 
Prussians and Swedes rearrang the carbon from the barrels of their shore 
batteries and freshly rigging their sacrificial navies - and all to the 
ground bass of Napoleon's soft chuckle. Is it any wonder that American 
ships avoided the Baltic? If an American ship were caught in the cul-
de-sac of the Baltic when a war broke out between Great Britain and the 
nations that joined the League, what would be that vessel's fate? Sei-
zure by a member of the League because she looked like a British ship? 
39Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 33-34, 36-37. 
40Boston Columbian Centinel, 3 September 1800. 
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Seizure by the French or the Danes while passing the Sound? (The war 
would probably make the Danes and French allies, and remember that 
France and the United States did not sign their final 11peace" until 
September thirtieth, nearly the end of the Baltic shipping season. 
Above all, what reception would Britain give to any neutral vessel 
trading wi~h its Baltic enemies - Britain -which "with her seven hun-
dred ships of war, can block up the Catigat as effectually as if an 
immense dam was erected over it?"41 
No sane American merchant of 1800 would risk too large a portion 
of his wealth in an area that might become a cock-pit of war on any 
roll of the dice. Conditions similar to those of 1800 would exist in 
the Baltic between 1807 and 1812, and yet hundreds of American vessels 
would flock through the Sound and Belts, but only because by then there 
was nowhere else to go. 
At the end of 1800 the Baltic situation was one of such tension 
and imbalance that it could not long remain static. Russian aristocrats, 
cut off from the chief market for the products of their estates and ap-
palled by rapprochement with Jacobin France, would not long accept Paul's 
new foreign policy. England, cut off from the source of much of the tim-
ber used in her fleets and from the source of ninety per cent of the hemp 
that was so vital to her surviva1,42 could not long accept Paul's foreign 
policy. Only the descent of winter checked a sudden and violent resolu-
tion of the unnatural situation. Even crises hibernate in winter in the 
Baltic. 
41Boston Columbian Centinel, 15 April 1801. 
42Ryan, A.N., "The Defense of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808-1813, 11 
The English Hist~rical Review, LXXIV (July, 1959), p. 444. 
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As spring came to the Northern Hemisphere in 1801, Federalists in 
America worried that that idiot Jacobin, President Jefferson, would al-
low America to be drawn into that "hostile compact," the League of Armed 
Neutrality of 1800; 43 a few American farmers, surmising that the hemp 
from Russia would soon be a rare article, thought of raising some them-
1 l bl h 44 d . t . d se ves as a va ua e cas crop; an Amer1can cap alns an supercargoes 
in.England found themselves offered amazingly high fees to take their 
- 45 
vessels to Russian and other Baltic ports on ~nglish account. 
British merchants could well offer such fees. Britain was already 
desperate for Russian naval stores. The Royal Navy was resorting to the 
use of inferior native beech in place of imported fir and there was talk 
of a project to make tar from seaweed. 46 Hemp, usually between thirty 
and fifty pounds a ton, was climbing to a vertiginous eighty-six pounds 
a ton. 47 
Like Britain's merchants, Britain's Lords of the Admiralty were 
also trying to find ways to Russia. With admirable dispatch, they de-
cided to blast a path. On the twelfth of March, 1901, a fleet of eight-
een sail-of-the-line and thirty-five smaller vessels sailed from Yar-
mouth for the Baltic. ·vfuen the fleet reached Danish waters an envoy was 
sent ashore to present Britain's demands to the Danes. The Danes 
43Boston Columbian Centinel, 15 April 1801. 
44rbid., 25 April 1801. 
45Peabody Museum, Letterbook of Thomas Sheafe, 1797-1803, Letter to 
Charles Coffin, Portsmouth, 1 May 1801. 
46Albion, Forests and Sea Power, p. 178-80. 
47Tooke, Thomas, A History of Prices and of the State of Circulation 
from 1793 to 1856 (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 
1838-1857), Vol. II, p. 403. 
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honorably refused to submit to dictation from London. The British 
fleet passed through the Sound and, on April Fools Day, 1801, Admiral 
Nelson took a large segment of that fleet to the head of a dangerously 
shallow but relatively unfortified channel leading to the harbor of 
Copenhagen. The next day he entered that channel, and, though his fleet 
was undt:r constant galling fire and several of his sail-of-the-line ran 
aground, he methodically battered a good part of the Danish fleet and 
the defensive batteries of Copenhagen into splinters and rubble.48 Be-
fore he slept that night he wrote Lady Hamil ton to tell her "Of eighteen 
sail, large and small, some are taken, some sunk, some burnt in the good 
old way.n49 British access to the Baltic was assured. 
In the harbor of Copenhagen on that tremendous day was the Salem 
brig Exchange. Josiah Orne, her captain, and his men had an awesomely 
close view of what the broadsides of a British fleet could accomplish in 
the way of creating hell on earth. 50 It was experiences like this that 
helped make Yankee seafarers so much less anxious to challenge Britain's 
might than frontiersmen from Ohio and Tennessee. 
Ironically, it may well be that all the Danes and Britons who died 
on that second of April in the roads of Copenhagen harbor died totally 
in vain. Paul I was the central figure of the League of 1800. Without 
him, Russia would resume trade with England, and withdraw from the League 
which would collapse like a tent without its center post. On the twenty-
fourth of March, when the British fleet was still off Elsinore, a new 
t:sar of Russia, Alexander I, announced that "It has pleased the decrees 
48Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 41, 42, 47-51. 
49aman, Nelson, p. 450 
50salem Gazette, 7 July 1801. 
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of the Almighty to shorten the life of our beloved Parent Sovereign 
Emperor Paul Petrovitz, who died suddenly by an apoplectic stroke, at 
night .... u51 
Alexander's explanation of his father's death was euphemistic. 
Paul's anti-British policy brought a massive decrease in Russia's for-
eign trade, and as her exports plummeted, the hatred of her nobles for 
Paul soared. Paul's eccentricity, accelerating toward complete insani-
ty, had changed the loyalty of those around him to complete revulsion 
and fear. A French emigre, inquiring after Paul's death about how it 
had been to serve him, was told, "Today one had a place, tomorrow one 
might be in disgrace, the day after in one's place again, the next day 
in fear of Siberia." 
A plot to assassinate the Tsar came into being, probably with the 
tacit approval of Alexander. On the night of the twenty-third of March, 
1801, a group of Paul's officers, crazed with drink, hatred and terror, 
burst into his apartment and beat and strangled him to death. The Eng-
lish doctor who supervised the embalming of Paul's corpse reported lat-
er that, in addition to the broad contusion around the neck, there were 
heavy traces of blows all over the body, many of which had probably been 
inflicted after death.52 
The League of 1800 was gone. Throughout 1801 diplomates busied 
themselves with sweeping away its remains. In 1801, 172 American ships 
51Boston Columbian Centinel, 20 May 1801; Oman, Nelson, p. 439. 
52waliszewski, K., Paul the First of Russia (Philadelphia; J.B. 
Lippincott Co., 1913), p. 386, 391, 423-25, 455-60. 
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passed through the Sound, more than ever before, and sixty-one vessels 
cleared St. Petersburg for America, only one below the previous all-
time high. 53 
The violent deaths of several thousand Danes and Britons and of 
the Tsar of Russia had cleared the Baltic of obstacles to American 
trade. 
53oddy, t'uropean Commerce, p. 369; Pitkin, View of Commerce of u.s., 
p. 272. 
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Chapter VII 
Setting the Stage for Gotterdammerung 
On 21 March 1801, two days before the murder of Tsar Paul, 
representatives of France and Britain began to hammer out a treaty of peace 
between their two nations. Neither France nor England was exhausted enough 
to make the details of the peace easy to work out, and months of wrangling 
were necessary before the final signatures were appended to the final docu-
ment. But that moment did come - the date was 25 March 1802 - and Britons 
and Frenchmen stopped trying to kill each other for the first time in 
close to a decade.l 
The decline of mass homicide in Europe had an appalling effect on 
American commerce. Long before the final peace, shrewd American merchants 
were paring down the capital they had laid out on speculation, demanding 
payment of their loans, and generally p£eparing for foul economic weather. 
Jacob Crowninshield, merchan.t of Salem, wrote in November of 1801, 
"It now behooves us to look about us, sell all we can to good 
men, buy as little as possible in order to lessen our payments, 
for money will soon be scarce •... Get all the hard dollars 
possible; if you can secure $50,000, so much the better. Take 
all they'll give you. We shall want them. . Buy no more 
vessels, for they'll fall greatly." 
Jacob, as sly a trader as his Old Testament namesake, knew what he was 
talking about. Already speculators were tumbling into ruin, especially 
those who had invested heavily in naval stores from Russia.2 
lGottschalk, Louis R., The Era of the French Revolution (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1929), p. 326; Rose, John H., The Life of Napoleon I (New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1918), Vol. I., p. 311-12. 
2Reinoehl, John H., "The Impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon Upon 
the United States as Revealed by the Fortunes of the Crowninshield Family 
of Salem" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, Michigan 
State College), p. 50-51. 
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The trouble was that now Europeans could use their own merchant 
marines for overseas commerce. A merchant of Le Havre who wanted to im-
port coffee from a plantation owned by his brother on Guadaloupe could 
send out his own ships to that island. No longer need he depend on neu-
trals to bring his tropical imports to Hamburg and then have the goods 
laboriously carted several hundred miles to his warehouse. 
In 1801 the United States re-exported 97,565,732 pounds of sugar 
and 45,106,494 of coffee. The next year those figures were 61,061,820 
and 36,501,998 respectively, and in 1803 - despite renewal of war in 
Europe - they had fallen to 23,223,849 and 10,294,693 respectively.3 
The momentum of the depression carried us deeper into economic despair 
even after new violence heralded new prosperity. 
The commercial situation was summed up by the American Thomas W. 
Ward of the ship Pallas in 1801. The Pallas had come over from Norfolk, 
Virginia, with a load of tobacco to peddle in Falmouth, England, before 
sailing on to Russia. Ward examined the peacetime prices of such coloni-
al goods as tobacco in that port, and declared, "This peace will make me 
turn bankrupt. n4 
The merchant marine of the United States was again on the outside 
looking in, and depression roosted like a raven on the ink pot of every 
American merchant. Many American merchants, finding no profit in follow-
ing the usual channels of trade, sent their vessels to the less fre-
quented corners of the watery world.5 In 1802 and 1803, although Ameri-
can trade with the rest of the world dropped in both value and quantity, 
3Pitkin, View of Commerce of U.S., p. 167. 
4Peabody, Log of ship Pallas, 1801-1802. 
5Reinoehl, "Impact of Fr. Revolution and Napoleon on U.S. 11 , p. 67. 
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Russia saw more Americans than she ever had seen before. In 1802 sixty-
five vessels cleared Kronstadt for America, an all-time high. In 1803, 
when America's total imports were lower than they had been for a decade, 
eighty-four vessels left Kronstadt for the United States.6 
The dominant reason for the amazing jump in tra~ with Russia in 1803 
was not primarily the depression, however, but the renewal of bloodshed 
in Europe. By the spring of that year the tensions between England and 
France had again become too great for a peaceful world to contain, and on 
18 May 1803 England renewed her war on Napoleon and his legions. On the 
eleventh Jacob Crowninshield had written, with the mixed emotions of an 
unemployed lawyer about to witness a fist fight between two litigious 
millionaires, "The affair of peace or war will be determined in a day or 
so. All are anxious. Many, however, dread it. For my part I shall re-
gret its taking place. Still, as individuals I think we may turn it to 
our advantage, but its effects will be dreadful upon Europe."7 Jacob was 
right again. It is probable that not until the First World War did the 
American merchant marine again carry as great a proportion of Europe's 
imports as in the years immediately following 1803. 
When the news of the war reached America many merchants, like Jacob 
Crowninshield, realized the opportunity for economic growth the war 
brought, and the expansion of our merchant marine that growth would en-
tail. That realization probably had something to do with the amazing 
number of American vessels loading hemp, cordage, iron and sailcloth at 
Kronstadt in 1803. Even more likely an explanation is that, until the 
6Albion and Po~e, Sea Lanes in Wartime, p. 70; Pitkin, View of Commerce 
of U.S., p. 272. 
?Reinoehl, "Impact of French Revolution and Napoleon on U.S., 11 p. 67. 
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trade patterns of this new war jelled, the wary American merchant would 
avoid trading with the main ports of the continent of Europe so far as he 
could. He would prefer ports as far as possible from the battle fields. 
Kronstadt was America's favorite any-port-in-a-storm. 
By 1803 the burgeoning Russo-American trade had become important 
enough to attract the attention of President Jefferson. It was suggested 
that we needed some sort of diplomatic representation in St. Petersburg 
and Kronstadt. 
In April of 1803 Jefferson's Secretary of State, James Madison, 
sent to Levett Harris of Philadelphia a commission appointing him Consul 
of the United States at St. Petersburg.8 Harris quickly accepted, busied 
himself with arranging his affairs and, before too many weeks had passed, 
embarked for Russia. His voluntary exile was to bring him into the com-
• pany of the great, into honor and wealth, and into treachery and disgrace. 
Harris arrived in St. Petersburg in October and was shortly 
thereafter received by Count Vorontsov, Alexander's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. At that meeting Harris gleaned his first strong indications 
that the advent of a new Tsar had meant the advent of a new Russian pol-
icy toward America. Count Vorontsov voiced much satisfaction at the ris-
ing state of the commerce with America and congratulated the United 
States on its acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase from France.9 
Again and again Harris was to receive indications in words and deeds 
of the affection of the Tsar for America and of his desire to encourage 
8consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, to Secretary of State, 
Philadelphia, 25 April 1803. 
9Ibid., To Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 25 October 1803, 27 Octo-
ber, 1803, and 5il7 November 1803. 
trade with her. The honors tendered Harris were enough to dazzle the 
poor man: 
11Since my arrival here - in compliments to the first 
appointments from the United States, no doubt - the most 
pointed and unremitted ~i~ attentions and civilities have 
been shown me by the officers of the government, and the 
principle nobility and persons of distinction; in short I 
have not been classed on this score, with the foreign con-
suls, but have always received invitations with ministers 
of the first rank."lO 
95 
Harris was accorded the ultimate in honor in 1806 when he informed 
the court that he had received a personal letter for the Tsar from 
President Jefferson. Harris was told that he might present it in per-
son. The Tsar of All the Russias granting a private audience to a mere 
consul - it was unheard of! After the audience Harris wrote home proud-
ly that all "the honors of the guard and palace, shown exclusively to 
ambassadors and officers of the court, were extended on this occasion 
to the consul of the United States.ull 
High honor had its drawbacks, too. Harris, treated like a 
minister of the first rank, found himself expected to live like one, to 
accept invitations from the great, to entertain, to eat, clothe and 
house himself like one of the great. Unfortunately, there was no sala-
ry attached to the post of consul. Harris's total income as the United 
States consul at St. Petersburg consisted of two dollars for each paper 
he authenticated with his Consular Seal, with the exception of the cer-
tificates of goods being landed, for which he received $1.50. Like 
many consuls, Harris set himself up as a commission merchant, earning 
the great bulk of his income by acting as a middleman between the 
lOrbid., To Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 12/24 June 1804. 
llrbid., To Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 10 August 1806. 
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Russian merchants and custom service, and the foreign supercargoes. He 
received a certain percentage on the value of each cargo that passed 
through his hands. 
Even this income wasn't sufficient to let him live as he felt 
society demanded. He hadn't been in Russia a year before he complained 
to the Secretary of State that he needed more money. The United States 
government, of course, refused.12 A soothsayer's foresight would have 
persuaded the United States to offer Harris more. Napoleon, certainly, 
if he could have seen into the future, beyond the exultation at Auster-
litz to his estrangement from his brother emperor Alexander to the 
flames of Moscow, would have been glad to supplement Harris's income. 
The first years of Levett Harris's stay in Russia were also marked 
by evidences of rapprochement between Russia and America other than 
those which personally flattered Harris. Alexander used his influence 
at Constantinople to have the Dardanelles opened to American vessels 
and on behalf of the crew of an American ship of war captured by Tri-
poli.l3 Alexander's intercessions may have had little effect, but 
they did prove that he was becoming our best friend in East Europe. 
In 1804 Tsar Alexander and President Jefferson began their 
correspondence. Both wrote of how happy the growing trade between 
their nations made them. Each threw bouquets to the other. Jefferson, 
the elected president of a republic, wrote on 15 June 1804: 
12Ibid., To Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, 12/24 June 1804; Ford, 
Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 536; Microfilms of the Adams Pa-
pers owned by the Adams Manuscript Trust and Deposited in the Massachu-
setts Historical Society, Part I, ·Reel 31, John Quincy Adams Diary, 
p. 180, 20 November 1810; p. 263, 24 June 1811. 
13consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, To Secretary of State, St. Pe-
tersburg, 12/24 June 1804; To Count Warontzoff, St. Petersburg, 26 Jan. 
1804. 
"I avail myself of this occasions of expressing the exalted 
pleasure I have felt in observing the various acts of your 
administration. " 
To which Alexander, autocrat of the Russias, answered on 7 November 
1804: 
" . . I express the wish that the United States may retain 
for a long time at the head of their administration as vir-
tuous and enlightened a chief as you are."l4 
Alexander's grandmother, Catherine the Great, had assuaged her 
97 
repressed desire to be an "enlightened despot" by having Alexander edu-
cated in the latest western style. The infection of liberalism he con-
tracted from this education hung on through the early years of his 
reign as Tsar, and he actually played with ideas of reform and even 
thought of instituting a constitution. Jefferson sent him several 
books on our own constitution, which Alexander was happy to receive.l5 
Thus, in the early years of the Nineteenth Century America and Russia 
had, of all things, something of an ideological basis for friendship. 
In 1804 Russo-American friendship was put to the test. In that 
year the United States was at war with the corsair power of Tripoli, 
and ringed the harbor of Tripoli with the men-o-war of the brand new 
United States navy. A ship flying the Russian flag appeared off that 
port, sighted the blockading squadron and fled under a full press of 
sail. An American man-o-war pursued, overhauled and captured her. The 
United States, in a complete reversal of her usual role, was guilty of 
seizing neutral propery on the high seas. The fact that this was 
14Laserson, Max M., The American Impact on Russia- Diplomatic and Ide-
ological, 1784-1917 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 82-83. 
15Ibid., p. 72-83. 
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property of a citizen of one of the most tender-minded neutrals in 
Europe increased the fascinating possibilities of the affair. 
In a bit more than a half year the affair was settled. The United 
States, of course, had to acquiesce to Russian demands and remit to the 
original owner the proceeds from the sale of the captured ship and car-
go; but for all of that the most significant aspect of the whole affair 
was Russia's restraint.l6 She resorted to none of the breast beating 
and sword rattling that are the usual accompaniment of conflict between 
a great and small nation, especially a conflict in which the smaller na-
tion is at fault. The empire of Russia had taken a moderate attitude 
towards an infraction of her maritime rights, which - if the guilty 
party had been Britain - would have set her to howling.* 
What underlay this warm affection of the Russian government for 
the United States? It could have stemmed from Alexander's pseudo-lib-
eralism - and some part of it probably did - but the real source of 
Russo-American rapprochement was economic. 
Russia was an empire whose aristocrats depended on trade with 
Great Britain for their hard cash. Russia was also an empire with a 
miniscule merchant fleet and merchant class. To ship and transact her 
16consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Samuel Barron to Harris, Syra-
cuse, 3 December 1804; Rodgers to Harris, Malta, 18 July 1805. 
*The only other Russo-American maritime incident in European waters 
outside the Baltic and White Seas in these years was the capture by the 
Russians of two American ships, the ship Commerce of Boston and Brigan-
tine Hector of Weymouth, Massachusetts, in 1807. Both were cruising in 
the Mediterranean too close to Turkish-held ports for Russian taste. 
Russia was then at war with Turkey. 
On this occasion Russia was the offender, and - as she was so much 
bigger than the United States - years passed before the owners of the 
Commerce and Hector received compensation. (American State Papers, For-
eign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 635, Vol. V, p. 784-85; Moore, J.B., Histo-
ry and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United 
States has been a Party (Washington, D.C.: 1898), Vol. V, p. 4554.) 
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export trade she had to depend on foreigners, most of whom were 
English. This engendered an ambivalent Russian attitude toward Great 
Britain; Russia feared and respected Britain's naval and mercantile 
strength; Russia hated Britain for her near monopoly of Russia's over-
seas trade and hated her for her overwhelming maritime pretensions. 
Russia therefore turned to any and every other maritime power - i.e., 
the United Statse- for an alternative to dependence on Great Britain. 
Count Rumiantsev, Chancellor of Russia, asserted to John Quincy Adams 
in 1811 the great attachment of his country to America and summed up 
the policy of his government by saying, "It was the interest of Russia 
to encourage and strengthen and multiply commercial powers which might 
be the rivals of England, to form a balance to her overbearing power.nl7 
However, in spite of the then current opinion of Rumiantsev and 
his Tsar, the most dangerously overbearing power in Europe in the first 
decade of the Nineteenth Century was not England but France. France 
was at the height of La Gloire and Napoleon was changing the map of Eu-
rope with the unilateral aplomb of a Hitler. 
The struggle between France and her allies and England and hers 
went into its final world-quaking stage in 1805. In that year Nelson 
caught the combined French and Spanish fleets off the Cape of Trafalgar, 
and Napoleon caught the armies of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz. 
Each man, a master of warfare in his medium, routed his opponents. Eng-
land, triumphant at sea, and France, triumphant on land, glared at each 
other across the most insurmountable barrier that could have separated 
them - the insubstantial line of surf curling on the beach. 
17Adams, C., Memoirs of J.Q. Adams, Vol. II, p. 271. 
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Britain and France, each seeking a way to deal the other a mortal 
blow in a situation in which they really could not come to grips, 
turned to economic warfare. Economic warfare had been constantly uti-
lized since 1793, but never in such grim earnestness as after 1805. 
Since the exports and imports of each of these super-powers were often 
carried in neutral bottoms, it was inevitable that the neutrals of the 
world would be caught and mangled between the oceanic grindstone of 
Britain and the continental grindstone of France. 
We need only examine a few of the decrees of this economic warfare 
to realize how impossible they eventually made life for the neutral 
traders. 
In 1805 Britain's courts handed down the Essex Decision. By this 
judgment goods could no longer be shipped from the colonies of France 
and her allies to Europe under any circumstances. Not even first ship-
ping them to a United States port would sufficiently "neutralize" them. 
On 16 May 1806 Britain declared the entire North European coast 
between the Elbe and Brest under blockade. 
Napoleon's answer was one he had been considering for some years. 
How could one destroy "a nation of shopkeepersn? The obvious answer 
was to deprive the shopkeepers of customers. Britain's economy de-
pended on continental markets for her products and re-exports. On 21 
November 1806 Napoleon issued the Berlin·: Decree forbidding France or 
any of her allies to trade with British vessels or any neutral vessel 
carrying British goods. Napoleon had begun his campaign to make the 
continent of Europe economically independent of Great Britain; i.e., he 
had founded his Continental System. 
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On the eleventh of November of 1807 Britain issued an Order in 
Council forbidding trade by neutral vessels with any port from which 
the British flag was excluded, unless those neutral vessels put into a 
British port en route and took on British goods or obtained licenses 
ror all other cargo. Britain was trying to force neutrals to carry her 
goods to the Continent or to pay Britain for the_privilege of doing 
otherwise. 
Napoleon countered with the Milan Decree of 17 December 1807. He 
declared that any neutral ship sailing to or from the British Isles or 
even submitting to search by British cruisers was subject to seizure. 
By the end of 1807 it had become practically impossible for an 
American vessel to land anywhere in Europe without breaking a law of ei-
ther France or England. Although American overseas trade had increased 
steadily ever since 1803, and although in 1807 we imported and exported 
goods of greater value than ever before in our history, the price in 
seizures of our vessels and diplomatic incidents verging on war had be-
come too great. The time was close when we would either have to fight 
for our right to trade unmolested or withdraw from international com-
merce. Shortly before Napoleon issued the Milan Decree, President Jef-
ferson, hoping that a cessation of trade with the United States would 
force England and France to respect our rights, asked Congress to pro-
claim an embargo on all exports from the United States to any part of 
the world. On 22 December 1807 the Embargo Act became law.l8 
l~his basic factual detail of the Anglo-French economic war can be 
found in any standard text or encyclopedia. For instance, Gottschalk, 
The Era of the French Revolution; Langer, An Encyclopedia of World His-
tory; Morris, Encyclopedia of American History. 
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In passing such an act the United States government postponed 
American embroilment in the Gotterdammerung that was beginning in the 
Baltic in 1807. Americans were there to witness the melodrama's first 
act, but would not become protagonists in it until the Embargo was re-
pealed. 
In the two years following his victory at Austerlitz, Napoleon 
busied himself with tidying up in Eastern Europe. Austria, cowed for 
the time being, gave no trouble, but Prussia challenged him in 1806. 
Before the year was out her armies had been smashed at Jena and Auer-
stadt. The King of Prussia fled eastward to take refuge with Alexander 
I and his armies. Napoleon marched through Poland into East Prussia 
and on 8 February 1807 the French and Russian armies met at Eylau in 
one of the bloodiest and yet most indecisive battles of the Napoleonic 
era. After pausing some months to lick their wounds, the two armies 
sprang at each other again at Friedland on 14 June. This time the de-
cision was clearly in favor of France, although Alexander's ability to 
wage war was by no means destroyed. 
On 25 June Napoleon and Alexander met on a raft moored in the 
middle of the Niemen River near Tilsit. That river forming as it did 
the boundary between East Prussia and Russia had become the boundary 
between the domains of Napoleon and Alexander. Alexander, who had good 
reason to fear France and little to love England, is supposed to ha~e 
said upon greeting Napoleon on the raft, "Sire, I hate the British as 
much as you do." "In that case," Napoleon replied, "peace is made."l9 
By the middle of July the treaties of Tilsit were completed and 
signed. The most important agreements were, of course, secret. In 
19tobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, p. 155. 
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return for a pledge of French support for his schemes for Turkey, 
Alexander pledged to support Napoleon's schemes for West Europe. Al-
exander promised to close Russia's ports to English goods and to de-
clare war on England if by November that nation hadn't accepted peace 
with France, consented to return all her conquests since 1805 and 
granted to all complete freedom of the seas. Alexander also promised 
to use all Russia's influence to force neutrals into Napoleon's camp.20 
The meeting at Tilsit was the apogee of Napoleon's fiery passage 
through European history. Britain, alone and threatened with sever-
ance from the chief source of her naval stores, was teetering on the 
edge of defeat. Napoleon next moved to dragoon the neutrals into his 
service. He was especially interested in Denmark. By utilizing her 
strategic location and her fleet, he could cut off British access to 
the Baltic completely, and, perhaps, again challenge Britain's naval 
supremacy. 
On the 31st of July Napoleon notified Denmark that she must choose 
between England and France.21 Tiny Denmark was discovering, as she did 
again in 1940, that being neutral, small and innocent does not necessar-
ily qualify one for survival. 
It remained to be seen what England would do. Her secret service 
had already informed her of the secret agreements at Tilsit, and Napo-
leon's designs on Denmark had been common knowledge for at least a year. 
In March of 1806 the American minister to France, John Armstrong, had 
20The basic facts of the war with Prussia and the meeting at Tilsit can 
be found in any text on the era. See, for instance, Gottschalk, The 
Era of the French Revolution, Part II, Book I, Chapter 4. 
21Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 276-77. 
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reported that Denmark was probably going to yield Elsinore to France.22 
The very next month Levett Harris wrote the Secretary of State from St. 
Petersburg that "Much conversation prevails here upon the probable oc-
elusion of the Sound. II He went on to discuss the unwillingness of 
either Britain or France to allow the other to use or control the Sound, 
and he predicted that "T'is not therefore improbable but that the Danes 
may be sacrificed to the conflicting views of those two nations."23 
On 26 July 1807 Admiral James Gambier sailed from Yarmouth road 
with seventeen sail of the line and twenty-one lesser vessels of war. 
On the 29th transports bearing 18,000 troops followed. Very few on 
shore knew where the expedition was bound, but it was rumored that Den-
mark was a probable destination.24 
On the sixth of August the English plenipotentiary, Francis James 
Jackson, was at Kiel (then a part of Denmark) presenting Prince Freder-
ick, Regent of Denmark, with Britain's demands. The demands were ad-
mirably straightforward: Break off relations with France, contract an 
alliance with Britain and - most important of all - give up your fleet 
into British hands. The alternative offered was the destruction of 
Copenhagen. 
The Regent's reaction was such that Jackson felt it necessary to 
protect his government's honor by replying, "I cannot willingly listen 
to such language, Your Royal Highness." His Royal Highness, however, 
22Hill, Charles E., The Danish Sound Dues and the Command of the Baltic 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1926), p. 220. 
23consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, To Secretary of State, 
St. Petersburg, 17-29 April 1806. 
24Bryant, Arthur, Years of Victory, 1802-1812 (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1945), p. 199-200; Clowes, William L. et al, The Royal Navy, 
A History from the Earliest Times to the Present (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1900), Vol. V, p. 209. 
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was not yet finished: "If you have the courage to undertake a mission 
like this, you should have the courage to listen to anything. I would 
tell your master the same, if he were here.n25 
On 17 August Napoleon ordered Marshall Bernadote to prepare his 
force of 30,000 at Hamburg to advance into Denmark on short notice as 
either friend or enemy.26 
On the fourth of August the Salem ship Susan had weighed her 
anchor from the bottom of Lisbon harbor and "stood down the river Ta-
gus, the wind N by E." Once in deep water she settled on a course 
north for the Baltic. 
Eight days out she was boarded by an English frigate, "one of 
George's ships." Ten days out a French privateer sighted her, but she 
showed him a clean pair of heels. On the nineteenth she passed Beachy 
Head. On the twenty-first, seventeen days out, the British sloop-of-
war Ariel obliged her to heave to, "pressed a Danish sailor" who had 
shipped on the Susan, and "sent on board an American seaman in his 
place, John Rust." (The only way an American merchant vessel could a-
void visitors in European waters after 1805 was to sink in at least ten 
fathoms of water.) 
On the twenty-fifth the Susan came into the waters around Zealand. 
"At three A.M. saw the Kole light south four leagues, was boarded by an 
English frigate. At eight passed Elsinore Castle, passed a number of 
English ships anchored under the Swedish shore. . . . " The Susan had 
25Frischauer, Paul, England's Years of Danger (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1938), p. 186. 
26Adams, Henry, History of the United States (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1891), Vol. IV, p. 63. 
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found Admiral Gambier's fleet. That fleet was now grown to twenty-five 
sail of the line and forty lesser war vessels. It included transports 
with 27,000 troops aboard. All in all, it was one of the greatest con-
centrations of mobile might of the entire Napoleonic period.27 
On the twenty-fifth the Susan also met and "Supplied Captain Cav-
endish of the brig Rover of Salem with two barrels beef, one bag pota-
toes, six salt fish, one cask water, one bag flour." One must have 
victuals, be : it Sunday, Monday or doomsday. 
By the time the Susan entered the Sound, Admiral Gambier had 
clapped a blockade on Zealand and was putting troops ashore to scatter 
the meager Danish forces and set up batteries bearing on Copenhagen. 
The weather was all that one could desire for such an operation -
pleasant and suitable for outdoor work according to the Susan's log. 
On the twenty-seventh the Susan, continuing through the Sound, "passed 
a fleet of men-of-war, transports and merchant ships of about two hun-
dred sail of English and Danish prizes, at anchor abreast of Copenhag-
en. Brisk firing of cannon and heaving of shells kept up on shore . 
. Passed a number of ships of war at anchor on the grounds. Was 
boarded by the Mador, three deck ship of war commanded by Captain Lin-
sey, formerly of Boston. Ends with pleasant light southwest breezes. 
" The Susan passed on up the Baltic to Russia.28 
When the Susan's topsails tipped over the horizon and disappeared 
the agony of Copenhagen had not really started. It wasn't until 7:30 
P.M. on 2 September that the real British bombardment began. Hundreds 
27Bryant, Years of Victory, p. 200; Clowes, The Royal Nayy, Vol. V, 
p. 210. 
2~ssex, Log of ship Susan, 1806-1807. 
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and hundreds of redhot shells and rockets poured into the city from the 
British land batteries and fleet. Fires started almost immediately. 
The firing ceased in the daytime and recommenced the next night. So it 
went on for three nights. Twenty-eight streets, with houses, churches 
and places were destroyed and 2000 Danes killed.29 
On 7 September the Danes surrendered their fleet. When the news 
of the bombardment and its success reached Britain, most Britons were 
happy to hear of it. Some found it all difficult to reconcile with 
those ethics Britain was supposed to be defending, and none of the usu-
al medals to commemorate great victories were struck off. But the jus-
tification "What were we to do, let Napoleon have the fleet?" was dif-
ficult to counter, and most probably agreed with Cobbett, the political 
writer, when he said that if the Ministers did not deserve impeachment 
for doing what they had done, then they would have deserved impeachment 
for not doing it.30 
Elsewhere in the world the bombardment brought a thrill of horror. 
Three years later John Quincy Adams summed up the attitudes of most 
non-Britons: 
"Among the examples of political profligacy and wanton 
outrage, which the European nations for the last half cen-
tury have rendered so familiar, the British attack upon Co-
penhagen, as far as I have been able to estimate its merits, 
stands at the very pinnacle of infamy."31 
29ctowes, Royal Navy, Vol. V, p. 214-15; Frischauer, England's Years of 
Danger, p. 187. 
30Bryant, Years of Victory, p. 200-201; Clowes, Royal Navy, Vol. V,p.217. 
3lconsular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. I, To Joy, St. Petersburg, 11 
May 1810. This letter is not signed, but from its handwriting, style, 
date and city of origin, I am convinced tt ... came from John Quincy Adams. 
It may be of interest to the reader to note what John Quincy Adam~s 
grandson had to say of the bombardment. "The city was neither invested 
nor assaulted not intended to be occupied; it was merely destroyed, lit-
tle by little, - as a bandit would cut off first an ear, then the nose, 
then a finger of his victim, to hasten payment of a ransom." (Adams, H., 
History of U.S., Vol. IV, p. 65.) 
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Britain had gained another fleet, but in doing so presented 
Napoleon not only with a propaganda victory but also with one of his 
most loyal allies. Denmark, her capitol violated by British cannon-
eers for the second time in six years, declared war on England immedi-
ately. Denmark had lost her navy, but she still had shipyards and her 
strategic position athwart the entrance to the Baltic. Britain might 
yet regret 1807. 
When the news of the bombardment reached Russia, feeling against 
the British rose so rapidly and a declaration of war against Britain 
was so obviously in the offing that many British vessels at Kronstadt 
weighed anchor and sailed off without completing their cargoes.32 
Alexander himself must have received the news from Denmark with 
mixed feelings: Fear -"I suppose the English fleet will now come to 
Kronstadt ... ;"33 horror- the murder of 2000 innocents by somebody 
else is enough to move even a Tsar; and just a bit of satisfaction at 
having been presented with such a perfect excuse to declare the war a-
gainst Britain that he had promised Napoleon. 
Alexander temporized until his ports and fleets were safe behind a 
shield of Baltic ice, and then - on 8 November 1807 - he broke off re-
lations with Great Britain.34 
On the first of that month the Susan, loaded with hemp and cable, 
cleared Kronstadt for home. Off Copenhagen she was inspected by a par-
ty from an English man-o-war and a gale forced her to anchor seven days 
32consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, To Secretary of State, 
St. Petersburg, 18/30 September 1807. 
33Frischauer, England's Years of Danger, p. 187. 
34Rose, Napoleon, Vol. II, p. 134. 
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with an English convoy of forty merchantmen. On the twentieth, she 
struck a reef off Elsinore and had to hire two boats from shore to tow 
her off. The rest of her voyage home was uneventful, except for one 
more inspection by a British ship, the cutter Factor. By the first of 
December the Susan was safe in Salem harbor.35 
In 1807 the furies of economic warfare drove the Susan and eighty-
seven other American vessels to Kronstadt.36 Never before had so many 
American sail gone to that port.* In no previous year had our exports 
to and imports from Russia been so great. Yet the omens for the future 
were bad. 
The Susan and her sister ships in the Baltic had survived un-
scathed a shipping season full of violence and auguries of future vio-
lence. The Susan had witnessed part of the bombardment of Copenhagen 
and had cleared Kronstadt only a month before Russia declared war on 
England. Yet no English ship had tried to capture her. No Russian had 
tried to seize her as being English. No Dane had come over her side 
with cocked pistols and a conviction that everyone who spoke English 
was a subject of George III, The Susan and her eighty-seven sisters 
had passed through the Baltic unscathed. They were among the very last 
Americans to do so. 
*with the possible exception of 1806, for which no figures are avail-
able. 
35Essex, Log of Susan, 1806-07; Peabody, Hitchings, "Digest of Duties 
from 1789 to 1851." 
36consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, To Secretary of State, 
St. Petersburg, 19/31 Dec. 1807. 
Chapter VI II 
Act I, Scene I: Some Yankees Learn Sleight of Hand 
In 1807 three American ships came to Russia in addition to the 
eighty-eight which came to Kronstadt. Of these three, two came to 
Archangel and one to Narva. All three had been chartered by the Eng-
lish.l 
When American sailors are seen in Kronstadt's streets by the 
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hundreds, when Americans steer through ice floes to far Archangel, and 
when England, with the greatest merchant marine in the world, begins 
chartering American merchantmen, "the time is out of joint" and condi-
tiona are becoming rawly desperate. 
1807, however, was prosaic compared to the year that followed. In 
1808 American, English and Russian traders reaped the harvest of the 
tares and dragon's teeth their governments had sown the previous autumn. 
In America the Embargo reduced the enormous export trade to what little 
could be smuggled out by alleged coasters or over the borders into Cana-
da and the .noridas. A tiny number of American vessels were given per-
mission to clear foreign - the brig Leopard, for instance, was author-
ized to sail from New York to St. Petersburg and return with $9800 worth 
of goods - but the total of such clearances amounted to not even a drop 
in the bueket.2 
In Great Britain the effects of the Continental System spread like 
a killing fog. ~learances from her ports to ~rope dropped from 2,290 
lconsular Despatches -St. Petersburg, Vol. I, to Secretary of State, 
St. Petersburg, 19/31 Dee. 1807. 
2Message of the President of the United States, 'l'ransmitting List of 
Vessels Permitted to Depart from the United States clinee December, 1807. 
(Washington City: Roger Chew Weightman, 1808). 
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in 1807 to 1,282 in 1808. The value of her exports to the north of 
Europe decreased by fifty per cent. Her imports of naval stores plum-
meted. For example, in 1807 she imported £639,507 worth of hemp, and 
in 1808 onlyt218,947 worth.3 In 1808 attempts were made to raise hemp 
in India, New Holland, and even to make cordage out of the fiber of the 
plantain tree of the West Indies.4 The price of hemp careened upward. 
Hemp, f 58 per ton in the summer of 1807, was £ 118 a year later. 5 
1808 confirmed for Russian anglophiles all that they had supposed 
Alexander's alliance with France would mean. England, which regularly 
took half or more of the exports of Russia, was cut off by war. Jef-
ferson's Embargo prevented the United States from taking England's 
place to any significant extent. War with Sweden, practically Brit-
ain's only remaining ally, closed off any intercourse with that neigh-
bor. Trade by sea with everyone and anyone else was cut off by the 
presence of the British fleet in the Baltic. Normally, between three 
and five thousand vessels entered Russia's ports every year. In 1808 
the total of all entries into all of Russia's ports was 996.6 
The traders and governments of these nations in 1808 moved as best 
they could to remedy their discomforts. American traders badgered Jef-
ferson and Congress to lift the Embargo. American skippers in foreign 
ports or on the high seas when the Embargo was passed often decided to 
3Journals of the House of Commons, Vol. LXV, p. 647-48, 696, Vol. LXVII, 
p. 766. 
4D'Ivernois, Francis, Effects of the Continental Blockade Upon the Com-
merce. Finance. Credit and Prosperity of the British Islands (London: 
1810), n. 52-54. 
STooke, A History of Prices, Vol. I, p. 274. 
6"Recent State of Russian Commerce," Weekly Register, Vol. III (10 Oct. 
1812), p. 95. Quoted from Count Romanzou "State of the Commerce of the 
Russian Empire from 1802 to 1808. 11 
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stay away from home rather than spend the duration of the Embargo 
fretting on shore. A few of those caught at home ports waited for a 
moonless night and slipped out to sea despite Jefferson's law. After 
all, a ship was a sea-going machine for making money, not a breakwater 
to protect wharf pilings. 
These expatriate skippers, conniving Flying Dutchmen inadvertently 
cursed by Jefferson to briny exile, were by natural selection among the 
most dangerous Americans to have wandering about in Europe in 1808. If 
they were like most officers of American merchant ships, they were Yan-
kee and Federalist and their attitude toward the Republican administra-
tion would not be one of reverence. As men who voluntarily chose to 
disobey the law of their own government, they would be apt to disobey 
the laws of any and every country, and thus sully Americans' interna-
tional reputation. 
An extreme example of their type was Captain Arnold of the ship 
Carmelite, which was at Kronstadt in 1809. As Arnold was taking his 
ship out of the harbor in October of that year, a Russian boat over-
took her and Lieutenant Durnilov of the Russian Imperial Marines came 
on board. The Lieutenant directed Arnold to come about or drop anchor 
because the Carmelite was fraudulently clearing with sailors of other 
foreign vessels aboard, which was illegal according to Russian law. 
Arnold refused to obey and Durnilov ordered his own boatmen to execute 
the order. Then, in the words of Count Rumiantsev's complaint to the 
United States government about the affair, " ... There immediately a-
rose a great uproar among the crew of the Carmelite, who opposed the 
lowering of the sails. The Russian officer repeated the order to cast 
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anchor, where upon Captain Arnold and the supercargo rushed from the 
cabin armed with swords and guns, and taking aim at the Russians em-
ployed, threatened to fire upon and to sabre them if they dared to pro-
ceed, or, to carry them to America if they did not immediately go from 
on board." Lieutenant Durnilov noted the numerical superiority and ear-
neatness of the Americans, the lengthening distance to shore and the 
falling dusk. He wisely returned to his own craft. The Carmelite made 
off under a press of sail. 
When Rumiantsev's complaint reached Washington, President Madison 
expressed his deep regret, but admitted that he could do nothing in the 
way of immediately punishing Arnold. Captain Arnold, it seemed, was a 
rugged individualist who had sailed from America after the Embargo went 
into effect and who had not returned.7 
As none of Arnold and his like would think of returning home with 
cargo until the repeal of the Embargo, they of necessity sold the serv-
ices of themselves and their vessels to whoever had need of an empty 
ship and a neutral flag, i.e. the English. English merchants were par-
ticularly interested in renting sheep's clothing for voyages to Russia, 
and would pay an American three times the fee an English smuggler could 
get for such a voyage.8 Thus a goodly part - possibly a majority - of 
the small number of American vessels that entered Russia's ports in 1808 
were sailing under secret .British cont~act. The ships futrora of New 
7Diplomatic Despatches -Russia, Vol. I, Letter from Rumiantsev to J.Q. 
Adams, dated 23 Feb. 1810, enclosed with Despatch dated St. Petersburg, 
24 March 1810; J.Q. Adams to Rumiantsev, St. Petersburg, 31 Dec./12 Jan. 
1811; J.Q. Adams to Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 27 Jan. 1811. 
&~morial against the License Trade, presented by the Merchants and 
Ship Owners of the Town of Kingston upon Hull, to Board of Trade, 4 A-
pril 1811," Papers Relating to the License Trade, Parliamentary Papers, 
1812. 
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York and Diana of Boston arrived at Russian ports on the Baltic in that 
year and were seized and condemned for sailing on British account. Two 
or three Americans came to Archangel and sailed safely away, and it 
wasn't until later that it was learned that they were pure unadulter-
ated English merchantmen.9 We will never know how many of the other 
English vessels in disguise or Americans sailing on English account. 
Our only source of information on American ships in Russia that year is 
Levett Harris, which makes them all suspect. 
The prostitution of the American flag by some Americans to the 
interests of British commerce was so blatant - and would continue to be 
so for the next four years - that all honest Americans were forced to 
confess the existence of the unsavory practice. In July of 1809 forty-
three Americans at Christiansand, Norway (Norway was then a possession 
of Denmark) - captains and supercargoes of vessels seized and charged 
with sailing for the English, and therefore men to whose interest it 
was to deny that any American had ever accepted any British employ-
ment - admitted in a memorial to their government '!... . that many of 
our citizens have, especially during eighteen months last past, been 
engaged in a commerce, violating alike the laws of the United States 
and those of the belligerents, and which has been carried on under false 
papers procured in England, and under the mask of the American flag."lO 
The ,hiring of ;,American ships was only one of the methods Great 
Britain used to survive Napoleon's Continental System and Russia's en-
mity. Lacking a dishonorable neutral to do their smuggling for them, 
9consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. I, to Sec. of State, St. Pe-
tersburg, 5/17 July 1809. 
lOAmerican State Papers, .Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 330. 
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Britons would often slip through the meshes of the Continental System 
by posing as neutrals themselves. After 1807 neutral nations were few 
and far between, and British merchantmen often experienced the indigni-
ty of flying the flags of such comic opera nations as Knyphausen, Pap-
penburg and Oldenburg. The flag of the United States was, of course, 
a favorite cover. The United States consul at Bordeaux wrote in Novem-
her of 1808, "The English ... send shoals of American vessels from 
their ports, who never saw America, and whose papers were manufactured 
in London."ll British merchants and captains went to extraordinary 
lengths to disguise their ships. The forty-three Americans at Chris-
tiansand mentioned above even thought " .. it not improbable that lat-
terly the English have built their ships as much as possible to resem-
ble the Americans, and with them have been carrying on an extensive 
trade, especially to Archangel and to the Baltic, under the American 
flag and with American papers of English manufacture. 11 12 
The more successful the British became at posing as Americans, the 
more dangerous it became to be an American. Dickson, the United States 
consul at Gothenburg, reported in 1808 that every British convoy passing 
Gothenburg bound for Russia contained British ships flying the American 
flag. 
11 
• • In a short time, 11 he worried, "the seas wi 11 be 
entirely covered with them to the great detriment of the 
honest and fair American trader, as it is not to be ex-
pected that the Russians, Danes, and Prussians who very 
vigorously carry their decrees against England into exe-
cution can be long blind to this nefarious practice, and 
llLingelbach, W.E., "Historical Investigation and the Commercial History 
of the Napoleonic Era," American Historical Review, Vol. XIX ( 
1914), p. 269-70. 
12American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 330. 
the papers being in many instances so like as with difficulty 
to be known from the real, the consequences will be that ev-
ery ship sailing under the flag of the United States will be 
seized and condemned indiscriminately.nl3 
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Forging foreign ship papers became one of the minor industries of 
the port cities of England. Between 1807 and 1812 a good engraver was 
as valuable as a regiment to England's war effort, for as Sir William 
Scott said, "It is a matter perfectly notorious that we are carrying on 
the whole trade of the world onder simulated and disguised papers . 
. "14 English craftsmen learned to reproduce the signatures of Jef-
ferson and Madison with near perfection and could make the eye of the 
eagle of the United States seal gleam with sufficient fire to call forth 
whole floods of Fourth of July oratory. One of the leading forgers of 
American documents was Mr. Van Sander, a Londoner who kept his atelier 
near Whitehall.lS Another who dealt in forgeries, although probably as 
a dealer rather than a creator, was Peter Vander, also of London. When 
he went bankrupt in 1812 (alas, in 1812 the Continental System so de-
cayed that it was hard for an honest forger to make a living) his as-
signees put up for auction - besides "several capital charts," among 
which were charts of the Northern Sea, the Cattegat and the Baltic Pi-
lot - thirty-four boxes containing simulated ships' papers and seals for 
foreign countries, various colored ink~, foreign writing paper, etc.16 
Americans occasionally assisted British merchants in their 
masquerade by selling them American vessels - keel to truck, papers, 
13consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I, To William Pinkney, Gothen-
burg, 22 July 1808. 
14:(tuppenthal, Roland, "Denmark and the Continental System," Journal of 
Modern History, (March, 1943), Vol. XV, p. 16. 
15American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 342-43. 
16"British Manufactures," Weekly Register (26 Sept. 1812), Vol. III, 
p. 63, quoting London Morning Chronicle, 12 June 1812. 
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flag and all. The Manhattan of New York and the Two Friends of 
Charleston were two dishonored in this fashion.l7 Sometimes the transac-
tions allowing British merchants to hide behind the Stars and Stripes 
were rococo masterpieces of casuistry. For instance, in 1809 Mr. John 
Thomas of Baltimore, U.S.A., sold to Mr. Worthy of Liverpool, Great 
Britain, a power of attorney, irrevocable, over the American vessel 
Thomas, and made him supercargo of that vessel. In 1810 Worthy bought a 
cargo at New York as an agent of John Thomas, but paid for the goods 
with bills of exchange upon a Liverpool house. Worthy, with a pass-
port - real or forged - as a United States citizen, then sailed the ves-
sel Thomas to Archangel, where she was admitted as American. There one 
of her sailors told the Russians that, although she was ostensibly going 
to clear for New York, she was really going to sail to Liverpool. The 
Russians confiscated the vessel. While the ship was under confiscation 
and awaiting trial, the Liverpool house refused to cash the bills of ex-
change which had been paid to the New York concern for the Thomas's car-
go. Worthy, who had fled when the Thomas was seized, then mortgaged the 
Thomas to the New York concern as payment on the sum owed that concern. 
The New York concern also procured a real bill of sale from John Thomas, 
the original owner. The New York concern then sent a captain and crew 
to Archangel to claim the Thomas and sail it away. Levett Harris did his 
best to get the vessel freed and also claimed very heavy damages for her 
detention. The final settlement of the case is unknown.l8 
Question: in the name of sweet reason, who did own the ship? 
17Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. III, p. 535. 
18Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 390-91. 
118 
Although the British government was conscious of the necessity of 
smuggling to British survival after the Treaty of Tilsit, the government 
of George III was also perfectly conscious of the fact that unrestricted 
smuggling would help France more than Britain. It would restore to Napo-
leon that access to the highways of the ocean that so many British tars 
had died to deny him. The British government therefore tried, with con-
siderable success, to manage the illicit trade by issuing licenses to 
all smugglers who had British approval. These licenses, obtained from 
the Privy Council, gave a ship safe passage through the British blockade 
no matter what nationality she affected. Without such a license she was 
liable to capture. Thus a smuggler, with a license to show the British 
navy and a set of forged American, Portuguese, Pappenburg, Mecklenburg, 
etc., papers to show the privateers and custom inspectors of France and 
her allies, was theoretically as safe as in his mother's arms. Of 
course, the captain of the smuggling vessel had to pledge his sacred 
oath on each contradictory set of papers - but honor is a very negoti-
able security in time of war.l9 
In 1807, 2,606 such licenses were issued by the British government. 
In 1808 the number was 4,910, in 1809 15,226 and in 1810 18,356! Scores 
of thousands of foreign sailors were being employed by the British. In 
1811 the number of licenses fell off very sharply to a mere 7,602 be-
cause in that year the Continental System reached its peak of efficiency 
and all British trade languished. After 1811 the decline of Napoleon's 
power and influence made licenses superfluous.20 
19Phillimore, Joseph, Reflections on the Nature and Extent of the 
License Trade (London: 1811), p. 29-31. 
2011An Account of the Number of Commercial Licenses Granted during the 
last Ten Years," Parliamentary Papers. 1812, Miscellaneous. 
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Today we don't know much about the license trade beyond its 
general outlines - smugglers rarely write memoirs - and perhaps we will 
never know what portion of the licensed vessels which went to Russia 
posed as American or what portion of them~ American. We do know 
that four fifths of the licensed vessels went to the North German, Scan-
dinavian and Russian ports,21 and there are literally heaps of evidence 
that an appreciable portion of these claimed American nationality. 
It is therefore just - in a bitter-sweet way - that many of the 
ships issued British licenses to trade with the United States when ex-
ports to Britain were embargoed by the United States government dis-
guised themselves as Russians. Of the fifty-five vessels, almost all 
British owned, licensed to smuggle timber and other naval stores out of 
the United States after 1 July 1810, twenty flew the Russian flag.22 
The one ingredient that made England's license trade possible was 
her supremacy on the high seas. In the words of Admiral Alfred Mahan, 
the greatest scholar of the maritime history of this period, "Great as 
was the power of Napoleon, it ceased like that of certain wizards, when 
it reached the water."23 Britain's navy constantly shielded Britain's 
smuggler and only left him in total dependence on his disguise and wits 
when he came within range of Napoleon's shore batteries. The British 
navy arranged convoy shuttles that provided the license trader with 
nearly complete protection on the high seas, and screened the coast of 
the continent with dozens of cruising frigates, brigs of war, cutters~ 
2l~a_11, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 322. 
22"An Account of All Licenses Granted for Importing Cargoes From . . . 
North America ... to Britain ... in Foreign Ships since 1 July 1810," 
Parliamentary Paper, 1812. 
23Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 279. 
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etc., to keep most of Napoleon's privateers in port. Only in narrow 
waters, such as those around Denmark, were privateers a real and constant 
danger. 
In the spring of 1808 Admiral Saumarez, one of England's greatest 
and yet most unpraised captains of the Napoleonic Wars, entered the Bal-
tic with a fleet of sixty-two men-o-war, sixteen of which were sail of 
the line. Significantly, his flagship was the Victory, which had been 
Nelson's ship at Trafalgar. For the next four shipping seasons, he and 
his fleet would dominate the Baltic, driven from that sea only by the 
advance of ice and returning every spring when the ice, in its turn, re-
treated. Saumarez won no great battles - there were no fleets to do 
battle with - but he did efficiently manage the incredibly difficult 
business of shepherding vast convoys of "neutrals" through the Great 
Belt, and he performed great feats of diplomacy in preserving and culti-
vating the fund of North European good will toward Britain which had 
survived Napoleon's machinations and Britain's brutality. He kept open 
the vital channels of trade between his nation and the Baltic. Without 
his services it is entirely possible that Napoleon's Continental System 
would have succeeded in its object.24 
Saumarez's main opponent in the Baltic and its approaches was 
Denmark. Denmark, her fleet gone, her merchant marine decimated and her 
vital maritime commerce throttled, moaned for her dead like Laertes· over 
the graves of his father and sister, and - like Laertes - plotted re-
venge with the ready approval of the true villain of the piece. 
24Albion, Forests and Sea Power, p. 181-82; Ross, Sir John, and 
Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez (London: Richard Bentley, 
1838), Vol. II, p. 98-101. 
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The Danish government, having nei.ther the time or means to 
reproduce its fleet, turned to privateering as a way to strike at Eng-
land. In September, 1807, while the ruins of Copenhagen still smol-
dered, the first K~rreglement - regulation for privateering - was is-
sued. The Danish and Norwegian sailors, their normal ways of earning a 
living cut off by the presence of the British fleet, were spurred into 
privateering by hunger as well as by patriotism, and thirty-two vessels 
were fitted out for privateering in less than a month.25 They were just 
the vanguard. 
In addition to encouraging such private ventures into naval 
warfare, the Danish government itself built and sent out numbers of gun-
boats. These boats carried at the very most only two twenty-four pound-
ers and a crew of sixty, and, while they did have auxiliary sails, nor-
mally depended on oars. They were paltry successors to the proud sail 
of the line that now flew the hated Union Jack, but in Denmark's narrow, 
reef-strewn waters they could be deadly weapons. In the Belts or Sound 
an English mistake in seamanship or a slackening of the wind could leave 
a whole convoy of tender "neutral" merchantmen open to attack while 
their seventy-two gun shepherd languished on a sand bar or whistled for 
wind a mile away. With a bit of luck, oars and two cannon and a few 
dozen sabres might bring down the British Empire.26 
The Danish gunboats and privateers operated from bases on both 
flanks of the Skagerak (remember, Norway is Danish), from Denmark prop-
er and from Zealand. and from Bornholm and other islands in the Baltic. 
25Ruppenthal, Journal of Modern History, Vol. XV, p. 19. 
26Ryan, A.N., "The Defense of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808-1813," 
The English Historical Review, (July, 1959), Vol. LXXIV, p. 445. 
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The Danes and Norwegians devised "telegraph" systems to warn of 
approaching sails: sentinels stationed high in the hills along the coast 
peering over the far edge of the beach-dweller's horizon to signal pri-
vateers waiting below to the attack long before the privateers or their 
prey saw each other. Thus it was impossible for any American - fraudu-
lent or real - to pass through the narrows to the Baltic and Kronstadt 
between 1807 and 1812 without knowing that he was constantly under the 
gimlet eye of one or several or a hundred plunder-hungry Danes.27 
Danes, particularly hungry ones, found it very difficult to tell an 
American vessel from a British, and when they did seize a real American, 
they were inclined to assume, too often with justification, that the 
Bostonian or New Yorker of Philadelphian was sailing on British account. 
The fact that the captain and crew of a privateer got a good percentage 
of whatever they brought in and persuaded the courts to condemn was not, 
of course, inclined to blunt their eagerness or sharpen their discern-
ment. 
Shortly after the melting ice admitted shipping to the Baltic in 
1808, the Danish privateers brought in the Margaret, Captain Alex. 
Clark, allegedly of Baltimore, bound into the Baltic from Charleston. A 
bit later the Jermina and Fanny, Captain Jacob Sherburne, allegedly of 
Charleston bound for Russia, and the Galen, Captain Stedman, allegedly 
of Boston bound from London to Russia, were captured. These were the 
first of well over one hundred fifty vessels seized and brought into 
Danish ports while indignantly claiming American nationality.28 
27Ibid., p. 448; Ruppenthal, Journal of Modern History, Vol. XV, p. 19. 
28consular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copenhag-
en, 19 May 1808. 
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By 18 November of 1808 eleven vessels flying the American flag had 
been captured. The American consul at Copenhagen found himself with 
several score of stranded Americans on his hands. l'he problem of main-
taining them was so difficult that the Consul asked for and received per-
mission to load them on the Live Oak, one of the captured vessels, and 
ship them all back to America. Some of the Americans, however, were of 
little expense or trouble to him. 'l'hey enlisted aboard Danish priva-
teers, possibly to show that they weren't the kind to hold a grudge. 
Of the captains of the eleven captured ships, only Captain Stedman 
of the Galen was able to convince the Vanish authorities by November 
that his ship was, indeed, an American vessel. The Galen was released 
and Captain Stedman bound himself to sail her directly back to the 
United States. As the Galen cleared L;openhagen, there was in sight of 
that port a British convoy. In full view of those on shore, the Galen 
joined that convoy and resumed its voyage to Russia. 29 The Americans 
awaiting trial then presumably felt like knotting a bit of Russian hemp 
about their necks and casting themselves from the highest yardarm avail-
able in the harbor of vopenhagen. 
When the Galen arrived at Kronstadt it found a city by now fully 
aware of what the alliance with Napoleon was doing to Russia's commerce. 
Usually eight hundred to a thousand vessels arrived at St. Petersburg 
and her seaward offspring, Kronstadt, in a year. ln 1808 sixty 
arrived. 30 
29Ibid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 18 Nov. 1808. 
30uiplomatic Despatches -Russia, Vol. I, Extract from Court Gazette of 
St. Petersburg dated 27 Jan. 1810, 0. S. 
124 
Russian merchants and nobles were grumbling, somethines under their 
breath and sometimes not, and developing a mercenary myopia that made it 
impossible for them to tell a false neutral arrivaL from a real one. 
The Russian gover.nment was busying itself with finding new customers for 
Russian products. Alexander's valiant ally, France, was no good as a 
customer. France was a continental nation too, and raised for itself 
many of the goods Russia exported. 31 The goods she did want, and want 
desperately from Russia, such as masts and spars, were too cumbersome to 
ship any way but by sea, and there lay the British fleet, eager to uti-
lize every stick of timber it could seize. In 1810 the French needed 
masts so badly that they tried to float rafts of masts from Riga along 
the coastal shallows behind the sand bars and low islands to Memel, 
where they could travel by inland waterways to Hamburg and thence to 
l<'rance. But a storm shattered the rafts and strewed the masts all over 
the Baltic.32 There was simply no way in which France could substitute 
for England as Russia's chief customer. 
On 13 July 1808 ~ount Rumiantsev, Chancellor of Russia, informed 
Levett Harris that Russia was sending its first diplomatic representa-
tive to the United States. 'I'sar Alexander had appointed Andre Dashkoff 
the Russian consul-general at Philadelphia and also conferred on him the 
office of his charge d'affaires near the ~ongress of the United ~tates.33 
As Rumiantsev said, '' ••• in dissolving our commercial connections with 
Great Britain, it became necessary to seek some other power in whom we 
31oddy, European Commerce, p. 125, 397. 
32Adams Microfilm, Reel 136, p. 187, To Sec. of ~tate, St. Petersburg, 
6 Nov. 1810. 
33Hildt, J.U., Early Uiplomatic Negotiations of the United States with 
Russia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1906), p. 38. 
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might find a substitute, and on looking around, I could see none but the 
United States who were at all competent to this object."34 
34American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 299. 
Chapter IX 
Act I, Scene II: Yankees, Vikings, 
and Englishmen Learn Russian Roulette 
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President Jefferson had little desire to see his nation entangled 
in the war between Russia and Great Britain - or in any other war - but 
he had to quiet the clamor of the American seaboard cities for trade. 
In America in 1809 the ice and President Jefferson's unshakeable dedi-
~ation to his Embargo melted about the same time. On the first day of 
March, three days before the presidency passed to James Madison, Jeffer-
son signed the Non-intercourse Act, which renewed our trade with all the 
world but France, Britain, their colonies and lands occupied by their 
forces. 
Americans wishing to trade with Russia could now do so in perfect 
legality. Even Great Britain, seeking cover for her license trade, 
smiled upon Russo-American commerce. On April 2, London issued a new 
Order in Council modifying the Order of 1807 so as to permit Americans 
to trade with any North European port east of the Ems River not in ac-
tual possession of the French without stopping first in British ports.l 
American vessels sailing directly to Russia could pass right beneath 
the guns of British men-o-war with impunity. 
Everything in the United States and Russia seemed to point to 1809 
becoming the greatest year of Russo-American commerce. The Non-inter-
course Act made trade with most of Western Europe illegal. Nearly all 
the leading rivals of the United States for Russian trade had been elim-
inated, and Russia's capacity as a market for goods brought by Americans 
lBemis, Samuel Flagg, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 167. 
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was thus far greater than it had ever been before. Russia, anxious to 
open new channels for her exports, gave American ships a more hospitable 
welcome than they could find practically anywhere else in Europe.2 Now 
that the end of the Embargo had changed sailing ships from liabilities 
into assets, the demand in America for Russian naval stores was enormous. 
Russian duck, which brought at most $24.50 a bolt wholesale in 1807, was 
priced as high as $44 a bolt in 1809.3 Hemp, usually about $250 to $270 
a ton, and would continue to bring such prices for a year and more.4 As 
late as July, 1810, even the despised Kentucky dew-retted hemp brought 
$330 a ton in Philadelphia.S 
Americans who did reach Russia in 1809 and return made fantastically 
high profits. The North America of Portland sailed for Russia with the 
usual cargo of mahogany, logwood, coffee, pepper, indigo and rum, and re-
turned with the usual cargo of iron, hemp, sheeting, ravensduck, sail-
cloth and bristles. And yet hers was one of the most profitable voyages 
in the history of Portland.6 Similarly lucrative was the voyage of Bos-
ton's Catherine to Russia in 1809. She cleared $115,000 on that single 
voyage.7 
Yet in 1809 only fifty-five American vessels found their way to 
Kronstadt. ~robably something like two thirds as many.entered at the 
2coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 64; Peabody, Letterbook of 
Captain Thomas Osgood, 1809-11, To P.&H. Le Mesurier & Co., St. Peters-
burg, 8 Nov. 1809. 
3cole, Arthur H., Wholesale Commodit 
1861, Statistical Supp ement Cambri ge: Harvar University 
p. 148, 154. 
4American State Papers. Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 39. 
5Hopkins, Hemp Industry in Kentucky, p. 82-83. 
6Rowe, William, The Maritime History of Maine (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1948), p. 86. 
7nulles, Foster R., The Road _to Teheran_ (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1944), p. 22. 
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other Russian Baltic ports and at Archangel, making a total of, let us 
say, eighty to ninety American vessels in Russian ports that year.8 
That figure isn't really impressive if you consider the forces driving 
and attracting Americans to Russia in 1809. The number of American ves-
sels that arrived in Russia in 1809 was probably not much, if at all, in 
excess of the number that arrived in 1807. 
The mystery of why so few arrived in 1809 is, unfortunately for 
American merchants of the day, very easy to explain. In 1809 the accel-
erating economic warfare between France and England made the life of the 
neutral trader very miserable indeed. In the fall of that year Stephen 
Girard, the great Philadelphia merchant, wrote plaintively to Baring 
Brothers and Company, his chief agent and broker in Europe, "It is re-
markable that out of six ships which I have dispatched for Europe since 
the Embargo has been taken off, that three of them have been captured, 
one lost, and only one has arrived safely at her destination."9 
The chief opponents of Girard in his losing battle to make a profit 
in European trade in 1809 were the Danes and Norwegians. These peaceful 
Scandinavians, egged on by French scheming and driven by English brutal-
ity, assumed again the posture of Vikings and scourged the waters around 
Norway and Denmark. In the process of bringing in every vessel in 1809 
that wasn't lucky, fast, or hiding behind a British man-o-war, these 
corsairs of Frederick VI, King of Denmark, captured fifty-one vessels 
flying the American flag.lO 
8Diplomatic Despatches - Russia, Vol. I, Extract from Gazette of St. 
Petersburg, 27 Jan. 1810, 0. S. 
9MCMaster, John Bach, The Life and Times of Stephen Girard, Mariner and 
Merchant (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1918), Vol. II, p. l07. 
lOAmerican State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 332. 
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However, the attitude of Danes and Americans toward each other was 
not exclusively that of wolf and prey. In 1809 they also did consider-
able trading, mostly through the tiny Danish town of Tonningen in 
Schleswig. (Schleswig- Holstein was then still part of Denmark.) In 
1809 1onningen found that the fortunes of war had made it the most west-
erly port in North Europe not under Napoleon's direct control and not 
blockaded by the British navy. Between June and December of 1809, 150 
American vessels, among others, carefully tacked through the dangerous 
baffle of shoals at the mouth of the Eyder, and up that narrow river to 
Tonningen. There they unloaded enormous quantities of colonial goods. 
This produce was carted south to Altona on the border near Hamburg and 
smuggled from there across into the heart of Napoleon's Europe in 
pouches, under ladies' dresses, in coffins which pious Danes brought 
across the border to Hamburg to bury, and in a thousand other ways. Be-
fore the year was over, Napoleon -to whom all Americans were Englishmen. 
in disguise and all colonial produce English in origin - intimidated 
Frederick VI into closing this gaping rent in the Continental System. 
"J'ai vu avec peine qu'Altona etait devenue colonie anglaise, 11 murmured 
Bonaparte, and Frederick jumped. But in 1809, called by the Danes "den 
auden Tonningenske," Americans exported over four million dollars worth 
of goods to Denmark, more than twice as much as ever before. 11 
Denmark, however, is best remembered by Americans who were there in 
1809 not for Tonningen but for Ghristiansand and Copenhagen and the 
scores of inlets from which the privateers slipped like barracuda from 
coral caves. The Danes captured twenty-five American vessels and 
llRuppenthal, Journal of Modern History, Vol. XV, p. 11, 12, 14, 15, 
21, 22; Misc. Doc. of House of Rep. for 2d Sess., 52nd Cong. Vol. 
XXVI, p. XIII. 
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brought them into ports of Zealand, Denmark proper and adjacent islands. 
Eighteen of the twenty-five were acquitted and seven condemned.12 The 
Norwegian subjects of Denmark, literally driven by hunger, were even 
more active. In the same period they brought in thirty-six American 
sail. Thirty of these were eventually acquitted and six condemned.l3 
In total, fifty-one were captured in 1809, and of these all but 
thirteen acquitted. The large number of acquittals indicates that the 
Danish prize courts were among the most just in Europe at the time. The 
large number of acquittals also probably indicates that nothing like a 
majority of the ships sporting the American flag in European waters in 
these years were disguised Englishmen. (Fraudulent Americans, however, 
would probably always take the English convoys past Danish territory, 
and thus usually escape capture, so the number of Americans acquitted by 
the Danes is no more than merely indicative of American honesty.) 
Americans caught up in "the law's delay" in Denmark had not our 
detachment, and they didn't think of the Danes as just. In fact, they 
thought Danish law and courts the very writ and tribunals of the Devil. 
George Thorndike of the captured Massachusetts vessel Suwarrow discov-
ered that his Bowdoin College baccalaureate thesis on international 
trade, which the privateers had commanded, was being used against his 
ship in court. The thesis contained deprecatory remarks about Napoleon. 
Therefore, the privateers reasoned in a non sequitur born of greed, the 
Suwarrow must be English. The vessel was not condemned on that fiction, 
though. She was condemned on the charge that, although neither the ves-
sel or cargo were English, they had become tainted with Englishness when 
12Am.erican State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 531. 
13Ibid., p. 533. 
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the Suwarrow appealed to a British frigate for help at the time of the 
capture. The Americans shouted that there wasn't even an English sail 
in sight at the time - but to no avail.l4 
The forty-three American memorialists at Christiansand, Norway, 
whom we met in the last chapter, agreed that the Danes did work rather 
too hard at trying to convict: 
"In some cases, where the most trifling inaccuracy could not 
be discovered in our ships' papers, we have found them, when 
out of our possession, mutilated and defaced. In some in-
stances, our people have been tempted with bribes, and 
threatened with punishments, to induce their giving false 
testimony against our property. . . . 11 
The Danes, the forty-three also agreed, did little to broach the lan-
guage barrier: 
''In those cases which have been adjudicated, all the 
proceedings are in the Danish language, (with which your 
memorialists are unacquainted,) and we have been invari-
ably refused either a copy of those proceedings general-
ly, or even the particular charges against us, until what 
they called the trial was over. . . . "15 
All the captured Americans complained bitterly of the snail-pace of 
Danish justice. While prices of colonial goods in Tonningen and Kron-
stadt dropped, the captured Americans waited. While their provisions 
ran out and their crews idled and got paid for it, the Americans waited. 
While Napoleon thought about forcing Frederick VI to sequester all neu-
tral property in Danish territory, and thought about adding all Denmark 
to his empire, which would have meant confiscation of all American prop-
erty in that land, the Americans sat and waited. Their nail-biting 
wasn't entirely mercenary, either. By September of 1809 there were 
14Forbes, J.D., Israel Thorndike, Federalist Financier (New York: 
Exposition Press, 1933), p. 69-70. 
15American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 329. 
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upwards of 400 Americans at Christiansand, and all Norway was on the 
edge of starvation.l6 
Delay was part and parcel of Danish justice. The Suwarrow, for 
instance, was captured on 30 April 1809 and wasn't finally condemned un-
til December.l7 The vessel Good Friends, one of the lost ships of which 
Girard complained, was taken on 18 July 1809 and not freed until 9 June 
1810.18 
When the American ships were, as was usually the case, liberated, 
it still cost their owners money. The courts invariably dunned the 
Americans for the court costs, which amounted to two, three and even 
five hundred rixdollars per trial. And Americans cleared by the lower 
courts often found it cheaper to bribe the privateers not to appeal 
their cases than to wait for trial in the higher courts. More litiga-
tion meant months and months more delay. The captains and supercargoes 
of the seventeen American sail brought into Norway and freed by the low-
er courts of Christiansand paid between them 19,800 rixdollars to avoid 
appeal.l9 To give a specific example, William Adgate of the Good Friends 
waited for a year for his ship to be cleared by the lower court, and 
when that wonderful day finally came, he was told by Gabriel and Ebe 
Lund, the privateers who had brought in the Good Friends, that they 
wanted 20,000 rixdollars or they would appeal. Adgate settled with them 
for 6,700 rixdollars and blessed the moment when the Good Friends 
weighed anchor and stood out to sea.20 
16Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 346, 350. 
17Forbes, Thorndike, p. 69-70. 
l~CMaster, Girard, Vol. II, p. 87, 96. 
19American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 529. 
2~CMaster, Girard, Vol. II, p. 97. 
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The whole problem of Danish seizure of American property was 
immensely complicated by the lack of any but the most minimal United 
States diplomatic representation in Denmark. The United States did not 
even have the standard treaty of peace and commerce with Denmark, al-
though the absence of such a treaty meant that Americans paid higher 
Sound dues and half again as much duty on goods they brought to Denmark 
than merchants of Britain, Holland, France, and all the other nations 
which had treaties with Denmark.21 At the end of the 1\merican Revolu-
tion Benjamin Franklin and the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs had 
drawn up such a treaty, but because of inactivity by our Congress it 
died in embryo.22 During these barren negotiations Franklin had written 
to the Danish minister: 
" ... Those ministers are wise who look into futurity and 
quench the first spark between two nations, which neglected 
may in time grow into flame, all the consequences whereof 
no human prudence can foresee, which may produce much mis-
chief to both and cannot possibly do any good to either."23 
Danish-American relations between 1807 and 1812 exactly confirmed Frank-
lin's moralizing. 
If America's Congressmen were sluggards, however, her merchants 
were not, and the numbers of American ships passing through the Sound 
by the early 1790s made it apparent that the United States would have 
to have a consul at Copenhagen. In 1792 George Washington appointed 
Hans Rudolph Saabye, a wealthy Danish merchant ~~£_member of the House of 
21Hill, Charles E., The Danish Sound Dues and the Command of the Baltic 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1926), p. 269; Fogdall, Soren, Danish-
American Diplomacy, 1776-1920 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
1922), p. 47-48. 
22Ibid., p. 21. 
23nahlerup, Joost, "Early Danish-American Diplomacy," The American-
Scandinavian Review, Vol. XXX (Dec., 1942), p. 313. 
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Ryberg who had been involved in trade with Americans in the 1780s, as 
the United States consul in Denmark.24 
Thus it was that when Americans of vessels seized by the Danes were 
crying that " ••• neither the correctness of our papers, nor the justice 
of our causes afford us any prospect of acquittal. If we ever obtain 
redress it must be by the interference of our own government,"25 the on-
ly official of that government on the scene was (1) a Dane and (2) a 
member of a commercial house that, like nearly every institution in Co-
penhagen, was involved either directly or indirectly in privateering.26 
Mr. Saaby never perverted his consulship by working against the 
Americans. In fact, he did nothing at all about Americans. Considering 
the helplessness of those seeking his aid, this may have been nearly as 
reprehensible. The forty-three memorialists at Christiansand gently 
complained that "Mr. Saabye, although well apprized of our situation, 
had not taken those steps which are certainly in his power ••• "27 Robert 
Rogers of the Suwarrow howled that "our consul here is apathy itself," 
and claimed that Saabye's "present conduct ought in the mind of every 
American to stigmatize him with the guilt of the unpardonable sin."28 
Not all Danish subjects drove Americans to such desperate extremes 
of expression. Americans had only praise for Peter Isaacson of Chris-
tiansaad,, whom they- for lack of help or direction from their own 
24Fogdall, Vanish-American Diplomacy, p. 29; Commerce of Rhode Island, 
Vol. II, p. 376, 384, 437, 453. 
25peabody, Letterbook of Robert Rogers, 1809-10; 'ro Israel Thorndike, 
Christiania, 18 Dec. 1809. 
26Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 350-51. 
27American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 329. 
28Letterbook of Rogers, To Levett Harris, ~openhagen, 21 Aug. 1809, To 
Israel Thorndike, Christiania, 29 Sept. 1809. 
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government - chose and appointed as United States consul in that nest of 
privateers.29 But the attitude of most Americans toward the Danes in 
1809 was expressed by the supercargo of the Good Friends, William Adgate: 
"The blood suckers are determined to get all they can out of us." The 
voice of his friend, Captain Thompson, skipper of the Good Friends, 
rings out to us across a century and a half, "Was you here, you would 
only help your humble servant to swear at their damn proceed-
ings ."30 
Some Americans, of course, did slip past the Danish privateers, but 
even for them life was not entirely filled with joy. Many of them scur-
ried into Gothenburg, Sweden, hoping not so much to find a market there 
as to gain information as to where one could find a good market in the 
north of Europe. For instance, when Captain Thomas B. Osgood cleared 
Salem with the bark Mary in May, 1809, he was instructed by her owners 
to go to Gothenburg and "After obtaining at this place all the necessary 
information we submit entirely to your judgment the future course of the 
voyage." As possibilities they suggested Hamburg, Amsterdam, Antwerp, 
Lubeck, Kiel or St. Petersburg.31 A perfect indicator of why United 
States trade increased with Russia so much after 1808 is the fact that, 
by the end of that shipping season, St. Petersburg was the only port 
left on that list where Osgood could take the Mary with any degree of 
confidence that she would not be seized. 
29American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 329, 521-22. 
30McMaster, Girard, Vol. II, p. 94. 
31Peabody, Letterbook of Captain Thomas B. Osgood, 1809-11, To Osgood, 
Salem, May, 1809. 
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At the beginning of 1809 Sweden was still at war with Russia and 
Denmark, and was England's only remaining ally on the Baltic. The Danes 
contributed little to the war against Sweden beyond harrassing her mari-
time commerce and floating inflamatory literature across the Sound by 
balloon,32 but the armies of Alexander 1 needed little help. Before 
summer was over Sweden was reeling before those armies, and in Septem-
ber, she signed a peace surrendering l<'inland to Russia. A few months 
later Sweden succumbed to pressure from F'rance and Russia, and joined 
the vontinental System. 
Sweden's dependence on trade with England, however, prevented her 
from ever becoming more than a nominal enemy of the British. Admiral 
Saumarez avoiding molesting Swedish shipping, and Sweden never looked too 
closely at "neutral" merchantmen arriving in her ports. Gothenburg con-
tinued as the great entrepot of trade trying to find a chink in the 
North European ramparts of the Continental System. ·rhe total value of 
goods in bond in Sweden grew from 511,000 rixdollars in 1807 to 
10,200,000 in 1813.33 Gothenburg - the waiting room of the Baltic -
which had a population of only about 20,000,found itself transformed 
into one of the greatest ports in the world.34 
Sweden, like other nations whose normal channels of trade were 
disrupted by war, discovered a strong vein of love for America in 1809. 
In May the American consul at Gothenburg reported to the Secretary of 
State that "The Swedish government, I can assure you, is much inclined 
to cultivate a close commercial intercourse with the United States and 
32Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 33. 
33scott, Franklin, The United States and Scandinavia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 210 
34worcester, J.E., A Geographical uictionary, Vol. I, p. 672. 
137 
there is no flag so much respected in their ports as ours. . "35 
Sweden's blooming respect for the Stars and Stripes was not misplaced. 
In 1809 the United States, which at a maximum had never exported to Swe-
den in a single year more than $125,000 worth, poured on to her wharves 
goods to the value of over five million dollars.36 
Yet there was no profit for Americans at Gothenburg. The immense 
quaritities of colonial goods bulging the warehouses of that city drugged 
the market, and sugar and coffee were as cheap as dirt in Gothenburg for 
the duration of the Continental System. When Captain Osgood brought the 
Mary into Gothenburg in June of 1809 he discovered that her cargo of in-
digo, cotton, sugar, coffee and pepper, worth a king's ransom on the 
Continent, would not even attract an offer in Sweden.37 
The news was that the demand for such goods was high in Russia and 
that the captain who could manage to get his cargo there was assured of 
a great voyage. But there was the problem of the Danish privateers, and 
in addition there was the problem of the war between Sweden and Russia. 
Until those two made peace, an American arriving at Kronstadt from Goth-
enburg might simply be making a gift of his vessel and cargo to the Rus-
sian government. "I wish 'twas in my power to go to Russia," longed 
Captain Osgood, "but should I go under existing circumstance, the ves-
sel and cargo would be condemned as coming from an enemy port."38 
The situation of the American captains and supercargoes at 
Consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Gothenbur& 
8 May 1809. 
3~isc. Doc. of House of Rep .• 2d Sess. 52d Cong. Vol. XXVI, p. XVII. 
37Letterbook of Osgood, To Pickman and Derby, Gothenburg, 6 July 1809. 
38rbid. 
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profit and total failure tormented their imaginations. The only thing 
the Americans were sure of was that they couldn't remain in Gothenburg. 
In Sweden there was no chance of selling their cargoes, and the trick-
le of daily expenses was slowly bleeding away all chance of a successful 
voyage. 
In Russia the merchants were as anxious for the arrival of Americans 
as the Americans were anxious to arrive. In July a letter arrived in 
Gothenburg from St. Petersburg dated 27 June in which the writer stated 
that only a miniscule 109 vessels had thus far entered at Kronstadt and 
only four or five of them were American. Where are the Americans? the 
writer asked.39 The answer was, of course, fuming in Christiansand and 
Copenhagen or suffering the tortures of Tantalus in Gothenburg. 
Even as late as 4 September only twelve of the fifty-five American 
sail to come to Kronstadt in 1809 had arrived.40 But in August and Sep-
tember two developments put an end to the paralysis of American shipping 
in the Baltic. In August the accumulated complaints of neutral nations 
and England's retaliatory blockade of Norway persuaded Frederick VI to 
prohibit privateering everywhere but in the waters around British-held 
Heligoland.41 And in September the war between Sweden and Russia ended. 
In the few weeks remaining before ice reclaimed the Gulf of Finland 
forty-three American vessels arrived in Kronstadt. 
A good many of the fifty-five American sail that came to Kronstadt 
and the Americans that entered elsewhere in the Baltic in 1809-=mu~s~t ____ _ 
~eabody, Letterbook of Benjamin Shreve, 1809-10, To Peele, Dodge, and 
Robinson, Gothenburg, 28 July 1809. 
40consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 
23 Aug/4 Sept. 1809. 
41Ruppenthal, Journal of Modern Histor~, Vol. XV, p. 19; Ryan, The Eng-
lish Histori~al Review, Vol. LXXIV, p. 
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have passed through the Danish narrows as members of British convoys. 
In the first place, it was safer to do so. In the second place, the 
British fleet, seeking to rob Denmark of her Sound dues and to destroy 
the commerce of Copenhagen, permitted very few neutrals to enter the 
Sound, encouraging them rather to take British convoy through the Great 
Belt.42 All in all, only forty~five American sail passed into the Bal-
tic through the Sound in 1809, five of which were seized by the Danes 
and condemned by the Danish prize courts. Of the remaining forty,only 
twenty returned through the Sound.43 
Between 1807 and 1812 literally hundreds of American vessels passed 
in and out of the Baltic under the protective cannon of British men-o-
war, but very few Americans left contemporary accounts of that part of 
the voyage. If their vessels were brought in later by the Danes, any 
letter or diary or log that showed they had sailed in a British convoy 
would be used as evidence against them. Men skirting the edge of the 
law are rarely seized with the autobiographical urge. 
Captain Osgood, for example, dutifully reported to the owners of 
the Mary every detail of her voyage, but failed to send them any infor-
mation about her voyage from Gothenburg to Kronstadt. We have no record 
of whether she did nor did not hurry past Denmark under the protection 
of British guns. All we know is that the Mary arrived in Kronstadt har-
bor on 26 September 1809.44 
Sailing with the British was certainly not anything Osgood would 
have been ashamed to tell the 's owners. His friend Ben"amin 
2Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 430-31. 
43oiplomatic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To. Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 
12 Feb. 1812. 
44Letterbook of Osgood, To Pickman and Derby, Kronstadt, 4 Oct. 1809. 
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Shreve, supercargo of the bark William Gray of Beverly, wrote jauntily 
to his employers from Gothenburg in August, 1809: 
"Gentlemen, 
A convoy was appointed this day for the Baltic, to sail 
the day after tomorrow, and I believe it will go through 
the Belt. It will consist of a brig of sixteen guns and a 
sloop of war. In the Belt, I understand, there are many 
(British) ships of the line. I feel no apprehension of 
capture, and I am happy to say nothing has transpired to 
lessen the opinion I have all along entertained, that this 
will be a very profitable voyage if we can get home in 
safety. . . . I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you 
about Christmas."45 
Throughout the existence of the Continental System the British navy 
maintained an admirably efficient convoy service shuttling neutrals, 
real and false, in and out of the Baltic. Vessels bound from the Brit-
ish Isles to the Baltic gathered at four points: at Nore, the Humber 
estuary, Leith and Long Hope Sound in the Orkneys. Every fortnight or 
so the convoys sailed out into the North Sea from these rendezvous es-
corted by one or two small men-o-war.46 The Eclipse of Philadelphia 
sailed with one of those convoys in 1810, and her supercargo, RichardS. 
Smith, recorded nearly sixty years later his memories of that exciting 
period of his youth: 
"We sailed from the harbor of Long Hope under convoy of the 
sloop-of-war, the fleet numbering about thirty sail .... I 
was occupied and amused watching the movements of so many 
vessels of different nations, and of various classes; ships 
of large size, others of peculiar shape and rig, and all be-
ing subject to the signals and orders of the convoying ship. 
One would get a little in advance of the convoy, when a gun 
fired in that direction would cause a sudden hauling down 
of sails, and dropping astern, to receive a reproof for 
breach of orders; others would hoist all sail, and even then 
45Letterbook of Shreve, To Peale, Dodge, and Robinson, Gothenburg, 14 
Aug. 1809. 
46Ryan, English Historical Review, Vol. LXXIV, p. 452. 
fall so far in the rear that we all would have to shorten 
sail until they could come up with us." 
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This first leg of the convoy route to the Baltic was usually the 
least dangerous, but the Danes were never to be underestimated. As 
Smith's convoy neared the Naze of Norway: 
"We observed a sloop-of-war, under English colors, making 
all sail towards us, firing guns and making signals, which 
were answered by our convoying ship. Being near our con-
voy, we hailed, and asked the meaning of these signals, 
and were directed to look up to windward, and there we 
should see a fleet of about forty sail of vessels, which, 
being under convoy of the ship that was approaching us, 
had a few hours before been met by three Danish gun-brigs, 
and the whole of them captured and driven before them to 
Christiansand. . . .We considered ourselves fortunate 
that the Danes were too much occupied to turn their atten-
tion to us, otherwise, as they were to windward of us, 
they could really have run down to us, when our convoying 
ship would not have been able to cope with three."47 
The immediate destination of a convoy from England was Wingo Sound 
near Gothenburg, where the North Sea escorts left the convoy and she an-
chored to wait, probably impatiently, for a convoy for the Great Belt to 
be assembled. Sweden never molested the British in Wingo Sound, which 
is another proof of the perfunctory nature of her alliance with Napo-
leon.48 
In 1808 the British had sent convoys through the Sound, but had 
discovered that the Great Belt was the safer route, in spite of its 
reefs, swirling currents, its two Danish shores and its great length. 
47Smith, Richard S., Reminiscences of Seven Years of Early Life (Wilming-
ton, Delaware: Ferris Brothers, 1884), p. 18, 19. Smith's memory in 
the second note is somewhat faulty. The number of Danish brigs was real-
ly five and the British escort was a brig of war. Incidentally, eighteen 
of the vessels captured were American. (Ryan, English Historical Review, 
LXXIV, p. 453; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 
533.) This attack was one of the few occasions when the Danes came out 
in anything larger than gunboats. 
48smith, Reminiscences, p. 20; Ryan, English Historical Review, LXXIV, 
p. 454. 
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It took four or more days to pass through the tricky channels of the 
Belt, meaning nights of danger and tension anchored practically within 
cannon shot of shore, but the Sound channel close to the Swedish shore 
which Danish batteries forced the British to use was so narrow and closed 
in with sand bars that a convoy had no room to maneuver at all. Strung 
out in single file, it was a line of sitting ducks for Danish galleys on 
calm days. 
The convoys leaving Wingo Bay for the Baltic were often several 
hundred in number. As they cleared they were escorted by not more than 
a frigate and brig of war or so, but at the head of the Belt their es-
cart was increased by a sail of the line, which stayed with them until 
they were through that passage. Halfway through the Belt, they came un-
der the additional protection of four other sail of the line which were 
stationed there as a sort of floating battery to shelter the convoys 
from the large enemy bases in that area.49 
During the passage of the Belt, tension rose as the sun set. Under 
cover of darkness the Danes would slip out from the flanking shores to 
catch a straggler or to hazard a sudden attack to cut out one or two 
merchantmen. George Coggeshall went through the Belt in one of these 
convoys as captain of the Eliza of New York in 1810, and forty years 
later he remembered that as dusk approached, the British would signal 
for "The headmost ships to shorten sail and close convoy, and it some-
times happened that one of the frigates was ordered to make fast to a 
dull sailing ship, and tow her up into the midst of the fleet."50 Then 
all dropped anchor, the merchantmen clustered in the middle like ewes 
49Ibid., p. 455-57. 
50coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 86. 
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and lambs, the men-o-war spaced around the convoy like old rams.Sl Boats 
from the men-o-war, armed with cannon, rowed round the convoy in the 
dark.52 
In the best of weather this passage of the Belt by such large groups 
of ships called for excellent seamanship. In poor weather it called for 
prodigies of seamanship. The Belt, narrow and reef strewn, was not wide 
enough for a large number of ships to beat to windward at once, so when-
ever the wind was contrary, the whole convoy had to drop anchor, no mat-
ter how deep the water, rocky the bottom or otherwise unsuitable the sit-
uation for an anchorage. With ships tossing about, dragging their an-
chors and tangling their cables and reefs and breakers on the lee no mat-
ter which way the wind blew, the convoy could rapidly degenerate into a 
mess to test the sanity of the coolest sailor. Captain Coggeshall tells 
of one such occasion: 
"Fro'm the twenty-seventh to the twenty-nineth (of October, 
1810) we lay at anchor the greatest part of the time - the 
wind being ahead. At six P.M., on the twenty-nineth, all 
the fleet was ordered to get under way; it was blowing strong 
at the time, with a high sea running, and so many ships 
crowded together that I found it impossible to weigh our an-
chor, without getting foul of some other vessel; we were 
therefore obliged to cut the cable and lose the anchor, with 
the greater part of the small bower. A great many vessels 
were similarly situated and were obliged to slip and cut, 
and make sail, to keep up with the convoy. I think, without 
the least exaggeration, I passed more than fifty buoys on 
anchors and cables that had been thus left."53 
Losing anchors was such a standard event on these mad voyages that the 
experienced advised that anyone taking convoy through the Belt "should 
have at least three anchors and cables.n54 
51 Ibid., p. 87. --
52Ryan, English Historical Review, LXXIV, p. 457. 
53coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 87. 
54peabody, Log of bark William Gray, 29 July 1810. 
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Despite manifold difficulties, the British convoy shuttles through 
the Belt were eminently successful. Except for two or three successful 
Danish sorties, the most damaging of which w~s the one Smith observed, 
the attacks on the convoys were insignificant. Between mid-June and 
early November, 1809, for instances, 2,210 merchantmen were escorted 
through the Belt without a single casualty as result of enemy action. 55 
To the extent to which this flow or merchantmen through the straits of 
Denmark preserved Britain's economy from collapse, Napoleon owed his de-
feat to the excellent work of Saumarez and his sailors. 
Once out of the Belt and into the Baltic, the sail of the line left 
the convoy. The other escort vessels, the sloops and brigs of war and 
such minor men-a-war, continued with the convoy to a point about fifty 
leagues beyond the island of Bornholm. There they, too, left, and the 
merchantmen were stripped of all but the indirect protection of the 
British cruisers that screened Gotland and Danzig, from which F'renoh 
privateers sometimes sallied forth to capture an occasional merchantman. 
But French privateering in the Baltic never compared to the Danish in 
magnitude, and not until 1811 and 1812 did the activities of French pri-
vateers become one of the primary worries of Americans on the way to 
Russia. 56 
Americans and other neutrals seeking convoy on the return voyage 
from Russia gathered at Karlskrona, Sweden, until Napoleon obliged Swe-
den to declare war on Britain in 1810,and after that even, in the harbor 
of the island of Hano near Karlskrona.57 As in the case of Wingo Bay the 
55Ryan, English Historical Review, LXXIV, p. 457. 
56Ibid., p. 457-60. 
57Ibici •• p. 459-60. 
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Swedes smiled upon the use of this anchorage by the "enemy." The convoy 
system from Hano was, as one would expect, the same as that from Wingo. 
In the ports of Russia, the beloved targets towards which the vast 
apparatus of convoys was aimed, the government of Alexander I continued 
in its attempt to make Russia a dutiful member of the Continental Sys-
tem. In May of 1809 the Chancellor, Count Rumiantsev, issued a ukase 
augustly proclaiming that Russia had always protected neutral shipping: 
"But, as we have learned by experience the last year that the 
enemy found means, through the medium of neutral vessels, of 
obtaining the produce he required, and of exchanging his own 
to his aggrandizement, ... we command. " 
and there followed a list of legal hurdles a ship must clear before she 
or her cargo would be admitted to Russian ports. The ship's register, 
logbook, muster-roll, etc., must all confirm her neutrality, the burden 
of proof of her cargo's neutral origin was laid upon her captain or su-
percargo, and so on and so on. The penalty for failing to prove her 
spotless neutrality was to be, at best, refusal of entrance, and at 
worst, confiscation. The discovery of forged papers or two sets of pa-
pers meant automatic confiscation.58 All in all, Russia confiscated the 
cargoes of forty-nine vessels that arrived in 1809.59 
If Russia were trying to cut off all commerce between herself and 
England, then she did indeed need this tough new policy for dealing with 
neutral vessels. The one flaw in the new policy was the difficulty of 
executing it properly when seemingly all the neutrals and the entire pop-
ulations of St. Petersburg, Kronstadt, Riga, Reval, Archangel, etc., 
58American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 327. 
S~ikhailowitch, Nicolas, Les Relations Diplomatigues de la Russie et de 
la France d'apres les Rapports des Ambassadeurs d'Alexandre et de Napo-
leon, 1808-1812 (St. Petersburg: Manufacture des Papiers de L'Etat, 
1905-1908), Vol. V, p. 289. 
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were intent on subverting it. Subvert it they did. In 1809 England 
imported twice as many naval stores from the Baltic as in 1808.60 And a 
good portion of those stores seem to have gone to England on American 
ships. In October Levett Harris, in one of the last honest letters he 
would write about Americans sailing on British account, said, "Nearly 
half of those (Americans) which have taken cargoes from hence ... will 
to all appearances land them in Eng land." 61 
The Russian government, while it might be quite fond of the United 
States, could not regard the United States flag as proof positive that 
the vessel and cargo over which it flew were neutral. Despite all the 
good will in the world, Russia was obligated to condemn four American 
vessels: the Georgia, Intercourse, Weltha Ann, and Malvina.62 It well 
behooved Russia to examine Yankees with a sharp eye because the American 
merchant marine was well on its way to becoming John Bull's favorite 
crutch. 
It seems to be a law of the universe that regulations are not for 
catching criminals as much as for exasperating honest folk. The regula-
tions laid down by the ukase, though obviously not stringent enough to 
stop smugglers, were stringent enough to make life hard for honest neu-
tral traders. The Mary, commanded by Captain Osgood, arriven in Kron-
stadt on the twenty-sixth of September, but was not allowed to discharge 
~~ cargo until the fourteenth of October.63 
ooke, A History of Prices, Vol. I, p. 300-301. 
6lconsular Despatches - St. Petersburg, To.Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 
13/25 Oct. 1809. 
62American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 343; Consular 
Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 
1/13 June 1810. 
63Letterbook of Osgood, To Pickman and Derby, Kronstadt, 4 Oct. and 16 
Oct. 1809. 
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This sort of delay was particularly aggravating with the days 
growing shorter and skims of ice appearing on the edges of the Neva. 
Captain Osgood didn't even hold the Mary in port until he could sell her 
cargo. He loaded her with iron, hemp and linens, and sent her off on 
the second of November under John Ropes, his first officer. He himself 
stayed in Russia to sell the tropical goods the Mary had brought from 
America.64 
The merchants of the Russian ports were as aggravated and frustrated 
in their drive to make 1809 a golden year of profit as the Americans. 
There was no doubt that business was vastly superior to that of 1808. 
In 1809 376 vessels arrived at Kronstadt and St. Petersburg as compared 
to sixty for 1808. Financially the contrast between the two years was 
just as spectacular: 
1808 
1809 
Imports 
1,452,233 rubles 
5,159,798 II 
Exports 
5,875,896 rubles 
20,314,406 II 
But the harbor and facilities of Kronstadt were sufficient to handle a 
thousand vessels a season~ Merchants, nobles in St. Petersburg, and 
serfs hundreds of miles distant in the hemp fields of the Ukraine turned 
peevish for lack of an outlet for their goods. In the summer of 1809 
the French ambassador gave a dinner at which most of the high officials 
of the Russian government were present. He rose and proposed a toast to 
the Emperor Alexander. The glittering assemblage rose and toasted their 
tsar. The French ambassador then waited for some Russian to propose a 
reciprocal toast to the Emperor of France. Nothing happened and the 
64Ibid., To Pickman and Derby, Kronstadt, 14/26 Nov. 1809. 
65Diplomatic Despatches - Russia, Vol. I, Translated extract from Court 
Gazette of St. Petersburg, 27 Jan. 1810, 0. S. 
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company \~irred uncomfortably in the knowledge that an indirect but very 
open insult had been paid to the ambassador and his emperor. 66 The min-
ister from Westphalia best described the climate of opinion in Russia: 
"There is the Emperor and Rumiantsev on one side, and the whole people 
on the other."67 
The perverted spirit that directed the course of American trade 
with Russia in 1809 crowned the shipping season of that year with a mas·-
terpiece of exasperating lunacy. The westerly winds, which blew direct-
ly in over the bow of any ship trying to beat its way out of a Russian 
port on the Baltic, rose earlier than usual. A bad storm swept the Bal-
tic, driving many ships back to port. Then an uncommonly early and se-
vere frost fell on the Baltic coast like a white tiger. 
More vessels were frozen in at the ports of Russia than ever before: 
187 at Riga, and ninety-five at Kronstadt and St. Petersburg. Of the 
ninety-five at Kronstadt and St. Petersburg, fifteen to eighteen were 
American.68 Osgood's Mary never made it out of the Gulf of Finland. 
The storm chased her into Reval harbor, where she was forthwith 
imprisoned by ice.69 
66Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 138, 15 Aug. 1810. 
67Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 69. 
68Letterbook of Osgood, to Pickman and Derby, St. Petersburg, 5 Dec. 
1809 and 4/16 ? 18 '; Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 260, To 
Abigail Adams, St. Petersburg, 3/15 Nov. 1810; Diplomatic Despatches 
Russia, Vol. I, Extract from Court Gazette of St. Petersburg, 27 Jan. 
1810, o.s. 
69Letterbook of Osgood, ToP. and H. Le Mesurier and Co., St. Petersburg, 
26 Nov. 1809 
Chapter X 
Act II, Scene I: Tsar Meets Adams 
John Quincy Adams's diary for Saturday, 5 August 1809, reads: 
"At noon this day I left my house at the corner of Boylston 
and Nassau Streets, in Boston, accompanied by my wife, my 
youngest child, Charles Francis, my wife's sister, Catherine 
Johnson, my nephew and private secretary, VVilliam Steuben 
Smith, Martha Godfrey, who attends my wife as her chamber-
maid, and a black man-servant named Nelson, to embark on a 
voyage to Russia, charged with a commission as Minister 
Plenipotentiary from the United States to Russia."l 
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Before Adams returned to Boston in 1815, Nelson left him to enter 
the service of Alexander I, Miss Johnson married Mr. Smith, and Adams's 
wife gave birth in pain to a child that lived in pain a handful of weeks 
and was then buried in Russian soil.2 Before Adams found his way home, 
Russia and the United States each suffered and survived devastating 
wars. Adams played important roles in the beginnings of Russia's war 
and in the end of America's. Never again, not even as president, did 
John Quincy Adams stand as near the center of the stage of world history 
as during his stay in St. Petersburg. 
But for the vagaries of domestic politics, the United States would 
have had a minister in Russia a year before. President Jefferson had 
long realized that America needed a powerful friend in a world at war, 
and he felt "that Russia, while her present monarch lives, is the most 
cordially friendly to us of any power on earth, (and) will go furthest 
to serve us, and is most worthy of conciliation."3 Jefferson appointed 
lAdams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 3. 
2Ford, Writings of J. Q. Adams, Vol. III, n. 472; Adwas Microfilm, 
Diary, Reel 31, p. 458, 17 Feb. 1812. 
3Bergh, (ed.), 1'he Writings of Jefferson, Vol. XI, p. 292. 
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his friend, William Short, as minister to Russia, and sent him off to 
Europe in August, 1808, with orders to wait at Paris until the Senate 
confirmed the appointment. On 27 February 1809 the Senate, preaching 
economy and freedom from foreign entanglements, rejected the appoint-
ment. In March James Madison, the new president, nominated John Quincy 
Adams as minister to Russia. Adams, a skillful and experienced diplomat 
who had been in Russia with Francis Dana, was by far the most suitable 
American for the post. The Senate, however, rejected him and the whole 
idea of a United States minister in Russia. Madison busied himself with 
mending his political fences and in June was able to force Adams's ap-
pointment through the Senate.4 
The new minister and his party took passage on the Horace, a vessel 
owned by his friend, the great Massachusetts merchant, William Gray. 
The voyage to Russia was almost a parody on the mari£ime plight of neu-
trals of the time. In all, the English and Danes forced the Horace to 
come to eleven times. What must have seemed whole legions of Englishmen 
and Danes climbed over her side to interrogate her captain and peer sus-
piciously at her papers. Only the presence of a minister of the United 
States on board won for her from the British navy the privilege of going 
through the Sound rather than through the Belt, and saved her from 
seizure by gunboats from Norway and Denmark.S 
The voyage afforded Adams a full briefing on the problems of Baltic 
trading. A Danish gunboat brought the Horace into Christiansand for 
4Adams, Henry, History of the United States (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1891), Vol. IV, p. 465-67, Vol. V, p. 11, 12,86. 
5Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 3-43. 
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examination, and there he heard the woeful tales of the hundreds of 
Americans of the vessels detained in that port. Vfuen the Horace reached 
Denmark, he went ashore to plead for these and other Americans detained 
at Copenhagen. His plea brought no results whatsoever, which was in 
itself particularly educational. 6 
On 22 October, seventy-five long and stormy days from Boston Harbor, 
the Horace sailed into Kronstadt road. The following day Adams traveled 
up the Neva by government packet to St. Petersburg, where he met his as-
sociate and companion of the next few years, Levett Harris.? 
Before Adaw$ and his party could even properly set themselves up in 
their new quarters in St. Petersburg, the new minister found himself at 
work trying to separate the true American traders from the false, and 
his Yankee instinct was already whispering that the smile of welcome 
that brightened every face masked fear, distrust and vicious faithless-
ness. 
November was not half over when he received a request to 
authenticate the passport of an American, Archibald Graham by nanw, who 
was waiting in Lisbon to come to Russia. A prominent merchant of St. 
Petersburg gave his solemn guarantee that Graham was a citizen of the 
United States, yet Adams learned through Levett Harris and an American 
just come from Portugal that Graham was in reality a Scotchman who had 
arrived in Lisbon in a ship under Pappenburg colors, which was really an 
American ship that had sailed from the United States during the Embargo. 
That Graham had a passport was credited to the skills of Van Sander of 
London. 8 
eibid., p. 22-24, 36. 
?Ibid., p. 46-48. 
8Ford, Writings of J. Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 362-63. 
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Harris's part in the Graham affair confirmed the good reports Adams 
already had of the American consul-general in Russia. In fact, the Rus-
sians thought so highly of Harris that Adams reported to the Secretary 
of State: 
"This gentleman appears, indeed, to have conducted himself in 
a manner so highly acceptable to this government, as not only 
to have acquired a personal consideration enjoyed by few among 
the diplomatic characters accredited to the Emperor, but to 
have contributed much to the favorable dispositions towards 
our country entertained by his Imperial Majesty. "9 
'rhe only thing that Adams f'ound to object to in Harris 1 s aonduct 
was the man's extraordinary generosity. A bit over a month after first 
meeting the consul, Adams complained that, "He has made to me since I 
arrived here a number of presents, some of which were of sufficient val-
ue to make me hesitate about accepting them; and to Mrs. Adams and Cath-
erine a Turkish shawl each, still more expensive. 11 Adams, who disap-
proved of public officials accepting presents from anyone, determined to 
limit his acceptance of gifts from Harris and to 11return equivalents in 
point of cost, that at least I may derive no profit from the 
interchange." 10 
On the morning of Adams's third day in St. Petersburg, Harris 
notified Count Nicholas Rumiantsev, Chancellor of the Empire of Russia 
and most powerful subject of Tsar Alexander, that the minister from the 
United States had arrived. That evening Adams, accompanied by Harris, 
went to present his formal credentials to the Chancellor.ll At this 
9Ibid., p. 353-54. 
lOAdams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 70-71. 
11~ •• p. 45. 
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meeting and the many others that followed, Rumiantsev always treated 
Adams with the greatest civility. The Count emphasized again and again 
with the most open frankness Russia's need for the American merchant 
marine to handle her commerce. Rumiantsev was always America's firmest 
Russian friend - except when the interests of the United States were con-
trary to those of France. He was the leader of the French party in Russia. 
No Russian official was more anxious for trade with America and yet more 
tolerant of Americans trading on E~glish account. 12 
On 26 December Adams had a long interview with Chancellor Rumiantsev. 
They talked on the Continental System, of Adams's c lairr, that artie les of 
English manufacture were coming into Russia in abundance, which Rumiant-
sev denied; and of Rumiantsev's claim that none but English colonies pro-
duced colonial goods, which Adams denied with many a reference to the cot-
ton and sugar of Louisiana and Georgia and to the coffee of the Spanish 
Vfest Indies. The conversation revolved around Adam's request that the 
Tsar use his good offices to influence the Danish government to free the 
quantities of American property which it had not been able to prove Eng-
lish but which it still held under sequestration. Rumiantsev did not say 
no, but did openly imply that Russia would not interfere in the matter. 
On the '29th Rumiantsev informed Adams that he had passed the request 
on to the Tsar, who had immediately ordered that a message be sent the 
Danish government suggesting that it expedite the restoration of Ameri-
can property. 13 For all his diplomatic experience, Adams had never 
12Adams, History of U.S., Vol. V, p. 410. 
13Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 81-88. 
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before come up against anything more secret and strange than are the 
currents of Russian diplomacy. 
One week after coming up from Kronstadt, Adams accepted an 
invitation from Rumiantsev to dine at one of the Chancellor's homes. 
There Adams met for the first time the ambassador from France, Armand-
Augustin-Louis de Gaulaincourt, due de Vincence.l4 For as long as 
Caulaincourt remained in France, he and Adams were mutually respectful 
blood enemies. Adams main task in Russia was to fight for the admis-
sion of American ships and cargoes to Russia's ports. Caulaincourt's 
main task was to ensure the enforcement of the ~ontinental System, to 
prevent any and all ~nglish property or· what might have been at one time 
English property from finding a market in Russia. To Napoleon - and 
therefove to Caulaincourt - any neutral ship coming to Russia might con-
ceal English property, and so all neutral ships were to be considered as 
English. Caulaincourt was an ogre who would eat up every American ship 
that came his way. 
If Caulaincourt had only been an ugly ogre, Adam's task would have 
be~ much simpler. Unfortunately, the French ambassador was honorable, 
handsome, wise, and a nobleman by birth -which counted in Russia - and 
by character, as well as by Napoleon's favor. Where Adams was rather 
cold and tactless, Caulaincourt was warm and charming. Where Adams had 
only a small income from his government and entertained little, Caulain-
court had hundreds and hundreds of thousands of francs from Napoleon and 
gave entertainments, dinners and balls which were the leading events of 
the St. Petersburg social whirl. Where Adams was only a minister in 
14Ibid., p. 49. 
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rank and had to deal with Alexander through Rumiantsev, Caulaincourt 
was an ambassador and dealt with the Tsar in person. Vfuere Adams was 
never more than a respected acquaintance of Alexander, Caulaincourt was 
as close to being a personal friend of the Tsar as any representative 
of a foreign power could be.l5 
All that John Quincy Adams had on his side were his not 
inconsiderable wits, the reputation for strict honesty which Russians 
soon grew to associate with his name, and the simple but important fact 
that ninety-nine out of every hundred influential Russians demanded that 
Russia's ports remain open to American ships. 
A week after meeting Caulaincourt, Adams received notice that Tsar 
Alexander I was ready to grant an audience to the American minister. A 
little after one o'clock on the fifth day of November Adams went to the 
Imperial Palace. About two o'clock he was conducted to the entrance of 
the Tsar's cabinet. As Adams stepped through the door the room was 
empty but for a youngish, rather too finely drawn man who advanced to 
meet him and said in the perfect French spoken by all upper class Rus-
sians of the day, "Sir, I am charmed to have the pleasure of seeing you 
here." The mystic royal son of a murdered tsar and grandson of a mur-
dered tsar greeted the Congregational son of a president and grandson of 
a shoemaker. Full formal diplomatic relations between the autocracy of 
Russia and the republic of the United States of America began. 
This first encounter between Alexander and Adams went smoothly. 
Alexander praised the United States, dwelt on the friendship between Rus-
sia and France, and emphasized that England's maritime pretensions alone 
15Adams, History of U.S., Vol. V, p. 412. 
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kept Europe from peace. In the midst of this conversation Alexander 
took the American minister "by the arm and walked from near the door to 
a window opening on the river - a movement seemingly intended to avoid 
being overheard." 
Returning to the subject of Russo-American relations, the Tsar 
suggested that conflicts of interest between his nation and Adams's were 
extremely unlikely and that "by means of commerce the two states might 
be greatly useful to each other, and his desire was to give the greatest 
extension and facility to these means of mutual benefit.nl6 
A few days later Adams had his first audience with the Empress-
mother. His diary reads: "She said there were many very excellent arti-
cles brought here from America. And, said I, many sent from this country 
equally important to us. So that it is a commerce extremely beneficial 
to both parties. This, she said, was the best kind of commerce."l7 As 
Adams took his leave of the Empress-mother (doubtless making sure to 
kiss her hand because he had been warned that the omission of the cour-
tesy would displease her very much) 18 he must have wondered where the 
legendary deviousness of the Russian royalty was. The Romanovs were cer-
tainly making bluntly apparent why they w~1ted friendship with the United 
States. 
While Adams was busy meeting his friends, his sometimes friends, and 
his enemies, winter came to Russia. Winter came, indeed. The day Ad~~s 
16Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 50-53. 
17Ibid., p. 59. 
18 ~·· p. 56. 
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learned from Rumiantsev of the Tsar's intercession with the Danes in 
favor of the Americans the temperature dropped to fifteen below zero, 
Fahrenheit. That evening Nelson, Adams's man-servant, froze his toes 
accompanying his master out to watch the coasters at Caulaincourt's 
ice-hills at Krurunenoi-ostrow. 19 
Nelson's consolation for his discomfort was the knowledge that the 
temperatures that slowed the blood in his poor toes also congealed the 
tides of the Baltic and slowed the pulse of crisis. Commerce and crisis 
waited for spring. 
Or, at least, such had always been the case in the past. But the 
winter of 1809-10 was marked by a particularly unusual exception to the 
rule, an exception whose significance was an omen that 1810 was to be a 
year of many exceptions. 
On the 23rd of February, when the Neva flowed sluggishly beneath a 
yard of ice and all sensible inhabitants of St. Petersburg stirred from 
the fire only to get more wood, Count Rumiantsev sent 1~dams word that 
the first American ship of the year had arrived in Kussia. F:>.r, far to 
the south, the Turks in Constantinople, spurred by a scarcity to grain, 
had admitted the brig Calumet, Captain Holmes, of Baltimore to the Black 
Sea in hopes that her neutral flag would persuade the Russians to let 
her buy and return to Constantinople with Russian grain, which Russian 
law forbade to the enemy Turk. The Calumet got no grain, but she did at-
tain the honor of being the first Araerican vessel at Odessa and probably 
the first on the waters of the Black Sea. 
l9Ibid., p. 90. 
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Rumor raised the number of American sail at Odessa to forty and 
the French ambassador was disturbed. The Russian government expressed 
great satisfaction with what it hoped was the opening of a new channel 
of trade with the United States. The Turk, however, was refused his 
grain no matter what the nationality of the errand boy he hired, and so 
Constantinople sulkily returned to the old policy of refusing Arr,erican 
ships entry to the Black Sea. The winter opening of Russo-.~erican trade 
of 1810 was a false alarm.20 
As spring spread north from the Black Sea and turned the steppes 
green, the inhabitants of St. Petersburg began to lay wagers as to the 
time the ice of the Neva would break, a habit they had picked up from 
the English merchants. On the 12th of May, about two or three in the 
morning, the ice of the Neva groaned, split, gnashed into blocks and be-
gan to move toward the sea. At three o'clock that afternoon the first 
boat of the year passed the fortress with the Governor aboard, and the 
guns boomed. Adams was told that, as was traditional, the Governor car-
ried a glass of water to the ·rsar to drink, and would receive one hundred 
ducats in return. 
On this day the summer season began. The double-windows were taken 
off the houses. The nobility and wealthier merchants began to move from 
their town houses to their country homes. The boat replaced the sleigh 
for river travel, and crisis was free from its cage of ice. 21 
2
°Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 411, 416-17, 442-43; St. 
Petersburgische Zeitung, 15 April 1810; Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reer-
31, p. 34, 23 Feb. 1810. 
21Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 123-24. 
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American merchants ordering their ships to Russia or anywhere else 
in Europe in the spring of 1810 were either deluded or desperate. No 
one eould predict what sort of dangers Americans in European waters would 
have to face. Even the London House of Baring, which profited from Amer-
ican tll7ade~·in Europe, confided to a Baltimore client, "We perfectly agree 
with you that in the present situation of American commerce, all that pru-
dent men have to do is to remain quiet and wait for better times. 11 22 
There was, of course, the gauntlet of the Danes to run. There was the pos-
sibility that the British, in retaliation against the exclusion of the 
Union Jack from the ports of the Baltic, would turn back all ships bound 
for those ports.23 And there existed the chilling possibility that an 
American merchant vessel on the way to or from Russia would find that the 
Danes were the least of her dangers. At any moment news of yet another 
cavalier outrage against America's neutral rights might precipitate the 
United States into war against either France or Britain, which would put 
American ships in ~uropean waters in extreme jeopardy. Tempers in the 
United States were hot enough for war. Benjamin Rush, the usually cool-
headed successor to Franklin as intellectual leader of Philadelphia, 
wrote to John Quincy Adams on the Fourth of July, 1810, describing Napo-
leon as the "great hammer of the earth" and George III as the "great ham-
mer of the ocean." "I consider them both," he added, "as the scourge of 
the human race."24 
22Bruchey, Stuart W., Robert Oliver, Merchant of Baltimore, 1783-1819 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 355-56. 
23Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 391. 
24Adams Microfilm, Reel 410, Benjamin Rush to J.Q. Adams, Philadelphia, 
4 July 1810. 
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All the dictates of self-preservation and manhood demanded that 
Americans not permit themselves to be bludgeoned by these two hammers 
without making some defense, but what course of action was open to the 
United States? The United States again turned to retaliatory economic 
warfare. The Embargo and Non-intercourse had failed, but perhaps that 
was only because they hadn't been subtle enough. Perhaps the United 
States could tempt Great Britain and France into treating American mer-
chantmen properly. On the first of May, 1810, Congress replaced Non-
intercourse with Macon's Bill, Number 2. By this bill trade with Eng-
land and France was reopened, but if either Britain or France revoked or 
modified its edicts of economic warfare so as to stop violating American 
shipping, the United States would revive Non-intercourse against the 
other. For example, if France promised to stop seizing American ships 
and their cargoes, then the United States would stop exporting goods to 
England. If it were Britain that turned benevolent, then the United 
States would voluntarily acquiesce in her blockade of the Continent. 
Macon's Bill, Number 2, was obviously an American attempt to eat 
her cake and have it too. We would have all the profits of trading with 
each of the two great belligerents, and at the same time would slyly co-
erce each to allow us to trade with the other. The history of the early 
Nineteenth Century is cluttered with the shell-shocked wraiths of na-
tions that tried to be sly with Napoleon, and we nearly became one of 
them - of which more in another chapter. 
It behooved the sagacious American merchant thinking of sending a 
ship to Russia to bide his time and see what would be the effects of the 
Macon Bill. But there was the temptation of the high prices that Russian 
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goods continued to bring in American markets. Russian manufactures had 
fallen off sharply since 1809 - in the spring of 1810 Russian duck was 
down to $29 a bolt from a high of $44 a year before - but hen~ was still 
selling for well over half again its usual price. The price in Boston 
was $435 a ton in May, 1810. 25 And there was the truism that a merchant 
whose ships remain in port is a merchant losing money. 
Ships would go out from Salem, Boston, Newburyport and Philadelphia 
as certainly as men prefer the long chance to slow bankruptcy. And 
where better to go than Russia? 
The success of American trade with Russia depended, as always, less 
on the United States and Russia than on those powers that controlled the 
waters between them: Great Britain, Sweden and ~enmark. Britain nearly 
blighted Russo-American trade of 1810 before it really began. In May 
Admiral Saumarez, the colossus of the Kattegat, announced that only neu-
trals with British licenses would be allowed to pass to or from ports 
that excluded the British flag through the waters he controlled. If this 
edict should continue in force, it would be difficult indeed for any 
American arriving at Kronstadt to claim with a straight face that he had 
not consorted with the British. Fortunately, the Admiral soon heard of 
the Macon Bill and the reopening of trade between the United States and 
England, and resumed his beaming approval of American sail passing his 
flagship into the Baltic. Complete legalization of the presence of Amer-
ican ships to British ports might well mean that 1810 would be the great-
est year yet for English utilization of the American flag in the Baltic.26 
25cole, Wholesale ~ommodity Prices, p. 154, 158: Essex, Mark-Dawes, ed., 
Timothy William's Marine Notes, 1802-1812, p. 163. 
26Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 452; Clauder, Anna c., 
American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the french Revolution and 
Napoleon, 1798-1812 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1932), 
p. 220. 
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Saumarez and the British government for the time being even took a 
benevolent attitude toward American ships seeking to pass orthodoxly 
through the Sound, pay Sound dues, and thus escape Danish enmity. In 
1810 the British allowed 133 American sail to pass through the Sound. 
By summer, however, Danish depredations of shipping put this innovation 
in British policy in an unfavorable light. Thereafter in 1810 the block-
ade of the Sound was resumed, although with many, many interruptions. 
This spasmodic resumption of the blockade probably goes far to explain 
the strange fact that while 133 American sail passed into the Baltic 
through the Sound in 1810, only sixteen returned that way. A supple-
mentary explanation, suggested by contemporaries, was that an extraor-
dinary number of those 133 were sailing on British account, and there-
fore were careful to return by convoy through the Belt.27 
The Swedes, like the English, also continued to smile on American 
traders. The only exception to this rule took place in Stralsund, the 
port of that fragment of Sweden's trans-Baltic empire, Swedish Pomerania. 
A roaring trade in smuggled goods poured through Stralsund, but that 
port was on the san~ side of the Baltic as Napoleon's armies, and Swed-
ish officials there didn't dare continually to cheat on their allegiance 
to the Continental System. In early spring of 1810, they seized all 
American property in Stralsund.28 
27Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 506; Ross, Memoirs of 
Saumarez, Vol. II, p. 195; Diplomatic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To 
Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 12 Feb. 1812. 
28carlson, Knute E., Relations of the United States with Sweden (Allen-
town: University of Pennsylvania, 1921), p. 51. 
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On the other side, the "safe" side of the Baltic, the Swedes, as 
we noted in the last chapter, treated the Continental System as if Na-
poleon were the emperor of Bali rather than of ~urope. At the height of 
the shipping season in 1810 there were perhaps one hundred American sail 
lying in Gothenburg harbor, waiting for news of a safe market on the con-
tinent.29 The situation was the same tantalizing one of the year before. 
The American consul reported from Gothenburg that "the trade of the United 
States to this port has increased beyond anything that could have been ex-
pected, n30 and a tidal wave of sugar, coffee, cotton, dyewood, etc., 
glutted whatever market for American cargoes there might have been in 
Sweden. 
The number of Americans waiting at Gothenburg grew so large and 
many of them stayed so long that an American colony came into being. The 
American ship officers and supercargoes from Philadelphia and other ports 
south of Connecticut took rooms for the most part in Gothenburg itself. 
The New Englanders preferred a suburb called Massthuget, where many of 
them stayed at a small hotel run by a Scotchman named Todd. Todd set a 
good table, and many Americans came out from the city to dine with the 
Yankees, transforming Todd's Scandinavian hostelry for a few hours into 
as American an inn as one could find east of Passamaquoddy Bay.31 
Todd's dining room probably rang rarely with hearty laughter, but 
it was undoubtedly the scene of more cheerful gatherings than similar 
29McMaster, Girard, Vol. II, p. 125. 
30consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I., 1'o Sec. of State, 
Gothenburg, 26 Oct. 1810. 
3lsmith, Reminiscences, p. 40-41. 
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rooms with similar diners across the Kattegat and Skagerrak. The Danes 
brought little but woe to Americans in 1810. Tonningen was open to 
American shipping at the beginning of the season, but the steady con-
striction of a neutral's rights there diminished its attractions. In 
1809 a pilot was able to extort four to six hundred dollars for guiding 
an American vessel from British-held Heligoland to Tonningen. In the 
spring of 1810 he only got $50 for the same job. 32 Finally, in midsum-
mer Napoleon intimidated Denmark into closing all ports in Schleswig-
Holstein to American ships.33 
As the shipping season opened, the Danes naturally went back on the 
job of snapping up passing merchantmen. The activity of the naval gun-
boats was again supplemented and surpassed by that of the privateers. 
The neutral outcry against the undiscriminating voracity of the priva-
teers had persuaded Frederick VI the previous August to call them off, 
but the inability of the privateersmen to support themselves any other 
way obliged him to restore their bellicose privileges in the spring.34 
Americans were their chief victims. Between the winter of 1810 and Na-
poleon's defeat, Norwegian privateers, for instance, captured twice as 
many vessels of the United States as those of the next favorite victim, 
Sweden. 35 
In 1810 Danes fvom Denmark proper and the Danish islands brought 
in 68 American merchantmen. The Norwegians bagged 38, including 
32coggeshal, Second Series of Voyages, p. 66, 77. 
33Ruppenthal, Journal of Modern History, XV, p. 13. 
34rbid., p. 20. 
35Falnes, Oscar J., Review of Kaperfart Og Skipsfart, 1807-1814 by Joh. 
N. Tonnessen, American Historical Review, LXII (January, 1957), 
p. 393-94. 
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Osgood's ill-fated bark Mary, which escaped the ice at Reval only to be 
condemned at Christiansand for sailing in British convoy. The number 
of American seamen stranded in Denmark grew by leaps and bounds. Mr. 
Isaackson, the American consul at Christiansand, was obliged to charter 
a whole vessel, the ship America, to send 181 of the Americans back 
home. The bill he presented to the United States government for their 
maintenance and passage came to ~10,500.36 
In some cases the Danish seizures were embarrassingly justifiable. 
Two of those American merchantmen brought into Christiansand were so ob-
viously really not American that ~~. Isaackson didn't even want to in-
elude them in his accounting of captured United States vessels. Five 
others at Christiansand, while probably true Americans, were so obvi~J 
ously sailing on British account that they didn't appeal their cases 
when condemned.37 
The Danish courts continued to be surprisingly just, as compared 
with - let us say - the French prize courts. Of the 68 Americans 
brought into Denmark, at least forty were acquitted. Of Norway's 38, 
at least thirty were freed.3 8 The dispassionate American, if there were 
any, which is to be doubted, was gratified by the sustained mildness of 
Danish rapaciousness. 
Official American representation in Denmark continued to be 
atrociously poor. Mr. Saabye was so busy with his own affairs that, for 
practical purposes, one can say he ceased to act as American consul at 
36American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 822. 
37American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 523, 530, 533. 
38rbid., p. 530, 533. 
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Copenhagen. Mr. Isaackson at Christiansand continued to earn American 
praise, but he was, after all, a Dane, and so far away from Copenhagen 
that he had little effect on the course of Danish policy. 
The government of the United States had long since known of Danish 
maritime aggression, but the only action our government took in 1809 
was to send John lvi. Forbes, U.S. Consul at Hamburg, up to Copenhagen 
to see what he could do there. Being only a consul, and not even a con-
sul to a Danish port, he accomplished little or nothing and returned to 
Hamburg in March, 1810, after a rewardless winter in Copenhagen. 39 
During the last month or so of the winter, Forbes was assisted at 
Copenhagen by the man who inherited his mantle at the nearest thing to 
a properly accredited diplomatic representative of the United States in 
Denmark. That man was George Joy, who while on his way to fill the posi-
tion of U.S. consul at Rotterdam had been ordered to Copenhagen. 40 He, 
too, held only a consular appointment, and that not to Copenhagen or any 
other Danish port. He, however, was of a more inventive bent of mind 
than the orthodox Forbes. 
Joy, a man of no little wit and background (he referred to his task 
in Denmark as "going to Blefuscu to play Gulliver and bring away fifty 
ships by the strength of my under jaw."),4i took no more than a few 
months to create among Americans detained in Copenhagen a climate of 
39consular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. I, George Joy to ?, Copenhagen, 
23 Ivlarch 1810; Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 430. 
40consular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. I, To His Majesty the King of 
Denmark and Norway, Copenhagen, 12 Feb. 1810. 
41consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I, P.S. to letter to William 
Eustis, Gothenburg, August 1810. 
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opinion in which, to use his own words," ••• it was as much as a man's 
life was worth to open his lips in my favor. u42 
According to testimony given by Americans to Joy's successor in 
Copenhagen, Joy demanded the promise of large commissions on seized 
American ships and cargoes before he would approach the Danish govern-
ment to have that property liberated. Also, through an accomplice, the 
Danish King's secretary, Joy obtained ten licenses from the Danish govern-
ment which were to be used by American vessels lying in Norway as safe 
conduct passes if they were accosted by Danish privateers or naval ves-
sels on their way into the Baltic. Joy proceeded to Gothenburg where he 
offered the licenses to American captains and supercargoes there for a 
large percentage of the value of their cargoes. 43 
It may be that, as he claimed, the money he extracted from those he 
had been sent to protect was used for bribing Danish officials, and it 
may well be that the Americans at Copenhagen were simply cursing him for 
not being able to free their property as quickly as they would like. All 
this may be true, but it is also true that an apologist for Mr. Joy 
certainly has a lot to explain away.44 
The parsimonious and ostrich attitude of the Madison administration 
toward the crisis in our relations with Denmark brought John Quincy Adams, 
a member of Madison's own party, to write in August of 1810, "I believe 
42consular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. I, To Pinkney, Copenhage~, 
30 Jan. 1811. 
43Massachusetts Historical Society, Winthrop Collection, Vol. LIII, To 
Madison, Copenhagen, 23 June 1811. 
44Ibid.; Consular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. I, To Pinkney, Copenhagen, 
12Te0. 1810. 
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that the want of a native American accredited agent of the government 
of the United States at Copenhagen has cost our government ten times 
more than the cost would have been of maintaining one there, even with 
the character of a public minister."45 
45 Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 480. 
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Chapter XI 
Act Il, Scene II: Tsar Jilts Napoleon for Adams 
Fortunately, at the other end of the Baltic the United States did 
have - in the person of Adams himself - proper diplomatic representa~ 
tion. The Uaited States certainly had need of an astute diplomat at St. 
Petersburg because in 1810 Russia stood at a forking of the road. Her 
choice was between increasing subordination to Napoleon's will or in-
creasing independence and estrangement from France. Russia would be 
forced to this decision by the urgent pleas of American captains for e~ 
try to her ports. The shield and spokesman of these cheery sappers of 
the Continental System was John Quincy Adams of the house at the corner 
of Boylston and Nassau Streets, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Happily, the rapprochement between the United States and Russia 
was by this time so strong that nothing but matters pertaining to the ad-
mission of American ships had much effect on it. In March the Russian 
envoy in Philadelphia gave a party to celebrate the birthday of the Tsar, 
and placed at the front of his home, according to the newspaper report, 
"a transparency representing the cities of St. Petersburg and Archangel, 
and an American vessel in full sail, the whole surmounted by a crown and 
the letters AI" standing for Alexander I. A gathering of passersby took 
up the nG>tion that the placing of a crown over an American ship and col-
ors was an insult, and a young man of the type that sends diplomats to 
early graves "came up, and, imbibing all the indignation of those around 
him, he discharged two pistol-balls through the transparency." The em-
barrassment of the United States government was doubled by the fact that 
the impulsive young man was an officer in "the United States service." 
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When arraigned he helped not at all by declaring patriotically "that 
he thought it his duty as an American officer to bring down all crowns." 
The Russian government, more tolerant and sophisticated then than 
now, graciously accepted the apologies tendered by the United States 
and let the matter drop.l 
In January, 1810, the Russian charg~ to America made the perennial 
Russian complaint to our Secretary of State that Americans cruising off 
what Russia claimed were her possessions on the Northwest coast of North 
America were trading firearms to the Indians. In August Count Rumiant-
sev took the same matter up with Adams. On both occasions our represen-
tatives replied that the United States government could do nothing 
about such trading and the Russians would have to stop it themselves. 2 
In this important matter, as in the inane incident in Philadelphi~ 
the Russian government ate its crow quietly. As Rumiantsev said to 
Adams at the end of a discussion on Yankee inter'erence in Russian Amer-
ica, "Our attachment to the United States is obstinate - more obstinate 
than you are aware of."3 The real grist of Rus.so-Americw:t diplomacy of 
1810 lay elsewhere. 
I::1 t1.1e last ri:qs of May three American ships elbowed tl1rough ice 
floes and entered the harbor at Kronstadt. 4 The most incredible year 
of Russo-American trade yet had begun. 
1Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, n. 136; Adams l~crofilm, J.Q. Adams Letterbook, 
Reel 136, p. 131, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 31 July 1810. 
2Hildt, Early _ Diplo~~tic __ ~ego_t_i_~t_i_~, p. 47, 48, 50. 
3Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 180. 
4Adams, lviicrofilm, Diary, p. 113, 28 May 1810. 
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In 1809 any American ship directed to Russia that survived the 
Danes, Russian inspection and the storms and ice automatically made a 
very profitable voyage. In 1810 the task of American skippers and super-
cargoes was not that "simple." Now they had to fight the laws of supply 
and demand. The depredations of the Danes and Russian refusal to allow 
blatantly English ships to enter and unload did limit Russia's imports 
and thus did sustain the price of colonial goods in Russia - which was 
the salvation of most Americans - but the price of Russian goods rose 
steadily and steeply in response to the urgent demand of the arriving 
Americans. Captain Osgood especially bewailed the loss of his bark Mary 
because her cargo, which cost him 70,000 rubles in 1809, would have cost 
him 120,000 if he had tried to buy it in 1810. 5 At the same time the un-
precedented influx of goods from B.ussia drove down the price of these 
goods in u.s. markets. Hemp, ~435 a ton in Boston in May, was down to 
$300 in September. 6 
The sure-footed merchant, of course, survived. Adams's friend, 
Vrilliam Gray, made profit on every ship he sent to Russia in 1810.7 
But the economic winds were turning cold. If the trends of 1810 ex-
tended in 1811 and continued to sweep toward the extremes to which they 
seemed d,:.stined, then 1811 would be an unpleasant year even for the 
sagacious Mr. Gray. 
5Letterbook of Osgood, To Charles Saunders, St. Petersburg, 3 Aug. 
1810, To Pickman and Derby, Gothenburg, ll Oct. 1810. 
6Dawes, (ed.), William's Marine Notes, p. 163, 1~4. 
7Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, To William Gray, St. Petersburg, 
12 June 1811. 
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While Gray's merchant sail were unloading sugar, coffee, indigo, 
cotton, etc., onto Russian quays, Adams and Harris were involved in a 
constant struggle to protect them and other American ships from eonfis-
cation. The opponent of Adams and Harris was, like Jacob's angelic 
wrestler, strong, clever, and,:>to them, invisible. Their opponent was 
French influence in Russia, and it operated above their station in St. 
Petersburg society. It impinged on Russian policy through two channels: 
the friendship of Caulaincourt with Alexander and the latter's fear of 
Napoleon. 
Adams was constantly petitioning, almost nagging the Russians about 
American shipping. He asked Rumiantsev to make an exception in the case 
of several American vessels in the Russian blanket refusal to receive 
ships from British-occupied Portugal. And there was his request for ad-
mission of American merchantmen coming from Marie Galante, once a French 
possession in India but now held by the British. Then there was the 
case of the American vessels at Riga which had cleared from ports that 
had Russian consuls, but did not have certificates from those consuls 
testifying to the neutrality of the cargoes. -- In such cases Russian 
consular certificates of origin were an absolute prerequisite for admis-
sion --; and most significant of all, the cause celebre of the American 
ships arriving with certificates of origin from French consuls, which 
the French government dishonestly swore were forged.s The wrangling 
went on month after month. 
8 Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 143, 169, 199-200; Ford, Writings of 
J. Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 13, 18. 
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The months of Russian procrastination and the equivocations and 
the barefaced lies of the officials who administered the inspection and 
admission of neutral vessels exasperated Adams so much that he wrote in 
his diary of the Russians that 11To promise and not perform is their po-
lite mode of refusal." Their promises, he said, were "wind, too feeble 
instruments to bind. 119 
Suffering similar torments was the French ambassador. Adams's 
frustration was ultimately resolved. Caulaincourt's never was. In March 
of 1811, shortly before Napoleon called him back to France as a move in 
the heightening crisis between France and Russia, Caulaincourt was in-
formed that not a single one of the American vessels approved by the 
American minister and consul had been confiscated. 10 
This by no means meant that all Americans were lily white in the 
eyes of the Russians or even in the eyes of Adam.s. This certainly 
didn't mean that a lot of exquisitely entangled and involuted hankJ~anky 
involving American ships didn't go on. Harris reported to the Secretary 
of State that he had to request the Russian government to confiscate 
three American merchantmen- The Alpheus, Captain Crosdale, the Collo-
den, Captain Woodward, and the Catty, Captain Delano - which he had 
discovered had false papers. And even he admitted that some false Amer-
icans might have slipped into Russia without his knowing it. 11 
---------
9Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 232. 
lOAdams, Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 222, 10 March 1811. 
11consular Despatches -St. Petersburg, Vol. II, ·ro Sec. of State, 
St. Petersburg, 12/25 Sept. 1810. 
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The quality and quantity of unethical and illegal behavior in 
which transient Americans engaged in Russia in 1810 was at the very 
least equalled by Americans more permanently settled in that country. 
There was the case of Mr. Kelly whose wife came to Adams for help. Ac-
cording to her, Mr. Kelly, born in Maryland and veteran of glorious ser-
vice in the United States navy during the Revolution, had joined the 
Russian navy in 1788, and perfonned his duties faithfully as an officer 
in the Tsar's fleet for many years. Now a cripple, he was fobbed off 
with a paltry pension of a hundred rubles ayear, not enough for even a 
life of poverty. Oh please, Mr. Adams, she begged, can't you intercede 
with the Tsar for my d'~serving husband? Adams, touched, reluctantly 
told her that such a case in no way fell within his jurisdiction, but 
did give her some money out of his own pocket. It was only later that 
he learned that Mr. Kelly had been dismissed from the Russian navy for 
embezzling public property, and that, although Kelly had begun his ser-
vice in our revolution as an American sailor, he had finished that war 
as an English sailor.12 
Then there was the case of Mr. Donovan, an Irish-American of 
perhaps more rectitude than Mr. Kelly, and his troubles with Levett Har-
ris. On the 1st of September Adams wrote to William Gray praising Har-
ris, saying that 11 lVIy regard for him and confidence in him are such that 
for any business of my own, I should not only give a preference to the 
House (mercantile house) of which he was a partner upon the usual ter.ms 
12Adams, Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 163, 7 Oct. 1810. 
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of transacting business, but even at some additional charge. 11 l3 On the 
19th of the month :Mr. Donovan called on Adams. 
Mr. Donovan's bitter story was that Harris sold to the mercantile 
house that bid the highest the services and influence which his position 
as u.s. consul bestowed on him, and that Harris made the merchants he 
appointed as his consular agents in the ports of Russia pay him a com-
mission on the goods that passed through their hands. Donovan further 
claimed that Harris was charging the masters of American vessels as 
much as 24,000 rubles apiece to obtain admission for them to the ports 
of Russia, and had done so in 1808 and 1809. The money he split with 
his accomplice, Count Rumiantsev's secretary. No American obtained ad-
mission without such payment. Donovan avowed that he himself had paid 
Harris 3000 rubles.l4 
When Adams wrote to the Secretary of State discussing these 
charges, he said of Harris: 
"· •• I am fully convinced he has invariably discharged his 
official duties here with zeal, fidelity and ability, that 
he has uniformly rendered to his countrymen without excep-
tion every service which they needed, and which was in his 
powers; and that by the peculiar consideration which he en-
joys in the personal regard of the Emperor, and the esteem 
of his government he has often the means of rendering ser-
vices which to a less acceptable officer would be 
impossible.ttl5 
Adams belied the Calvinism of his religion by maintaining his faith in 
the honesty of his personable colleague. 
13rbid., Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 211, To William Gray, St. Petersburg, 
1 Sept. 1810. 
14rbid., Diary, Reel 31, p. 158, 19 Sept. 1810. 
15Ibid., Letterbook, Reel 13o, p. 226, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 
11 March 1811. 
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Russia's credulous and massive admission of American vessels also 
by no means indicates that Russia was purposefully or wholly shirking 
its obligations to the Continental System. In August of 1810 Captain 
Osgood wrote that "They are much more rigid in their examination of pa-
pers in this country than formerly."l6 Osgood had strong justification 
for his remark. By the end of July over sixty vessels with cargoes 
worth 16,000,000 rubles had arrived in Russian ports from - their mas-
ters said - Teneriffe, an island in the Canaries, and had been seques-
tered by the Russians. 17 Their papers were blatantly forgeries and 
Teneriffe was known widely as a euphemism for England. In the commercial 
circles of Russia the ruble's value was reckoned on its e«change value 
in the great banking centers of Amsterdam, Hamburg and 11 Teneriffe. 11 The 
"Teneriffe" exchange was reckoned in pence sterling.lS 
The battle was joined in the Council of State of the Hussian 
Empire on the matter of the Teneriffe ships. All the persuasion of the 
merchants and all the anger, and, we may guess, veiled threats of the 
great nobles swept against the determination of Alexand:>r and Rumiant-
sev to enforce the precepts of the Continental System and confiscate the 
Teneriffe fleet. 19 
16Letterbook of Osgood, To Pickman and Derby, St. Petersburg, 19 Aug. 
1810. 
l7Mihailowitch, Nicolas, ed., Les Relations Diplomatiques de la Russie 
et de la France, d'apres les rapports des ambassadeurs d'Alexandre et 
Napoleon, 1808-1812 (st. Petersbourg: Manufacture des Papiers de 
l'Etat, 1905-08), Vol. V, p. 75-76. 
l8Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 136, p. 168, To Albert Gallatin, 
St. Petersburg, 15/27 Sept. 1810. 
19Mikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, p. 76. 
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The debate raged hot and furious through the summer and into the 
fall. All St. Petersburg, ~1d all Paris and London, waited for the de-
cision. When it came, slowly, bit by bit, equivocally, it was ostensi-
bly a compromise. The cargoes of upwards of sixty-three Teneriffe ves-
sels were confiscated, but the vessels themselves were permitted to load 
with Russian goods and return to England.* Ostensibly it was compromise, 
but the English party in Russia was not pacified. The confiscation of 
the sixty-three cargoes was a mortal blow to rnany English merchants and 
devastated the clandestine Russo-English commerce. The Council assented 
to the confiscations against the will of practically every one of its 
members. The greatest nobles of the land coldly requested permission to 
leave the capital and go to their estates. Commercial houses in Riga 
and St. Petersburg which had had an interest in the Teneriffe cargoes 
fell into ruin. Public opinion raged against Caulaincourt and against 
the weakness of Tsar Alexander.20 
The French ambassador reported to Paris that power had now been 
centralized in the hands of the Tsar and Rumiantsev. Caulaincourt pre-
dieted that although Alexander's reign had been noted for its liberalis~ 
it would end by being more absolute than its predecessors.21 French in-
fluence in Russia had reached its peak. 
*There is some confusion here. Adams gives this version. Caulaincourt 
seemed to think that the vessels, too, were confiscated. This confusion 
is not surprising, considering the amount of double-dealing going on in 
the ports and chancellory of Russia in these years. 
20Adams, Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 123, 6 July 1810, p. 124, 11 July 
1810, Letterbook, Reel 136, p. 186, To Sec. of State, st. Petersburg, 
19/31 Oct. 1810; Ivlikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, 
p. 93. 
21~.' p. 93. 
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Napoleon's hegemony over Europe was seemingly near completion. 
Only England and those areas whose defenses were stiffened by the pres-
ence or proximity of English troops remained outside his sway. And Eng-
land was staggering under the regimen inflicted on her economy by the 
Continental System. By tightening the mesh of the Continental System, 
Napoleon could starve his island enemy into surrender in a matter of 
months. In July, 1810, after a year and more of squabbling with the 
king of Holland about his studiously faulty administration of the Con-
tinental System (particularly in the cases of American ships) Napoleon 
annexed that commercial land to the French Empire.22 In July he 
obliged Frederick VI to close the ports of Schleswig-Holstein to Ameri-
can vessels. In that same month the Pruss ian government succumbed to 
French pressure and issued a proclamation stating that "no vessel com-
ing from an American port, or belonging to an American citizen or sub-
ject, shall be admitted and received into the ports of this country, 
" Mecklenburg followed with a similar annour:cernent. 23 In Augu.st . . . 
Napoleon ordered his troops into Hamburg, Lubeck, Lauenburg and the 
whole coast between Holland and the Elbe, including the tiny state of 
Oldenburg, duchy of the Duke of Oldenburg, uncle of the Tsar.24 
On 5 August Napoleon issued the Tariff of Trianon to supplement 
the decrees that had founded the Continental System. Experience had 
taught him the impossibility of completely excluding colonial goods, so 
22Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 300, 320-21. 
23Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 467-477. 
24Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 325, 330. 
179 
by this decree they were to be allowed entrance, but only after their 
owners paid a colossal tariff of fifty per cent of their value. By this 
Napoleon hoped to ruin the English, American and Continental smugglers 
by scooping their illicit profits into his treasury and the treasuries 
of his allies. Napoleon's allies began dutifully to enact the tariff 
within their boundaries. 25 The mesh of the Continental System 
tightened all across the northern half of Burope. 
On 6 August Harris told Adams that he had heard that Tsar 
Alexander had said to Rumiantsev, "The Emperor Napoleon may do as he 
pleases - I will not quarrel with the Americans. "26 Alexander had 
faithfully followed Napoilieon's wishes in the matter of the Teneriffe 
ships, which had angered his volatile nobility and lamed his nation's 
economy as had nothing since the last years of his murdered father, Paul 
I. In September Alexander petulantly claimed to Caulaincourt that niraty-
six ships had been confiscated in Russia in 1810 (we must allow royalty 
poetic license), but that he would not ruin his own subjects and the mer-
chants of neutral lands by adopting Napoleon's new tariff policy.27 
As the autumn progressed gigantic forces moved to test Alexander's 
courage. At the end of summer a steady west wind had begun to blow 
across the Skagerrak, briskly pushing convoys into the westward-facing 
harbor of Gothenburg, but permitting none to leave. In September Axel 
Pontus von Rosen, the governor of Gothenburg, took a careful count and 
25Thiers, Louis, History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under 
Napoleon (London: Chatto and Winders, 1894), Vol. VII, p. 165-67. 
26Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 133, 6 Aug. 1810. 
27Mikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, p. 148. 
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and discovered that a fantastic total of 1,124 merchantmen and nineteen 
British men-o-war were anchored in his habor. 28 This was probably the 
greatest concentration of shipping yet known in the history of the 
world. 
On Sunday, 7 October 1810, the wind veered around to East-north-
east and a convoy of some 600 merchantmen and their escort got underway 
for the Baltic.29 Fifty or so Americans came down from Gothenburg and 
mounted a high point of land to watch the huge fleet move out of the 
harbor.3° In the convoy itself were perhaps two hundred other Americans 
on board more than a score of assorted vessels flying the American flag. 
Captain Coggeshall of the Eliza, whom we met in the last chapter, 
was in Gothenburg harbor waiting for convoy to Russia at this time. 
Years later he wrote of the convoy of 600 that left on 7 October: 
"This whole vast fleet were nominally neutral ships, sailing 
under the different flags of nearly all the petty states of 
Germany, and their cargoes purporting to be the bona fide 
property of their respective countries, while in point of 
fact, most of them were English property, cloaked or covered 
by the flags of these different nations by simulated or 
counterfeit papers."31 
A few days after clearing Gothenburg a violent gale struck the 
great convoy. Over one hundred of its vessels were wrecked or captured 
by the Danes while the British men-of-war battled the winds and heavy 
28Heckscher, Eli F., The Continental System, An Economic Interpretation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), p. 236. 
29 Essex, Log of Brig Independence, 12 Aug. 1810 - 17 Aug. 1811. 
30smith, Reminiscences, p. 37-38. 
31coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 83. 
seas. More than two hundred others turned back to Gothenburg. The 
scattered survivors continued on into the Baltic.32 
On 23 October Emperor Napoleon wrote to Emperor Alexander: 
"Six hundred merchant ships, wandering in the Baltic, have 
been refused admission to Prussian ports and those of Meck-
lenburg, and have steered for your Majesty's states. If 
you admit them the war still lasts ••• Your Majesty knows 
if you confiscate them we shall have peace. Whatever their 
papers, under whatever names they are masked, French, Ger-
man, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Your Majesty may be sure 
they are English."33 
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On 4 November Napoleon sent off a complaint to Russia (this through 
normal diplomatic channels) that part of the great convoy was discharg-
ing its cargoes in Russian ports. He prefaced this complaint with a 
growl "that the colonial merchandise which appeared at the last Leipsig 
fair was brought there by 700 wagons coming from Russia; that today all 
the traffic in that merchandise is done through Russia ••• "34 Napoleon 
exaggerated for effect, as was usual when he berated a wayward subordin-
ate. The statement, however, did perfectly reflect his growing 
impatience with Russia. 
In November the Moniteur, the leading Parisian newspaper, announced 
that none of the vessels belonging to the convoy of 600 would be 
admitted to Russian ports.35 
While Napoleon berated Russia via the diplomatic pouch, Caulain-
court was attempting more quietly to bend Russia to French policy via 
' 
,. 
his influence with Alexander. No one knew at the time, probably not even 
32smith, Reminiscences, p. 38-39. 
33Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 344. 
34~., p. 345. 
35Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 549, Vol. IV, p. 8. 
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Alexander, that Caulaincourt' s task was an impossible one. His task 
was singlehandedly to prevent the slow titanic movement of Russia out 
of the Continental System. Like a peg driven into a snowbank to pre-
vent it from drifting, he was admirably upstanding in his devotion to 
duty and, of necessity, unsuccessful. 
On the 6th of November Caulaincourt dined with the Tsar, as he had 
many times before and would continue to do. The light flow of conversa-
tion, unfortunately for the diners' digestion, grounded on the subject 
of American trade with Russia. This was an unpleasant but perennial 
subject of discussion between the two. The French ambassador began 
with a claim that British goods were coming to Russia in American bot-
toms. Alexander replied that no American sail except those approved by 
John Quincy Adams were admitted, and that Adams had honorably rejected 
many. Besides, Alexander said, the number of confiscations proved Rus-
sia's loyalty to the Continental System. Caulaincourt countered by say-
ing that the Americans did not produce colonial goods in such quantities 
as they were bringing to Russia. Alexander parried by saying that it 
was not for Caulaincourt or him to say what the Americans could produce. 
This phase of the conversation finished with Alexander repledging 
his allegiance to France in her economic war against Britain, but adding 
that conditions in Russia did not permit him to conduct that warfare in 
the same way as Napoleon did in France. 11 Je ne puis pas, 11 he said, "me 
faire faire un habit~ votre taille.u36 
'V'fbile Caulaincourt mused over his fruitless talk with the Tsar, 
Captain Coggeshall was guiding the Eliza of New York through snow 
36Mikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, p. 186-87. 
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squalls in the Baltic, desperately hoping to get her into a port before 
winter closed all ports. The Eliza had left Gothenburg in the convoy 
following the convoy of 600. 
On the 20th of November the Eliza slipped into Riga harbor, and two 
days later winter froze her fast. She was one of the last of seventy to 
one hundred "neutral11 merchantmen that arrived in Riga, Reval, and lesser 
Russian ports at the end of the season after ice sealed off Kronstadt. 
Most of them were presumably survivors of the convoy of 600. Twenty-
three were American - eight at Riga, one at Libau and fourteen at Reval 
and other ports. All of them, American, Swedish, Pappenburgian and what 
have you, were fixed immobile by government sequestration as well as by 
the ice.37 
On the 2nd of December Napoleon dispatched a letter curtly 
reminding Russia that" ... There is today no neutral, because the Eng-
lish want none, and stop every vessel not freighted on their account. 
Not a single vessel has entered the ports of Russia with so-called Amer-
ican papers which has not come really from England."38 
That communique probably c11ossed en route a personal letter from 
Alexander to Napoleon boasting of how severely Russia was enforcing the 
Continental System and of how many ships Russia had confiscated. The 
Tsar also mentioned the mere sixty-odd late arrivals in his ports and 
noted that "the 600 ships that Your Majesty spoke to me about have re-
turned to England."39 
37Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 194; Coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, 
p. 94-95; Mikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatigues, Vol. V, p. 290. 
38Adams, History of the U.S., Vol. V, p. 417. 
39Tatistcheff, Serge, Alexander Ier et Napoleon d'apres leur Correspond-
ance lnedite, 1801-1812 (Paris: Libraire Academique Didier, Perrin et 
Cie, Libraires-Editeurs, 1891), p. 543. 
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On 7 December Caulaincourt was again dining with Alexander. The 
conversation took the same course as before. Caulaincourt led off by 
insisting that the Americans were bringing English goods to Russia. 
Alexander said he refused to close his ports to ~nericans, explaining 
that Russia's commerce was so reduced that she could not renounce trade 
with America, practically her only remaining good customer. 
Then the Tsar took the initiative, pointing to France's equivocal 
enforcement of her own Continental System. Russia's enthusiasm for the 
war against England certainly wasn't increased by the open issuance of 
licenses by the French government to its subjects to trade with the Eng-
lish. The French claim that these licenses were only issued for such 
trade was more to the advantage of France than Britain did nothing to 
lessen Russian dissatisfaction. 
This don't-do-as-I-do,-do-as-I-say policy put Caulaincourt in a 
very uncomfortable position. The story of the vessel William Gustave 
of Bordeaux is a case in point. At the beginning of 1810 that vessel 
appeared in Russia flying the flag of a neutral. It had come to Russia 
from France via England. The Russian authorities, following the precepts 
of the Continental System, sequestered it. The William Gustave then pre-
sented a French license authorizing it to trade with England. Following 
instructions from Paris, Caulaincourt obtained the vessel's liberation 
in October, 1810.40 This was a very embarrassing episode for Caulain-
court, which Alexander did not forget or forgive. 
40Hanoteau, Jean, Ed., Memoires du General Caulaincourt, Due de 
Vincence, Grand Ecuyer de L'Empereur, Vol. I, L'Ambassade de Saint-
Petersbourg et la Campagne de Russie (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1933), 
n. 282-83. 
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Nor did Caulaincourt. ¥fuen he returned to France he candidly told 
Napoleon that the Continental System would have been rigidly enforced 
from Archangel to Danzig if only Napoleon "had frankly imposed upon him-
self those privations and sacrifices which he wished to demand of 
others."41 
The complaint of Alexander's which Caulaincourt found most difficult 
to answer during the 7 December exchange had to do with French dalliance 
with neutral traders. It was a widely known fact that, whenever Napoleon 
thought it politic, France recognized neutral vessels and traded for the 
colonial goods they brought. "Let us speak frankly," said Alexander. 
"What is the object for France of the measures that you take? It is to 
have alone the benefits of the commerce in colonial goods, to have a 
monopoly of it •••• Why haven't I the right to receive sugar from the 
Americans. • • ? "42 
As Alexander and Caulaincourt chatted over wine of Europe's fate, 
Captain Coggeshall and his fellow American skippers were busy finding 
comfortable winter quarters for their crews and themselves. The cap-
tain and supercargoes hired apartments in Riga, Coggeshall rooming with 
Captain William Colwell of the ship Venus of Boston. The two men hired 
a coachman, with horse and sleigh to attend them night and day. This 
service cost them only eight dollars a month and was a great convenience 
both for business - flying down the frozen Dvina River to their ships in 
the ivory harbor; or pleasure - trotting to the supper and whist parties 
4lcaulaincourt, With Napoleon in Russia (New York: William Murrow &: 
Co., 1935), p. 25. 
42Mikhailowitch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, p. 221-28. 
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that the hospitable burghers of Riga arranged for the foreign officers 
stranded so far from home. 43 
The rest of the Americans at Riga stayed eight or nine miles away 
at Boldera, the port of Riga near the ~outh of the Dvina. 
"At this place there were many cheap houses, built expressly 
to rent to the ship-masters that winter here, to shelter 
their mates and crews from the severity of this climate, it 
always being too cold to live on shipboard. These houses 
were in line at a convenient,distance from each other; and 
thus each American captain in port hired one for their mates 
and seamen, at a rent of ten dollars per month; and were 
tolerably well built, and as firewood was plenty and cheap, 
they were comfortable residences for the winter. We unbent 
our sails and stripped the masts of all the rigging, and in 
a warm and comfortable room by the side of a large fire, my 
mate and sailors overhauled the rigging, repaired all the 
old, and made an entire new suit of sails during the winter. 
The sailors gave names to these houses according to their 
own fancy, sometimes after their ship or vessel; others were 
called New-York, Boston, or Salem, corresponding to the 
places where they belong~d; and after the labor of the day, 
they would visit their respective neighbors at New-York, 
Boston, or Salem, and as there was no want for female soci-
ety among the lower classes, balls and dances were very fre-
quent. The mates and petty officers also enjoyed the soci-
ety of each other, and in this manner contrived to spend 
their time pleasantly during the long cold evenings in this 
dreary climate."44 
The Yankee seamen settled down to wait out the snows. There was plenty 
of food, fuel and women, and so they were content enough, not knowing 
that their fate rolled like dice across the polished tables of palaces 
in St. Petersburg and Paris. 
F'ew beyond the innermost circles of Alexander's court knew just 
how much influence these seamen from the briny coves of the Merrimac, 
Charles, Hudson and Delaware Rivers had with the policy makers of the 
43coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 97-98, 100. 
44rbid., p. 96-97. 
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Russian Empire. American diplomats certainly entertained no optimistic 
views as to any increase of American influence in Russia at the expense 
of Napoleon. Jonathan Russell, the United States charg~ d'affaires in 
Paris, wrote on 4 December that Russia 11must promptly decide on hostil-
ities against commerce or against France. She must confiscate or fight 
and there is much reason to believe that she will elect the former. n45 
On the 17th John Quincy Adams wrote to William Gray, whose bark 
Leopard was one of the crucial twenty-three American merchantmen await-
ing either admission or confiscation, that there was little justifica-
tion for believing that any of the vessels arrived at the close of navi-
gation would be admitted.46 On the same day Adams reported to the Sec-
retary of State that the determination of Alexander, Rurniantsev and the 
Council of State in favor of continuing trade with America 11is said to 
be fixed and unalterable ••• , but ••• the necessity of commerce and the 
real regard for the United States, which is undissembled and unimpaired, 
may yield to the first principle of the Russian policy at this time, 
which is at all events to keep on good terms with France.n47 
On the last day of 1810 th~ government of Alexander I handed down 
a ukase setting forth a new policy for foreign commerce. A year and a 
half after, when Napoleon launched his invasion of Russia, he declared 
to his armies, 11At the end of 1810, Russia changed her political system; 
the English spirit recovered its influence; the ukase on commerce was 
the first act. 1148 
45Koht, Haldan, "Bernadette and Swedish-American Relations, 1810-1814, 11 
The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVI (Dec., 1944), p. 269. 
46Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 264, To William Gray, St. 
Petersburg, 5/17 Dec. 1810. 
47Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. III, p. 552. 
48Melvin, Frank E., Napoleon's Navigation System (New York: D. Appleton 
and Co., 1919), p. 233. 
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The ukase set up Neutral Maritime committees in each of Russia's 
ports to facilitate the handling of the papers of neutral merchantmen. 
The ukase listed all those things which could legally be imported 
into Russia. All else was prohibited. Not included in the list were 
silk cloth, velvet and lace. Importation by land of all grape wine, 
with the exception of Hungarian and VVallachian wine, was forbidden. 
Wine must come by sea, or not at all. 
For all practical purposes, all importation from France was thus 
forbidden. All the chief exports from France to Russia - silks, velvet~ 
laces, wines, etc. -were either debarred or to be refused entrance if 
they came by land. Since the British navy controlled the sea approached 
to Russia, any French wine dispatched by ship to Russia would only end 
up gracing the tables of Admiral Saumarez and his captains. 
Paragraph eleven of the ukase was of great interest to Americans. 
It proclaimed that only American and Brazilian ships were to be "admit-
ted with bills of lading, wherein the name of the consignee is not in-
serted ••• 11 This meant that only American and Brazilian skippers could 
bring cargoes to Russia without first receiving specific orders for 
those cargoes from specific merchants in Russia. Considering how slow 
and faulty were communications in 1810, this section of the ukase gave 
American and Brazilian merchants considerable advantage over merchants 
of other nations. Considering how few ships came to Russia from Brazil 
at this time, we may say that American shippers reaped that advantage 
nearly exclusively. 49 
49Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 4; Mikhailowitch, Les Rela-
tions Diplomatiques, Vol. V., p. 262; "Manifest of the Import and Export 
Trade of the Ellipire of Russia, for the Year 1811," enclosed with Diplo-
matic Despatches - Russia, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 27 
Jan. 1811. 
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~fuen Napoleon first read the new ukase he was confused and 
surprised. "Here is a great planet taking a wrong direction, 11 he said. 
"I do not understand its course at all."50 Shortly after, he recovered 
sufficiently to croon implications of bloody reprisal in a personal 
letter to Alexander: "For myself, I am always the same; but I am struck 
by the evidences of these facts, and by the thought that Your Iv'la.jesty is 
wholly disposed, as soon as circumstru1ces permit it, to make arrangement 
with England, which is the same thing as to kindle a war between the two 
Empires. tt5l 
Alexander answered in what he hoped was a disarmingly frank letter. 
The objects of the commercial ukase were two, he said. The first was 
to give greater facility to American commerce, because it was the only 
channel remaining by which Russia could export her accumulating iron, 
hemp, linens, etc.; France and her allies either would not or could not 
come to Russia to buy such goods. 
The second object of the ukase, according to Alexander, was to 
reduce to a minimum importations by land. By land came the luxury goods, 
the goods from France. These velvets and wines were many, many times 
more valuable per unit of weight than hemp or iron, and thus were very 
suitable for land transport. Therefore, while Russia's allegiance to 
the Continental System cut her off from her chief customer and source 
of hard cash, Great Britain, very expensive imports from the west con-
tinued to pour in. Russia had always been blessed with a very advanta-
geous balance of trade. Since the alliance with F'rance the opposite had 
50Rose, Napoleon, Vol. II, p. 216. 
51Adarns, History of U.S., Vol. V, p. 419. 
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been true. Russia's most important export had become gold and silver 
from her dwindling supply of specie.* 
The ruble, in obedience to the most basic laws of economics, had 
tumbled steadily in value. In 1805 it had been worth as high as 31~ 
pence sterling. In October, 1809, it was worth 21 pence. By September 
of 1810 it had plummeted to 14 pence. 52 Russia's hard cash was bleed-
ing away to the west, and Alexander and his advisors felt she was on 
the brink of disastrous inflation. The commercial ukase was essential 
to stop the exodus of gold in payment for her land imports from 
western Europe. 
So you can see, Alexander smiled, that the ukase is no more 
directed against your France than against any other European nation.53 
Ever since the arrival of the twenty-three American sail that lay 
in the outer ports of Russia's Baltic coast John Quincy Adams had been 
hounding the Russian government to win admittance for them. The Ameri-
can masters and supercargoes, living under the sword of confiscation, 
*It may be interesting to the reader to know that J. Jepson Oddy, a 
British merchant experienced in trading with Russia, predicted this 
situation in 1805: " ••• We cannot help observing how amazingly advan-
tageous its (Russia's) trade is with the British dominions. Not only 
the amount of the sales is equal nearly to those of all other nations, 
but it is from Britain only that Russia receives a balance in cash. 
Were the trade suspended, the importation of wines, brandies, and for-
eign produce and manufactures, from other countries, would totally ab-
sorb the monied capital of Russia; and it is not going too far to say, 
that such an event would do it more harm than any other that could 
take place." (Oddy, European Commerce, p. 209.) 
52oddy, European Commerce, p. 135; Peabody, Benjamin Shreve, Accounts 
and Papers Concerning my Voyage to Russia in the Bark ~illiam Gray; 
Peabody, Penn Townsend, Accounts, 1810-1812. 
53Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 3-4; Tatistcheff, 
Alexander Ier et Napoleon, p. 548-49. 
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petitioned Adams, cursed the French, cursed the Continental System, 
cursed the Russians, and waited and waited. One of the American super-
cargoes at Riga, a Mr. Kenyon of only twenty-two years, took up gam-
bling with members of the rich mercantile families of that port to 
while away the long winter. He won many thousand rubles, then lost 
some, then lost most of the cargo entrusted to him. After several 
weeks of despair, he shot himself. 54 
The others, most likely older, certainly wiser, contented 
themselves with waiting ••• and waiting. On 23 January Count Rumiant-
sev told Adams that the papers authorizing the admission of the Ameri-
cans only needed the Tsar's signature. There the matter stood for sev-
eral days. Then in early February permission was granted for seventeen 
of the American merchantmen to discharge their cargoes in part or whole. 
Coggeshall unloaded his cargo and it was sledged to St. Petersburg. 
"The sugars and other articles composing our cargo, were sold at the 
capital at very high prices. 11 Caulaincourt remarked to Adams on 15 Feb-
ruary with gracious bitterness, that "it seems you are great favorites 
here. You have found powerful protection, for most of your vessels have 
been admitted. 11 In 1Vl8.rch the remainder of the American cargoes were 
admitted. 55 '* 
*I do not know what became of the 50 to 80 non-American late arrivals of 
1810. On 3 February Caulaincourt wrote that it had been announced that 
they were confiscated, but that he hadn't received official confirmation. 
On 15 March Adams said scarcely any but the ~~ericans had been admitted. 
(.Mikhailowi tch, Les Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. V, p. 290; Adams Mi-
crofilm, Letterbook, Reel l3b, to Joy, S-c. Petersburg, 15 March 1811). 
54coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 101; Adams lviicrofilm, Diary, 
p. 292, 20 Sept. 1811. 
55Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 217, 226; Coggeshall, Second Series of 
Voyages, p. 98; Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 12-13, 35. 
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Captain Coggeshall loaded his Eliza with bar iron, eighty casks of 
tallow, several tons of hemp, filled her up with sheetint;s, drillings, 
diaper, canvas and ravensduck, and, on 25 May 1811, after six months 
and four days at Riga, cleared for New York. The Eliza passed through 
the Belt in British convoy and entered New York harbor on 9 August. 
She was one of the very first ships from Russia in 1811, and so her 
voyage was a profitable one. 56 
In 1810 there had come to Kronstadt 107 American merchantmen, a 
full one-fourth of the total entries - 410 - at that port in that year, 
and over one and a half times as many vessels as came from any other 
. 1 t' 57 s1ng e na 1on. Fifty-six American sail entered at Archangel.58 To 
Riga, Reval, Libau and the lesser Russian ports came forty or so addi-
tional American ships, making the total of American vessels entering 
Russia ports in 1810 something in the vicinity of 200. 59 
The impact of these two hundred on Russia's economy and on the 
Continental System was magnified by the fact that American ships now 
habitually arrived in Russia loaded with goods and not in ballast as in 
normal times. 60 The commercial warfare between France and England had 
robbed Americans of so many of their markets that Russia was one of the 
few countries left to which Americans could export. The total exports 
56coggeshall, Second Series of Voyages, p. 102-106. 
57st. Petersburgische ~eitung, 6 Dec. 1810. 
58peabody, J:i1emo Book on Russian Trade of Joseph V. :s~won, p. 26-31. 
59Adams, Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 272, To Mitchell, St. 
Petersburg, 5/18 Dec. 1810. 
60Adarll.s, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 196. 
from the United States to Russia in 1810 amounted in value to nearly 
four million dollars, well over four ti1nes the amount of 1809, the 
previous all-time high.61 
If, as Napoleon believed, all Americans coming to Russia were 
smuggling for the British, then a great breach had been torn in the 
wall of the Continental System in 1810. 
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61Misc. Documents of the House of Representatives, 1892-93, Vol. XXVI, 
p. XVI; Consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of 
State, 23 Oct./9 Nov. 1810. 
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Chapter XII 
Act II, Scene III: The United States, Darling of the Baltic 
In some ways 1810 had been a good year for Englishmen trading with 
Russia and the north of Eu~ope. Britain had imported 752,295 worth of 
hemp, more than in any year since the bombardment of Copenhagen,l and 
had sent off to the north of Europe (including France) nearly 14 mil-
lion worth of goods, actually a few hundred thousand pounds worth more 
than in the comparatively "normal" year of 1806.2 
In other ways 1810 bad been Britain's worst year of the war yet. 
It was the year in which Napoleon dedicated - for the first time, real-
ly - the full measure of his intellect, energy, diplomacy and armies to 
the enforcement of the Continental System. To ensure its enforcement 
he extended the French Empire to the borders of Denmark, startling his 
allies into more assiduous examination of "neutral" property arriving 
in their ports than ever before. In 1810 greater quantities of English 
property were confiscated than ever before. In the latter months of the 
year Napoleon had even set his customs agents and those of his obedient 
allies to making great bonfires of all the British manufactures they 
seized. (Auto-da-fes, John Quincy Adams called them).3 The heat from 
these fires was as a raw wind to the Briton who, for lack of customers 
for his products, was going hungry in the midst of plenty. 
1810 was the peak yaar of the British license trade. The British 
government issued 18.356 licenses for illicit trade with France and her 
lJournals of the House of Commons from January 1810 to August 1810, Vol. 
LXV, p. 647-48; Journals of the House of Commons from November 1812 to 
November 1813, Vol. LXVIII, p. 805-806. 
2Journals of the House of Commons from January 1812 to July 1812, Vol. 
LXVII, p. 766. 
3Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 38. 
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allies in that single twelve-month period.4 1810 was also the year 
that disillusioned England with the license trade. So many of these li-
censes were issued to foreigners that British shippers complained that 
the license trade was an ill-founded scheme whereby fees for freighting 
British goods were taken away from the British merchant marine.S Some 
Britons also complained of the power which the British government 
gained over the merchant class by granting or withholding licenses. 
Everyone bewailed the cultivation of forgery and perjury which was part 
and parcel of the license trade. 
None of these, however, was the real motive for English 
disillusionment with the license trade. The real cause was the enor-
mous confiscations on the Continent of shipping provided with these li-
censes, ruining some of the wealthiest merchants in London and filling 
Napoleon's coffers.6 Captain Osgood of the ill-fated Mary, who arrived 
in London in the fall of 1810, reported, "There is a total stagnation 
of business owing to the great and increasing number of bankrupts and 
the difficulty of trading with the Continent."7 In the spring this un-
fortunate Jonah of a captain witnessed the bankruptcy of Messrs. Le 
Mesurier and Company, the London house which handled the funds of the 
Massachusetts merchants who employed him.8 
4"Account of the Number of Commercial Licenses," Parliamentary Papers -
1812, Vol. IX. 
S"Memorial against the License Trade, presented by the Merchants and 
Ship Owners of the Town of Kingston upon Hull, to the Board of Trade, 
4 April 1811," Parliamentary Papers, 1812, Miscellaneous. 
6Hansard, T.C., The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the 
Present Time, Vol. XXI, p. 845-46. 
7Letterbook of Osgood, To Pickman and Derby, London, 13 Nov. 1810. 
8Ibid., To Holterman and Sons, London, 8 May 1811. 
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In 1811 most British merchants withdrew from the license trade, 
and only 7,602 licenses were issued, less than half the previous year's 
total.9 In August of 1811 Captain John March, one of the Americans lan-
guishing in Gothenburg, wrote home that the quantity of colonial produce 
sent by England into the Baltic "I suppose not more than one third what 
was last year."lO This constriction of her commerce in 1811 brought 
Great Britain closer to defeat than she would be again until the days 
of the Kaiser's U-boats. 
The British government knew well that commerce with the Baltic 
powers was necessary to the survival of Britain's merchants and the con-
tinued operation of her navy, and so ordered Admiral Saumarez to do his 
utmost to encourage neutral participation in that commerce. He there-
fore lifted the blockade of the Sound for the entire shipping season of 
1811.11 
France's annexation of many of the little states whose flags were 
utilized by smugglers for cover severely limited the English merchants 
in their choice of disguises. John Quincy Adams reported to the secre-
tary of State at the end of the 1811 shipping season that "The abolition 
of the Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, Pappenburg and Oldenburg flags has much 
increased the necessity under which the English have found themselves 
of resorting to that of the United States to carry their merchan-
dise ... "12 Just how often the English must have so abused the Ameri-
can flag was something Adams never realized until some years later. 
9"Account of the Number of Con:mercial Licenses," Parliamentary Papers, 
l~assachusetts Historical Society, Letterbook of John March, To Rol-
lins, Gothenburg, 29 August 1811. 
llAdams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 473-74, To T.B. Adams, St. 
Petersburg, 21 Oct. 1811. 
12Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 270. 
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British utilization of the Stars and Stripes during 1811 was even 
more unethical than during 1810, if that is possible. In 1810 American 
trade with Britain had at least been legal. In 1811 all such trade was 
forbidden by the American government. Napoleon had used the Macon Act 
as a lever to twist the United States out of its neutral position and 
turn her against Great Britain. 
The Macon Act, you will remember, promised the two great 
protagonists of the European War that if either of them granted the 
United States full rights as a neutral trader, then the United States 
would stop trading with the other. In July, 1810, Napoleon, a poker 
player always ready to bluff on a pair of deuces, declared that the 
Berlin and Milan Decrees, the basic documents of the Continental Sys-
tem, would no longer apply to American shipping after the first of No-
vember. 
James Madison accepted Napoleon's bluff at face value, and 
announced that non-intercourse would be revived against Britain in 
three months unless Britain revoked her onerous orders in council a-
gainst American shipping. Britain saw no evidence that the Berlin and 
Milan Decrees had been modified, and so made no change in her policy. 
Neither could Americans on the scene in Europe s~e any change in 
the French attitude toward American shipping. One American wrote to 
Girard, the Philadelphia merchant prince, on the next to the last day 
of 1810 that "I am afraid that we have been the dupes of the French 
government; three American vessels have lately arrived in France, of 
which one, the New Orleans packet, is already condemned .... The other 
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two still remain under seizure in execution of the Berlin and Milan 
Decrees."l3 
On 11 February 1811 Madison forbade further commerce with Great 
Britain. Shortly afterward, Congress expressed its approval. For 
practical purposes, Napoleon now had a trans-Atlantic member of the Con-
tinental System, and at the cost of only words. 
John Quincy Adams, thousands of miles and several .Oaths distant 
wrote from St. Petersburg in April like an~ post facto Cassandra: 
"The policy of France is at this time as hostile to the 
United States as it ever was, since our existence as a 
nation. We hear, and I most sincerely hope, that the 
non-importauion act (cutting off our trade with England) 
... did not eventually pass. It was a trap to catch us 
into a war with England; a war which England most richly 
deserves, but which would on our part be more than ever 
impolitic at this time." 14 
Tensions between the United States and Britain were drawn so 
tautly in the spring of 1811 that war seemed a possibility any day. 
The forty-four gun American frigate President, cruising off Sandy Hook 
in May sighted what she thought was a British frigate and pursued. 0-
vertaking the mysterious vessel at dusk and receiving no identifying 
signal, the President raked her stem and stern with broadsides. When 
the brief battle was over, the battered loser was revealed as the twen-
ty-gun British corvette Little Belt, barely half the size of the Presi-
dent. 
In Russia all held their breaths while the United States and 
Britain teetered on the edge of war. War would mean sure capture for 
American ships trying to get home from Russia. As a matter of fact, 
llMcMaster, Girard, Vol. II, p. 145. 
14Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 64-65. 
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practically the only British obstruction of Russo-American trade in 
1811 came as direct result of the Little Belt incident. Saumarez's 
fleet seized and held several American vessels at Wingo Bay and Hano 
Harbor until orders came through from London that all was well and that 
peace still existed between the two English-speaking powers.lS 
The Russians were no less nervous about the state of Anglo-
American relations than the English or Americans. Russia knew that war 
between Britain and the United States would bring a sudden end to Russo-
American trade and thus force her to a stark choice between economic ca-
tastrophe or war with France. With United States ships, now by any 
measure Russia's best customers, gone from her harbors, she would ei-
ther have to accept a profound reduction of her commerce or would have 
to take up direct trade with Britain again, which would shortly bring 
Napoleon's armies surging across her frontiers.l6 No one could be more 
concerned about America's rights vis~ vis the British navy than Alex-
ander, Tsar of Russia. 
Alexander had many additional reasons for sleepless nights in 1811. 
His war with Britain was not going poorly, but it was going on ... and 
on ... and on. Napoleon continued to harangue for a tighter administra-
tion of the Continental System, and at the same time the Russian nobil-
ity, who well remembered how to assassinate a Tsar, pressed for more 
trade. Alexander seemed caught in a situation in which there seemed no 
path of least resistance. 
Napoleon certainly did little to bolster Alexander's ardor for the 
alliance with France. In December, 1810, Napoleon had annexed Hambur~, 
lSAdams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 281, 20 Aug. 1811; Letterbook, 
Reel 135, To T.B. Adams, St. Petersburg, 21 Oct. 1811. 
16Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 252. 
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Bremen, Lubeck and the coast between France and Denmark - the territory 
he had occupied the previous summer. This annexation included the Duchy 
of Alexander's uncle, the Duke of Oldenburg, which angered the Tsar more 
than anything Napoleon had ever done. Napoleon had also extended the 
borders of his satellite, Poland, reviving the traditional Russian a-
version to a foreign-dominated Poland. In the fall of 1810 Napoleon 
had approved the nomination of the Swedish Estates of his general, Ber-
nadotte, as the crown prince of Sweden. From the day he arrived in 
Sweden, Bernadotte controlled the course of Swedish military and for-
eign policy. This was not a state of affairs Napoleon liked, for he 
properly judged Bernadotte to be too independent to be safely given 
that much power that far from Paris, but to Russia Bernadotte's arriv-
al in Sweden seemed another move in the ominous approach of France to-
ward the territories of Russia. At Russia's front Napoleon seized 
whole states, at her northern flank he insinuated himself into power 
through his protege.l7 
Russia's fears of these advances and Napoleon's extreme irritation 
at the commercial ukase of December brought France and Russia very 
close to war in the spring of 1811. (In the spring of 1811 all our 
protagonists, Russia, France, Britain and the United States, seemed to 
be rehearsing for the hecatombs of 1812.) 
As spring opened Alexander and Napoleon sent several hundred 
thousand men to glare suspiciously at each other over their mutual bor-
der.l8 The day after Easter Adams, taking his constitutional on the 
quay, met Gen~ral Pardo, the minister from Spail!.t_and cll.atted with him 
17Gottschalk, Era of the French Revolution, p. 385, 395, 484. 
18Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 245-46. 
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about the crisis. The General felt immediate war between France and 
Russia inevitable, chalking it up to Russia's "commercial system" and 
the Oldenburg seizure.l9 A few weeks later news reached St. Petersburg 
of an extemporaneous speech Napoleon had given before the Council of 
Commerce of Paris in which he openly threatened Russia. One account of 
the speech quoted him as saying, "The Emperor of Russia had not indeed 
as yet enforced my decrees in his ports, but he will do it within six 
months or I declare war against him. Who could hinder me, after Til-
sit, from marching to Petersburg? What I did not do, I can do."20 
On 19 May Caulaincourt departed St. Petersburg for France. "He 
leaves .this place," wrote Adams, "regretted I believe as much as a 
French ambassador possibly could be - loaded with the distinctions and 
favors of the Emperor Alexander beyond all example."21 Napoleon, as a 
method of expressing his displeasure with Russia, recalled this friend 
of Alexander and replaced him with Count Lauriston, an able man but one 
inferior in rank and ability to Caulaincourt.22 
In the winter Caulaincourt had carefully reckoned the sum of the 
results of his efforts to enforce the Continental System in Russia. 
The Russians assured him that two hundred ship cargoes had been confis-
cated since the beginning of 1809, but he had unimpeachable evidence of 
only one hundred and seventeen confiscations. And even that figure was 
obscure and misleading. Caulaincourt judged that~n reality, the 
19Ibid., p. 254. 
20Adams, History of U.S., Vol. V, p. 398; Diplomatic Despatches - Rus-
sia, Vol. I, "Discourse delivered by the Emperor Napoleon at the meet-
ing of the Council of Connnerce." 
21Adams Microfil~, Letterbook, Reel 136, p. 246, To Russell, St. Pe-
tersburg, 5 May 1811. 
22Honoteau, Caulaincourt, Vol. I, n. 280. 
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total should be reduced by two thirds because of the careful 
incompetence of the Russian officials who looked the other way while 
the "confiscated" cargoes were spirited off the vessels and into the 
night.23 
What thought troubled Caulaincourt's mind as his carriage lurched 
over the roads leading south and west away from St. Petersburg? Could 
it have been, how, how do you persuade a whole people to enforce a law 
they do not want enforced? 
Long before the roads in Russia dried enough for invasion, 
Napoleon permitted the tensions between France and Russia to relax. Al-
exander had called his bluff, and it had been a bluff ... this time. 
"The apprehensions of war," Adams said, "have vanished like a frightful 
vision of the night; though here and there a doubter insinuates that 
the catastrophe is not for any length of time delayed."24 
If Alexander had been clairvoyant, one of the events which had led 
to the crisis in Franco-Russian relations in the winter and spring of 
1811 would have filled him with joy rather than apprehension. Berna-
dotte's accession to power in Sweden was not an extension of Napoleon's 
power, but rather an omen that it had passed its maturity. Bernadette 
was like Caulaincourt in energy and ability, but superior to him in tal-
ent for self-advancement. Bernadette had started .as a Sergeant-Major 
and had learned on the way up that loyalty to one's chief is often too 
much baggage for a climber to carry. 
On his journey from the Continent to Sweden to accept the 
nomination of the Estates-General Bernadette received an excellent 
23Mikhailowitch, Relations Diplomatigues, Vol. V, p. 289-90. 
24Adams Microfilm', Letterbook, Reel 136, p. 246, To Russell, St. Peters-
burg, 5 May 1811. 
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lesson in the difference between being on the continent and being 
practically anywhere else in the world. When he reached the shore of 
the Great Belt, a British convoy of some hundreds of merchantmen was 
passing through, shepherded by Saumarez's Victory, six other ships of 
the line, six frigates and an assortment of sloops of war. In order to 
cross over Bernadotte was obliged to request permission of Admiral Sau-
marez, which was graciously granted by that sly maritime statesman. 
Bernadotte subsequently told one of the British officers of Saumarez's 
command that that enormous fleet,Ais omnipotent on its watery plain as 
ever Napoleon was on the fields of Austerlitz or Jena, "was the most 
beautiful and wonderful sight he had ever beheld, being one of which he 
had never formed an idea."25 
When Bernadotte reached Sweden he was rapidly introduced to a few 
more of the realities of the Swedish situation. Sweden's economy de-
pended on overseas commerce. Her greatest industry was iron production. 
Without export of iron, her miners, ironmongers, and merchants would 
simply have no way to make a.;.living. To export meant to coddle the 
British and cultivate the Americans. 
But first there was Napoleon to coddle and cultivate. Before Ber-
nadotte had been in Sweden a month the government of that nation had 
issued a set of regulations stringently enforcing the Continental Sys-
tem, and had declared war on Britain. According to these new regula-
tions the two million dollars worth on American property in entrepot at 
Gothenburg could not be exported. Its owners were condemned either to 
sell it at the current Swedish prices, which, as had been true for two 
years, would mean vast loss; or simply let the warehouse mice feed on 
25Ross, Memoirs of Saumarez, Vol. II, p. 215. 
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it. In compliance with Bernadotte's new regulations the Swedish 
officials seized the papers of six American ships in Swedish ports, in 
effect sequestering them.26 All boded ill for American traders who 
would touch at Swedish ports in the coming season. 
On the 1st of March, 1811, Bernadotte granted audience to John 
Speyer, a New York merchant appointed by the American envoy to France 
to be the "commercial agent" of the United States at Stockholm. (Like 
the Forbes and Joy appointments, this was another of the United States 
government's ad hoc arrangements to save money and keep the number of 
permanent diplomatic representatives abroad to a minimum.) Speyer 
found Bernadotte practically effusive in his declarations of affection 
for America: 
"I know through my friends that my election had alarmed the 
people of the United States, who consider their property 
here as lost, but they are mistaken. The Swedish nation 
has no disposition to treat you as you are treated close by. 
i.e., Denmark. Tell your government that we do not want 
to enrich ourselves at the expense of our friends. I love 
the Americans. Tell them they will always be treated here 
as friends. The King and myself and the constituted au-
thorities will do all we can for you. We have been the ad-
vocates of the United States. We have been much importuned 
but have refused everything that could affect your inter-
est .... Inform the President that you may safely come to 
Sweden, bring your produce and take ours in return." 
So much for the Continental System. Speyer st~ggered from the 
interview and reported to Washington that "the French party has lost 
nearly all its former influence."27 
Within two months the seized papers were returned to the six 
waiting American merchantmen and they were getting under way, several 
26Koht, Halvdan, "Bernadotte and Swedish-American Relations, 1810-1814," 
The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVI (December, 1944), p. 269, 271; 
Consular Despatches - Stockholm, Vol. I, To Russell, Stockholm 18 April 
1811. 
27Koht, Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVI (Dec., 1944), p. 270. 
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of them for Russia. At the same time the Swedish government granted 
Americans permission to export their property stored at Gothenburg, os-
tensibly only back to America but in reality to anywhere they wished. 
Later in the year American ships were permitted to sail in Swedish con-
voys, which they did - right past the noses of Napoleon's privateers.28 
As for Bernadette's dutiful declaration of war against England-
well, it was one thing to get him to declare it and quite another to get 
him to wage it. At the end of the 1811 shipping season Speyer reported 
that the English had never molested the Swedish coastal trade, that 
Swedish vessels had even sailed in British convoys, and that considera-
ble shipments had been smuggled from Sweden to England. "France," he 
wrote, "often remonstrates against this intercourse, and in vain impor-
tunes this government to adopt measures of decided hostility against 
the English fleets and trade in these seas ."29 
Bernadette, safe behind the shield of Admiral Saumarez and his 
fleet, could afford to treat Napoleon cavalierly. Frederick VI of Den-
mark, on the wrong side of that shield, still jumped nervously whenever 
Napoleon grumbled. In the past year the French Empire had advanced to 
the borders of Denmark. What would prevent it from advancing further? 
Rumors darted through Paris about impending annexation of Denmark and 
the possibility of a precautionary transfer by Frederick VI of his gov-
ernment to Norway.30 
Yet even the frightened Danes were growing restive and sullen 
under the domination of France. Privateering was no substitute for 
28Ibid., p. 271; Consular Despatches -Stockholm, To Russell, Stock-
holm, 18 April 1811, To Sec. of State, Stockholm, 22 Apr. 1811. 
29Koht, Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVI (Dec., 1944), p. 271. 
30oiplomatic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To Secretary of State, Paris, 
14 May 1811. 
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regular commerce. The British were brutal and hateful, but they did 
control the seas from which Denmark had drawn such a large part of its 
wealth. The empty expanse of the harbor of Copenhagen cried out for 
fleets of merchant sail from the great ports and far islands of the 
world. 
At this favorable conjunction of the planets, George W. Erving was 
dispatched by the United States government to Copenhagen, arriving at 
noon on the 30th of May, 1811.31 Erving wasn't a permanently ap-
pointed minister to the Danish court. His, too, was an ad hoc mission 
to try to settle the matter of seizures of American property, but he 
wasn't just an unknown picked to go to Copenhagen simply because he was 
near Denmark when the seizure problem occured to Madison. Erving was a 
man of skill, wisdom and high diplomatic reputation. And he arrived at 
the right time. 
He got down to work immediately. He quickly decided that Saabye, 
though perhaps honorable, was useless as an American consul because of 
his nationality and his inactivity. Joy, he had decided at the end of 
three weeks in Copenhagen, "is entirely undeserving of any kind of con-
fidence . "32 
Erving was equally keen in his handling of United States relations 
with the Danes. Rapport between him and the officials of the Danish 
court was wondrously immediate. Erving was apparently a catalyst which 
precipitated out of solution all the desires of Danes for a return of 
normal commerce with ne~u~t~r~a~l~s~·~----------
3lconsular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. II, To Forbes, Copenhagen, 31 
May 1811. 
32Diplomatic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copenhage~ 
19 Sept. 1811; Massachusetts Historical Society, Winthrop Collection, 
Vol. LIII, To Madison, Copenhagen, 23 June 1811. 
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On the 23rd of June Erving happily wrote the Secretary of State 
that "the evils which our commerce has suffered here, though very con-
siderable, yet have not been quite so extensive as has been generally 
believed; and you will learn also, with particular pleasure, that the 
depredations of the Danish privateers have been discontinued since my 
arrival." In the last dozen days upwards of forth American sail had 
passed through the Sound with little or no delay en route.33 
Erving's efforts were not rewarded with total success, of course. 
Fear of Napoleon made the Danes reluctant to free previously captured 
Americans. And there continued to be Danish seizures of American vas-
sels. In all the Danes brought thirty-seven American sail into their 
ports in 1811, but now the proportion of those condemned to those freed 
was smaller, and the speed of the courts in expediting the cases of de-
tained Americans was greater. As of 12 April 1812 only four of the 
thirty-seven had been condemned, and three of these four were so bla-
tantly sailing for the English that Erving wasted little sympathy on 
them. The only legal American vessel seized by the Danes in 1811 and 
condemned in the courts of Denmark was the Brutus, ~aptain Fenno, of 
Boston, bound from New Orleans to St. Petersburg.34 
At the other end of the Baltic the love affair between Russia and 
America continued to bloom. On 24 April 1811, the day the ice broke in 
the Neva, Adams was told by one of the Russian officials handling the 
examination of American merchantmen suspected of trading for the Eng-
lish that the ships in question had only to produce papers proving the 
neutrality of themselves and their cargoes to be released. Adams noted 
33American State Papers, ~·oreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 521. 
34Ibid., p. 561; Diplomatic Despatches -Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of 
State, Copenhagen, 12 April 1812. 
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that "as to the time which had been given for producing the papers, a 
year and a day had been fixed on ... ; but if longer time was wanting, 
he was as willing that they should have two or three years as one."35 
And so it went throughout the entire shipping season of 1811. 
The Russians, however, did not completely ignore their obligations 
to the Continental System. The alliance with France continued to exist. 
Forty to fifty arriving merchant sail were confiscated.36 Five Ameri-
can ships were seized.37 But the administration of the Continental Sys-
tern in Russia was much looser than ever before, and everyone knew it. 
For Americans the exasperation of the long delays before admission was 
a thing of the past, along with the constant worry that the wavering 
Tsar would suddenly acquiesce to French policy and confiscate every 
.~erican ship and cargo in his ports. Every honest American on his way 
to Russia could now be sure that the Russian government would accord 
him every courtesy and justice. Every dishonest American on his way to 
Russia could be sure that the prejudice of a large portion of the offi-
cials with whom he would have to deal would be in his favor. 
The benign attitude of the English, Swedes, Danes and Russians 
toward Americans guiding their vessels into the Baltic was, paradoxi-
cally, ruinous for the Americans. The night of 11 May the first vessel 
of the season arrived at Kronstadt. She was an American, last from 
Denmark where she had wintered.38 Although she was the very first of 
the year, she found the market for colonial goods at St. Petersburg 
35Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 257. 
3~ikhailowitch, Relations Diplomatigues, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 129. 
37consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 11/23 May 1812. 
38Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 81. 
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already overstocked. The commerce of 1810 had left Russia with such a 
superfluity of sugar, coffee, cotton, etc., that their prices had 
dropped during the winter, some as much as twenty per cent.39 
But the Americans, with nowhere else to go, came like lennnings to 
the ports of Russia. On the 25th of June John Quincy Adams wrote to 
his father, John Adams, that already the fortieth American vessel had 
entered at Kronstadt. Her name, the son was proud to write, was the 
John Adams. His pride, however, was tempered by his knowledge of the 
state of the market in Russia.40 
On 21 July Adams wrote his father again: 
"American vessels are now pouring upon us in floods. I 
wrote you less than a month since that there had then ar-
rived at Kronstadt forty since the opening of the year's 
navigation, and already the number exceeds ninety, be-
sides as many more at Archangel and other Russian ports . 
. . . I hear that they are still coming by the hundred. 
I am sorry for the adventurers. They will almost uni-
versally make ruinous voyages. "41 
By August the bottom of the Russian market for American imports 
had seemingly dropped out. Coffee, sixty-three to seventy-five rubles 
per pood in January, was down to forty to fifty-two rubles. Cotton, 
fifty-four rubles a pood in January, was twenty to twenty-five in Au-
gust. And so it went for all the other colonial goods.42 
The level of Russian tariffs, and the prices of Russian services 
and goods moved in the other direction: up. The tariffs under the 
commercial ukase of December, 1810, were higher than before, and some 
Americans were forced to sell their cargoes at tremendous losses just 
39Letterbook of March, To Coolidge and Co., Gothenburg, 6 April 1811. 
40ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 117. 
41 Ibid. , p. 142 . 
42Essex, "Prices Current, Imports, St. Petersburg, 24 Jan. 1811, 8 Aug. 
1811." 
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to pay the tariffs on them.43 Interest charged for bank loans went up. 
Hemp, the bellwether of Russian exports, rose from eighty-eight rubles 
per berkovets in January to a hundred and eight or a hundred and ten in 
August.44 
Some Americans hoped to offset their losses in selling colonial 
goods in Russia by the profits of selling Russian goods in America. 
They were grasping at straws. The United States was as glutted with im-
ports from Russia as Russia was with imports from America. Russian 
duck, which had been twenty-nine dollars a bolt in July, 1810, was 
$23.50 in July, 1811.45 The very best hemp, which had sold for as much 
as $320 a ton in the fall of 1810, was down to $250 in July of 1811. 
Ordinary hemp plummeted as low as $200 a ton.46 
The story of the ship John of Salem is a good example of the 
unfortunate state of an American vessel involved in Russo-American 
trade in 1811. In May the John cleared Salem harbor for Archangel 
loaded with cotton, coffee, and Arabian gum and drugs. She arrived at 
Archangel on the 4th of July, after a fast passage of thirty-six days, 
and immediately discovered that cotton would not sell at any price, nor 
would the gums, and the coffee only if it were of a special high quali-
ty. "Alloes, sandarac and myrrh" - presumably what was meant by 
"drugs" - sold well, but the John had only small quantities aboard. 
The master of the John, a Yankee by the name of Francis Boardman, put 
43Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 269; Adams Microfilm, Diary, 
Reel 31, p. 279, 12 Aug. 1811. 
44"Prices Current, Exports, St. Petersburg, 24 Jan. 18ll, 8 Aug. 1811." 
45cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices, p. 158, 161. 
46American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. II, p. 39; Dawes, ed., 
Timothy William's Marine Notes, p. 164, 165. 
her cargo into the hands of a local merchant to be sold if and when the 
market improved. The merchant advanced him enough credit for one hun-
dred tons of cordage, and in early autumn the John cleared Archangel. 
Her owners had guessed in the spring that the market for Russian 
goods in the United States would grow worse rather than better, and so 
had made up a letter of instructions which now directed the John not 
back to the United States, but "say to South American, or even In-
dia. " 
However, practically no amount of foresight could make a silk 
purse out of the sow's ear of the John's voyage of 1811. Wherever A-
merican ships could legally enter in 1811 and 1812 there seemed to be 
an oversupply of the goods they carried. The economic war had so dis-
torted world trade in 1811 that one of the more common neutral cargoes 
was Russian goods. 
First the John sailed to Lisbon. She sold thirty coils of her 
cordage there at a decent price, but then two other ships arrived from 
St. Petersburg with cordage. The John next crossed the Atlantic and 
put into Pernambuco, Brazil, and found the market there "completely 
glutted with navy stores." Next she sailed to Bahia, Brazil, and found 
conditions no different there. "I believe cordage is the dullest arti-
cle in market at this place or any on the coast," cried Francis Board-
man. On 25 April 1812 he wrote to Salem that he had finally sold the 
cordage, though at a very low price. His excuse was that there was 
"No sale whatever for cordage and several vessels ~.vere. . .laying in 
port partly loaded with it .. II The John took on a cargo of sugar and 
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cleared for home. For all the wisdom and energy expended by her owners 
and officers, hers had been a thoroughly unprofitable voyage.47 
There was ~ way in which an ~\merican trading with Russia could 
be sure of a pretty profit in 1811, though the record of history con-
tains only oblique reference to it. An American could always sail for 
the British. Prices of Russian goods were still far above normal in 
Great Britain, and British merchants were willing, even anxious, to pay 
enormous fees to neutrals to buy Russian naval stores and freight them 
to England. 
Most of these Anglo-American smugglers came to Russia in ballast, 
as did perhaps one third of all Americans arriving in Russia in 1811.48 
Not having a cargo reduced the amount of property the English who em-
ployed these ships would lose if the ships were confiscated. Moreover, 
being in ballast safeguarded these ships from seizure. The Russians 
were twice-over motivated to allow ships in ballast to enter with im-
punity. Once, because the mercantilist theory of the day taught that 
selling to an enemy while not buying from him would quickly draw off all 
his gold, and thus destroy his economy. Twice, because the ships that 
entered empty and left loaded with Russian goods did most to restore 
Russia's faborable balance of trade. Near the end of the shipping sea-
son Adams reported to his Secretary of State that the Russian Minister 
of Finance had said "that if a ship came empty, he did not care when she 
came, and was not ~nclined to scrutinize what she was~•-4_9 ______________ __ 
47Peabody, Account book of the Ship John, 1811-1812; Letterbook of 
Francis Boardman. 
48Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, n. 239. 
49Jbid., p. 234. 
The Russian economic policy of 1811 - the reduction of land 
imports and encouragement of all overseas trade - was crude but effec-
tive. By August the specie ruble had risen thirty to forty per cent in 
value in the financial marts of London, Hamburg, Paris and Amsterdam, 
and the depreciation of the paper ruble, the ruble with which most 
business was transacted and therefore the ruble with which most Ameri-
cans usually dealt, slowed, halted and was just beginning to inch up-
ward.SO The Russian economy was easing back upright, back toward Eng-
land and back from its dangerous list toward France. 
By the latter months of 1811 Adams was becoming conscious of the 
magnitude of American involvement in the clandestine trade between Rus-
sia and England. When quizzed in September by Lauriston, the new 
French ambassador, on that subject, he answered, "l-lell, between us 
two ... , there are many American vessels which I believe came from 
England, but they all came in ballast." Adams was not absolutely sure 
of that last. "Of loaded vessels," he added, "I assure you, not that 
there have been~. but, to my full persuasion, scarcely any."51 
To his own government he was more candid, admitting in October 
that he had his suspicions that more than one of the American merchant-
men arriving in Russia came loaded with English property, "although the 
vessel and papers and even the master and crew were really American .. 
and I am not sure there were not cases in which everything was English 
but the papers."52 
50Ibid., p. 194-95; Intelligenzblatt der St. Petersburgischen Zeitung, 
1811,'"'""" passim. 
51Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 308. 
52Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 235. 
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It is amazing that a man of Adams's keen intelligence should have 
taken so long to realize that many Americans were deeply implicated in 
every kind of English smuggling. The fact that he did most of his work 
in high official circles, never mixed with any Americans except those 
who voluntarily came to see him, and depended on Levett Harris for most 
of his information on the commercial life of Russia's ports helps to ex-
plain Adams's uncharacteristic obtuseness. 
Adams sat in the center of a web of intrigue and thievery not of 
his own making like a wholesome, herbivorous and rather dull spider. 
Dreadful hints came to him down the vibrating lines of the web, but he 
refused to give them the obvious interpretation. He never wondered how 
the smugglers managed to pass like oiled eels through the examinations 
of his consul. He never investigated Harris, and studiously avoided 
any interference in the consular duties of examining and pronouncing on 
the authenticity of the papers of arriving Americans unless Harris re-
quested his assistance. The only criticism of his consul that he ever 
made in his diary in 1811 was the mild "I hope Harris will not forget 
that he is an American consul as well as a commission merchant."53 
Adams's sojourn in Russia was probably the only time in his life 
when he thought better of his colleagues than his colleagues deserved. 
There was an additional factor that may have clouded Adams's mind 
in the critical months of the summer and fall of 1811. On the evening 
of Monday, 12 August 1811, "I had a daughter born, the first example I 
believe of an American a native of Russia."54 Mrs. Adams's pregnancy 
53Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 263, 24 June 1811. 
54rbid., Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 403, To President of U.S., St. Peters-
burg, 17 Aug. 1811. 
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and labor had both been difficult, and she emerged from the ordeal in a 
dangerously exhausted condition. The child was weak and sickly. The 
tremendous act of becoming had been nearly enough to bring it to death 
without first passing through life. 
The child was baptised Louisa Catherine Adams. Among her sponsors 
at the baptism were Harris, a Quaker, and the wife of the Portuguese 
minister, a Roman Catholic. "That a Quaker," wrote Adams happily to 
his own mother, "and a Portuguese Roman Catholic should join a church 
clergyman to baptize the child of a New England Congregationalist at St. 
Petersburg, the capital of Russia, is an incident rather extraordinary 
in the annals of the world."55 
As John Quincy Adams and his wife looked with wonder and terrible 
hope at the fretful mite their union had brought into the world, the 
world bored on through space and time to wilder and cruder events than 
any Adams had yet kno\vn. The birth of the Adams' newest heir had added 
one more to a larger population of resident Americans than Russia was 
ever to know again until the Twentieth Century. Hundreds of Americans 
jostled through the waterfront streets of Russia's ports. Some Ameri-
can supercargoes went far into the interior in search of markets, but-
tonholing prospective customers in the cool shadow of the Kremlin. 
When Louisa Catherine was borning, one hundred vessels flying the Amer-
ican flag were moored in Kronstadt harbor. One hundred. More American 
ships than had ever come to Kronstadt in any single entire season be-
fore 1810, and approximately as many had come in the entire year of 
1810.56 
55rbid., p. 437, To Abigail Adams, St. Petersburg, 10 Sept. 1811. 
56Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 185. 
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Unless something were to happen to reduce the constant stream of 
arriving Americans, and, even more important, unless some outlet were 
found for the plethora of colonial goods in Russia, the 1811 season 
would be uniformly disastrous for all Americans engaged in trade with 
Russia who weren't employed by the British. 
In 1811 for the first time French privateers began to shoH real 
activity in the Baltic and its approaches. By the end of May French 
privateers sailing from Dantzig had seized four American sail. One of 
their unfortunate skippers wrote to St. Petersburg that twenty-two A-
merican seamen from the four captured sail were being compelled to 
march from Dantzig to Antwerp, where they were to be forced to serve 
in the French fleet. Adams reacted with waspish anger: "I suppose 
that we shall be told this is a retaliation upon the British for their 
impressment of our men.n57 
Happily, this threat from Dantzig was ephemeral. Cruisers from 
the British fleet soon chased the privateers into Dantzig and kept them 
there.58 The French next turned to waters where Admiral Saumarez would 
give them no such trouble. 
The brigs Hero, of Marblehead, and Radius, of Boston, arrived in 
British waters in the early days of August. Like most Americans in 
1811, they did not take English convoy but proceeded through the Sound, 
paying their dues at Elsinore on 6 August. On the 7th, the wind being 
ahead, they dropped anchor off Copenhagen. On the 8th they were cap-
tured by a French privateer, La Minute No. 2, an open boat with four 
small swivels, manned by nineteen men (three of whom, incidentally, 
57Ibid., p. 81-82, 88, 124. 
58Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 473, To T.B. Adams, St. Pe-
tersburg, 21 Oct. 1811. 
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were Americans). The captain of La Minute No. 2 declared the American 
brigs prizes under French law and brought them into Copenhagen. They 
were the first prizes ever sent:into Copenhagen by a French cruiser. 
Their papers were sent to the prize courts in Paris, which meant sure 
condemnation.59 
La Minute No. 2 had come upon a sea wolf's paradise: no British 
men of war to worry about, for they rarely if ever entered the Sound, 
and a steady supply of defenceless merchantmen to prey on. Her master 
seems to have soon worked out unsavory little deals with certain Danish 
privateers. The change of policy of the Danish government had made it 
very difficult for Danish privateers to get their American prizes con-
demned in Danish courts, so certain of these privateers were glad to 
hunt for La Minute No. 2. The procedure was that the Danes would cap-
ture a neutral sail, and then, on the way back to Copenhagen, the 
French ship would wrest the prize from the suddenly numb grasp of the 
Dane. A split of the prize money was presumably made after the auto-
matic condemnation in the French courts.60 
Perhaps the saddest American victim of this collusion between the 
French and the Danes was Captain Dennis of the brig Hannah. She had 
been captured by a Norwegian privateer in July, 1810, condemned by a 
prize court at Christiansand, and then released by a higher court. She 
cleared Christiansand in June, 1811, for Russia, and was presently cap-
tured by a British sloop of war and sent into Yarmouth. After six 
weeks there, she was released and set out again. On 29 August a 
59Diplomatic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To Adams, Copenhagen, 9 Aug. 
1811. 
60rbid., To Rosenkrantz, Copenhagen, 1 Sept. 1811. 
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Danish privateer seized her and then supinely surrendered her to La 
Minute No. 2.61 
Americans could do little to combat this threat of the French 
privateers. Erving hired a Swedish boat to cruise from the island of 
Anholt in the Kattegat to warn all American vessels to take the Belt 
and pay their dues at Nyborg. Adams warned the hundred American sail 
at Kronstadt. Thus alerted, the great majority of Americans in Rus-
sia must have taken British convoy back through the Belt, rather than 
chance an encounter with the French in the Sound. Other Americans 
caught in the Baltic who were either unwarned or too ethical to take 
British convoy came, one by one, and anchored in Copenhagen roads to 
await developments. Some of these began to arm their vessels.62 
American tempers were fraying badly by the fall of 1811. For 
example, Danish privateers had put prize crews on two J~erican ves-
sels bound to Archangel to bring them into Norwegian parts, but the 
vessels never came to Norway ... nor were the prize crews ever seen 
again.63 If Americans were becoming that brusque with the comparative-
ly innocent Danes, they certainly wouldn't hesitate to fire on the 
blaaantly hostile French of La Minute No. ~· 
The Russians were very unhappy about this new danger to their 
trade with the United States. Per order of the Tsar, Count Rumiantsev 
sent stiff messages to the Danes about the matter, although all knew 
that the Danes were not to blame. The nearest Rumiantsev came to a 
61Ibid., Enclosure to Letter to Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 3 Sept. 1811. 
62American State Pgpers. Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 559-60; Ford, 
Writings of~. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 185. 
63consular Despatches - Archangel, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Archangel, 
24 Nov./6 Dec. 1811. 
constructive suggestion was a lame recommendation to Adams that 
hereafter most Americans take the Archangel route to Russia. 64 
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The Swedes also took a very dim view of the appearance of French 
privateers in their vicinity. Having vessels of the enemy, Great 
Britain, off their coast was one thing, but having vessels of an ally, 
France, ther~was quite somethmng else -especially as the French pri-
vateers grabbed Swedish merchantmen as readily as 1\merican. The Swed-
ish navy granted American merchantmen asylum in its convoys, and met 
the belligerent incursions of the French privateers with threat of 
powder and ball. Napoleon's reaction to Bernadotte's policy was quick: 
"I want to preserve peace with Sweden - this wish is palpable - but I 
prefer war to such.a state of peace." He would soon have his prefer-
ence.65 
The Danish government was just as angry about the French 
privateers as any one; perhaps even more angry because Frederick VI had 
been so delighted with the renewal cif the steady income of Sound dues 
from American shipping. The French were driving the Americans back in-
to the British convoys. And not only did the French embarrass the Danes 
by taking vessels that had passed legally through the Sound, but even 
vessels, such as the Hannah, which had been tried and freed by Danish 
courts. Poor Denmark was back in her usual situation of being the rope 
in a tug of war. 
In a clear example of how commerce and hopes of commerce fought 
against Napole~n's purposes, Denmark turned her meagre forces against 
64Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 319. 
65Adams, History of U.S., Vol. V, p. 426; Carlson, Relations of U.S. 
and Sweden, p. 52. 
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the French privateers and in favor of the neutral ships. Denmark by no 
manner of means went over to the English. In fact, she remained to the 
end one of Napoleon's most loyal satellites, but her faltering economy 
did force her out of the role of an unquestioning creature of the Con-
tinental System. 
Whenever the wind was fair for sailing, Danish gunboats and a gun-
brig put out from Copenhagen to lie in the Sound, not to prey on the 
neutral ships but to protect them. By the third week of September a 
cluster of twenty-odd American vessels was anchored in Copenhagen road, 
afraid to sail for fear of the French and afraid to stay for fear of 
the equinoctial storms. To get them safely through the Sound called 
for an es.cort of determined war ships. On the 21st of September twenty-
three American sail put out into. the Sound and passed through to the 
Kattegat under the convoy of Danish gunboats. One Danish privateer "was 
considered to be acting improperly" and was fired upon by a gunboat. 
Two men were wounded and one killed aboard the privateer. The Danish 
navy was serious in its accomplishment of the unaccustomed task of pro-
tecting neutrals against its erstwhile allies. 
The French privateers gave chase, firing continually to bring the 
fleet to, but all the Americans escaped their clutches. Of the twenty-
three, only two were brought back to Copenhagen. They were the Augustus 
and Horace of Salem, and were brought in by the Danes for carrying mus-
kets and cannon. Their captains acquiesced in the capture and the 
ships were released shortly after Erving made a representation of their 
case to the Danish King.66 If it had been the French who had tried to 
66American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, p. 559-60; Diplo-
matic Despatches - Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copenhagen 23 
Dec. 1811. 
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seize them, the Americans might well have made use of their illegal 
muskets and cannon, which would have made formulating a foreign policy 
even more difficult than it was for President Madison and his Secretary 
of State. 
Recourse to British convoy, characteristic assistance from the 
Swedes and uncharacteristic assistance from the Danes had saved the A-
mericans returning from Russia from decimating losses, but the problem 
of the French privateers had not been solved, only temporarily and par-
tially circumvented. All in all, eight American merchantmen had fallen 
victim to French privateering in Danish waters.67 Despite the belli-
gerency of the Swedes and Danes, the number of French privateers cruis-
ing in the Sound and its approaches grew to seven by October, and the 
Danish privateers were taking new heart from their example. Erving re-
ported to Washington that "I consider it as perfectly certain that we 
cannot have any commerce with Russia next year - this place will swarm 
with French privateers ... "68 Adams wrote that, if the United States 
government thought the trade with Russia worth having, it must send its 
own warships to convoy American merchantmen in a~d out of the Baltic.69 
It is, however, true that only the rarest of winds fails to blow 
someone some good. On the 23rd of October, practically at the end of 
the shipping season, Adams noted that since the appearance of the 
French privateers in the Sound "only one vessel has found her way here 
from that quarter." 70 The weight of constantly arriving cargoes was 
67Ibid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 12 April 1812. 
68Ibid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 9 Oct. 1811. 
69Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 135, p. 473, To T.B. Adams, St. 
Petersburg, 21 Oct. 1811. 
70Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 136, To Russell, St. Petersburg, 23 
Oct. 1811. 
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removed from the depressed prices of colonial goods in Russia. Ships 
continued to arrive at Archangel, of course, but the main avenue of ap-
proach to Russia had been cut off. Now the only problem was to find a 
buyer for the mountains of colonial goods already in Russia. 
In the latter part of August and the first weeks of September the 
price of sugar and cotton in St. Petersburg leapt nearly fifty per 
cent.71 The bursting abundance of colonial 80ods in Russia had breached 
the ramparts of Napoleon's Europe at the Prussian and Austrian frontiers. 
Fear of the French soon intimidated the Prussians into again sealing 
their borders agau.tcolonial goods, but Austrians were more attracted 
by the trains of coffee, sugar, indigo and rice coming into Vienna for 
the first time in months and months than they were frightened of Napo-
leon's armies.72 
This strange trade from St. Petersburg and Archangel and the other 
North Russian ports to Vienna lasted only a year, if that long, but it 
stands out as one of the more significant and certainly as one of the 
most fantastic examples of commerce in the history of the Napoleonic 
Era. The colonial goods, almost all brought to Russia in American 
ships, were loaded on wagons, or, in winter, sledges, and each was 
pulled by one horse. There was one driver to every six wagons or 
sledges. The trains of these vehicles jingled out of Archangel and St. 
Petersburg and headed south and east through piney forests to Moscow. 
There they turned south-west to Kiev on the Dnieper. As they moved 
south the pines thinned, disappeared, and were replaced entirely by 
hard wood trees. Then the hard woods thinned and the stands of timber 
7lrbid., Reel 135, To Gray, St. Petersburg, 17 Sept. 1811. 
72Letterbook of March, To Bartlett, Gothenburg, 11 Nov. 1811. 
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became farther and farther apart, for Kiev is on the edge of the great 
treeless steppes. At Kiev the trains turned west to distant Brody in 
that part of Austria which was once Poland. There Anton Harwik, the 
Austrian customs inspector, waved them on to Vienna. Anton had never 
seen so much cotton and sugar and pepper in his life. He wrote to Vi-
enna that the influx of colonial goods was tremendous. His figures on 
imports from Russia into the area of his jurisdiction bear him out: 
3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 
Cotton 660,300 lbs. 1,130,444 lbs. 1,901,300 lbs. 1,896,910 lbs. 
Coffee 
------------
1,825 " 11' 150 " 12,925 " 
Dyewoods 153,870 " 767,275 " 589,825 " 1,177,775 II 
Pepper 94,975 " 289,690 II 276,600 " 81,625 " Sugar 554,505 11 909,325 " 1,570,700 11 2,496,675 1173 
At Vienna the tired teamsters and horses were relieved of their 
precious burdens of coffee and sugar by sensible Viennese merchants to 
whom commerce meant more than any war ever could. The entire journey 
from St. Petersburg to Vienna took about sixty days. The prices of 
coffee and sugar and indigo in Austria made every step of the journey 
profitable. 
The Austrians took what they wanted of the colonial goods and 
shipped the rest to the south, west and north, to Italy, Bavaria, Saxo-
ny, Prussia, and, we may presume, to France itself. In Berlin, Munich, 
Milan.and Paris the very rich sipped coffee brought them from South A-
merica via Salem, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Vienna.74 
73osterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkamrnerarchiv, Comrnerz 
Ungarn und Galizien, Nr. 57, 1810-1813 Faszikel 987 (rote Nummer) 
fur das 3. Quartal 1811 fol. 1244-1264 
II II 4. 11 1811 II 1313-1326 
II II 1. II 1812 II 1081-1108 
" " 2. !1 1812 It 1159-1182. 
74Ibid., Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 281-82; Adams Micro-
film, Diary, Reel 31, p. 358, 26 March 1812. 
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The great bulk of the profits of this extraordinary commerce 
unfortunately did not go to Americans. A very few Americans, shrewd, 
lucky and wealthy enough to have delayed selling their property depos-
ited in Russia until improvement in the market, reaped a good harvest, 
but most of the profits.went to Russian merchants who had bought the 
coffee and sugar on speculation from the Americans in the summer when 
prices were abysmally low.75 
The Russian nation as a whole profited as much from the Vienna 
trade as did individual merchants. This trade completely restored the 
favorable balance of trade that Russia had been moving toward since the 
commercial ukase of December, 1810, and the exchange value of the ruble 
was worth 85 centimes, in August 98, in October 103, and at the end of 
the year 132 centimes. This precipitous rise was the same in every fi-
nancial mart of Europe - London, Hamburg, Amsterdam, etc.76 
The Continental System had been outflanked. John Quincy Adams 
wrote its eulogy: 
"The Emperor Napoleon has been preaching abstinence of 
sugar and coffee to the people of Europe, with as much 
zeal as the hermit Peter once preached the recovery of 
the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels. Finding his elo-
quence less persuasive than that of Peter; he has in-
vaded, conquered, incorporated, and good citied, half 
a dozen sovereignties of the old school, merely to teach 
the people abstinence of sugar and coffee. He has of-
fered them grape sugar, turnip sugar, maple sugar, and I 
know not how many more sugars and coffees in proportion, 
as substitutes for the pure sugar and coffee. He has 
taxed these delicious dainties beyond all endurance, and 
he has threatened fire and sword against whoever would 
75Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 282; Consular Despatches -
St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 10/22 Dec. 
1811. 
76Intelligenzblatt der St. Petersburgischen Zeitung, 3 Jan. 1811, 1 Aug. 
1811, 3 Oct. 1811, 12 Jan. 1812. 
not proscribe them like himself. Notwithstanding all 
which sugar and coffee still make their way even into 
France. First they went in from Holland, then from Hel-
igoland, then from Holstein, then from Prussia, and aft-
er having been driven from all these stages they have 
now found a vent through the very northern extremity of 
Europe. This channel of colonial trade has been barely 
opened during the present year; but it has proved so ad-
vantageous, not only to the individual merchants, but to 
the revenues, the finances, and the credit of this em-
pire, that it will probably be continued on a much more 
extensive scale the next summer, unless a new war should 
come and break it up altogether."77 
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Hm.; would Napoleon react to this "vent through the very northern 
extremity of Europe?" Levett Harris, a man who if not wise was certain-
ly shrewd, wrote to the Secretary of State, "I consider it almost im-
possible for Russia to retain for another year, the exclusive benefit 
of transmitting colonial supplies to nearly the whole continent. . . " 
He sadly looked forward to spring and "a new appeal to the sword."78 
In 1811 something in the vicinity of 225 vessels flying the 
American flag came to Russia, more than ever before. According to Har-
ris, 138 of these came to Kronstadt. According to Samuel Hazard, an 
American appointed consul at Archangel in August, 1811, sixty-five A-
merican sail arrived at Archangel. The total of all ships coming to 
Archangel that year was only 137, and the American entries amounted to 
the greatest number from any single nation by far. The remaining thir-
ty or so American arrivals came to Riga, Reval, and such lesser ports.79 
The American merchantmen had an even greater influence on Russia 
than their numbers would indicate because they most often arrived 
77Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 281-82. 
78consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 10/22 Dec. 1811. 
79Ibid., To Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 14/26 Oct. 1811; Consular 
Despatches -Archangel, Vol. I, List of American ships arrived and 
sailed from the Port of Archangel in the year 1811; Memo Book of Bacon, 
p. 32-41. 
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loaded. In September the French consul at St. Petersburg told Adams 
that, of the 121 American entries at Kronstadt he had thus far recorded, 
eighty-eight came with cargo. Of the entries of other nations, only 
eleven had arrived with cargo. At Archangel only three American vessels 
arrived in ballast and only one vessel not flying American colors ar-
rived with cargo in 1811.80 
In the year ending 30 September 1811, the United States exported 
six million dollars worth of goods to Russia, more than she ever had be-
fore in one year or would again in a single year until the middle of 
the century. This six million dollars amounted in value to one tenth 
of the entire exports of the United States for 1811. 81 
In the year ending 30 September 1811 the United States imported 
far more than it ever had before from Russia. For instance, hemp im-
ports for that year amounted to over 200,000 hundredweight, far more 
than ever before. 82 
In no previous year and in no year until World War II did the 
American and Russian peoples dedicate such a large portion of their 
attention, energy and goods to each other. 
80consular Despatches -Archangel, Vol. I, List of American ships 
arrived and sailed from the Port of Archangel in the year 1811, To Sec. 
of State, Archangel, 24 Nov./6 Dec. 1811; Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, 
Vol. IV, n. 239. 
81Misc. Doc. of House of Reps., 1892-93, Vol. XXVI, p. XVI; Pitkin, 
View of Commerce of u.s., p. 36-37. 
82American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, p. 953. 
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Chapter XIII 
Act III, Scene I: The Challenges 
At the beginning of 1812 Napoleon could practically taste victory. 
1811 had been the worst year of the war for Great Britain. The Emperor 
had reduced the number of her customers - especially her North European 
customers - until her economy sputtered and gasped like a lion elevated 
from the veldt to the summit of some mountain where the air is sparse 
and thin. 
The statistics tell the story. 
British exports 
to the world 
British exports 
to North Europe (in-
cluding France) 
1810 1811 
f.62 '702 ,409 £43,939,620 
f;l3 ,857,946 ±3,483,091 1 
The precipitous decline of trade with North Europe - a decline of over 
seventy-five per cent -was a tribute to Napoleon's concentration on 
enforcement of the Continental System in that area. Even Russia, for 
all her alleged infractions of the Continental System, contributed to 
England's economic troubles. England's hemp imports, usually a good 
yardstick for measuring her trade with Russia, sank from£752,295 worth 
in 1810 to f387,67l worth in 1811.2 
The statistics don't tell the whole story. They tell nothing of 
the insecure feeling the British merchant got in the pit of his stomach 
when he watched his fellows crash into bar~ruptcy around him, or when 
1Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. LXVII, p. 766. 
2~., Vol. LXVIII, p. 805-806. 
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he thought of the ungainly vastness of the public debt. No government 
had ever incurred anything approaching the size of that debt and 
survived. 
Statistics don't tell anything about the insecure feeling the 
British laborer got in the pit of his stomach when he had nothing to 
put in his stomach. Statistics tell nothing about the hunger, the bleak 
poverty, the soaring price of bread, the riots. In the history of the 
British lower classes 1811 stands wan and frightful, like a malnourished 
child. 
In the United States at the beginning of 1812 President Madison was 
succumbing to the blandishments of the War Hawks, who swore to fight to 
protect America's maritime rights. Oddly, the War Hawks were mostly wes-
teners, not east coast seamen. The War Hawks were the men whose atti-
tude toward Europe was dictated by who had been on which side in our 
Revolution, and by the conditions on the western frontier. Vfuo supplied 
the Indians with arms, the French? No, the British~ Most significant, 
these were the men whose hearts did not bleed so much for the impressed 
American sailor as throb with desire for the fertile, empty expanses of 
Canada. American westerners, with more lebensraum than most peoples 
ever dream about, wanted more. Six months before the War Hawks took us 
into war, John Randolph of Virginia rose in the Senate and flayed them 
with the truth: 11Agrarian cupidity, not maritime right urges the war • 
• • • We have heard but one word - like the whip-poor-will, but one 
eternal monotonous tone -Canada~ Canadal Canada!" 
On 1 April 1812 Madison, in order to insure the maximum economic 
pressure on England, called for an immediate and general embargo on 
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America's trade with the world. Congress hurried to comply, and on 4 
April the embargo was law. Six days later Madison was empowered to call 
up 100,000 militia. 
The number of ships clearing United States ports for Russia in the 
spring of 1812 was much less than in the spring of 1811. The news of 
Madison's embargo came too late to the North East ports to be completely 
credited with the drop in this number. Another motive was fear of what 
the impending war with England would mean to American ships not safe at 
home, and, more important, the memory of what an unpleasant and 
unprofitable year 1811 had been for American traders. 
The tale of the Golden Age, owned by John Crowninshield and 
captained by William Fairfield, is a case in point. In January of 1811 
she was at Minorca in the Mediterranean with a cargo of rum and tobacco. 
Prices at Minorca were bad, so Fairfield sailed the Golden Age to Ter-
ragona, off the south coast of Spain. Rumor had it that the Berlin and 
Milan decrees no longer applied to American shipping, but Fairfield was 
wary of approaching the French-held areas. At Terragona the market was 
also bad, and Fairfield sacrificed the cargo of the Golden Age at a very 
low price in order to take on wine, which was reported to be in demand 
in Spain and England. A few weeks later he reported from Lisbon there 
was little demand for wine there. (And, incidentally, that "The markets 
in this quarter are overstocked with colonial produce and also the pro-
ductions of our country.") In July the Golden Age was at an English 
port, and Fairfield was writing home that her wine had been rejected 
there for being of poor qu~lity. After long wrangling, however, he man-
aged to get a pittance for it, and with that he purchased a load of fish 
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and headed back for the Mediterranean. The price of fish was 
tremendously high in French-dominated Italy, he had heard, and by this 
time he had convinced himself that Napoleon spoke the truth when he 
said the Berlin and Milan decrees no longer applied to American vessels 
and cargoes. On 19 February 1812 the Golden Age arrived at Naples, 
where she was immediately seized and her cargo confiscated. 3 
Rare was the American who had come home from ~urope with a full 
purse in 1811, and the trade with Russia had been no better than with 
any other part of Europe. Losses in trade with Russia had nudged more 
than one American merchant into ruin in 1811. Now, of course, there was 
the trade from Russia to Vienna, but how lonb would it last? Russia 
would soon either have to truly enforce the Continental System or face 
war with France. Either eventuality would be disastrous for American 
traders. The first would mean exclusion or confiscation. The second 
would mean peace between Russia and ~ngland, and the arrival of hundreds 
of Bnglish vessels at the quays of every Russian port, drivins the 
prices of colonial goods down again. And, in case of peace between Eng-
land and Russia, wouldn't Saumarez be likely to refuse Americans permis-
sian to sail in his convoys? Why should he extend the protection of the 
British navy to rivals of his own merchant marine? Without British pro-
taction, &nerican ships would fall victim to the French privateers by 
the score. 4 
3Reinoehl, "Impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon on the 
Crowninshield Family," p. 170-74. 
4oiplomatic Despatches -Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 
12 April 1812. 
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By the end of May only four American sail had passed Gothenburg on 
the way into the Baltic. ~~. Pitcairn, the acting American consul at 
Hamburg, called the number of Americans coming to North Europe in 1812 
"a puny representation of our former trade, but in the present time a 
proof of the judgement and prudence of the traders." Taking into con-
sideration the delays, over-supplied markets and threats of confisca-
tion, Pitcairn judged that remaining at home in .America "will, to the 
whole mass of the nation, merchants and underwriters, leave at the end 
of the year more profit than by voyages so unfavorably circumstanced.n5 
Prices of colonial goods in Sweden remained as unattractively low 
as ever, but the Swedish government itself couldn't be blamed for any 
part of Pitcairn's gloom. Events were hurrying Sweden down the road 
towards war with Napoleon, and the farther along she went, the better 
she liked neutrals. 
On 7 January Bernadette made an official speech in which he 
bemoaned the fact that the Continental System and war with England had 
reduced the commerce of his adopted homeland to a meager coasting trad~ 
He went on to complain that French and Danish privateers had taken 
nearly fifty Swedish merchantmen. As to neutrals, he remarked that 
"such of their ships as have touched upon our coasts, have been allowed 
to continue their voyages, whatever might be their destinations." As 
to the United States in particular, he said: 
"About fifty American ships, driven on ou.r coasts by 
successive tempests, have been released. This act of 
justice, founded upon the rights of nations, has been 
5clauder, American Commerce and the French Revolution and Napoleon, 
p. 225. 
appreciated by the United States, and appearances promise 
us, that better understood relations with their govern-
ment will facilitate the exportation of the numerous piles 
of iron with which our public places are now filled. tt6 
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Speyer relayed a copy of the speech to Washington and noted that, 
to his knowledge, no more than twelve United States vessels had entered 
Swedish ports in distress since November, 1811. He guessed Bernadotte 
selected the larger number of fifty in order "to cover the release of 
such as were not American. 117 
In the same month as Bernadotte's speech, Napoleon, supremely 
annoyed with Sweden's foreign policy, sent his troops to occupy Swedish 
Pomerania in order to cut off smuggling through that province and to 
teach Sweden a lesson.8 Sweden took the lesson to heart, but inter-
preted it differently than Napoleon hoped. 
On 5 April 1812 Bernadotte concluded a secret alliance with Russia, 
abandoning all Swedish claims to Finland in return for a promise of Rus-
sian help in adding aorway to Sweden's possessions, and agreeing to lead 
a Swedish corps against France in case of war between Russia and France.9 
On 4 May Bernadotte officially ordered the Swedish navy to take 
into its convoys all vessels belonging to neutral nations at peace with 
England. Americans were quick to take advantage of that courtesy. The 
Swedish navy continued to do its best to clear the waters around Sweden 
of the swarming French privateers that were decimating her coasting 
6weekly Register, Vol. II, 28 March 1812, p. 57. 
7consular Despatches -Stockholm, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Stockholm, 
10 Jan. 1812. 
8scott, Franklin D., Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 11. 
9Koht, Journal of Modern History, Vol. ll'YI, p. 271. 
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trade. By the end of spring it had captured several and sent them into 
Swedish ports. It was probably at this time that the Swedes captured 
La Minute No. 2, the pioneer of the French privateers. 10 
Denmark also continued to cultivate what, if it can't be called a 
rapprochement, can be calmed a detente with the United States. During 
the winter the Danish courts freed almost all the captured American ves-
sels whose cases had not already been decided. 
Of course, Denmark didn't dare follow her new policy to its 
natural extreme. When, in February, Erving requested Danish convoy 
from Copenhagen to Elsinore for two American vGssels, he was refused. 
Frederick VI had apparently been informed that Napoleon reserved the 
lowest circle of Hades for allies who protected neutrals from French 
privateers, as the Danish navy had in the case of the fleet of twenty-
three American sail the previous September.l1 
The disparity between Denmark's real interests and the course of 
action forced on her by Napoleon became so great in 1812 that in July 
of that year Frederick VI actually said to John Forbes, American agent 
at Copenhagen, "I would rather be the United States consul at Copenhagen 
than ••• the king of Demnark. nl2 
If the Danes didn't dare do anything positive for American ships, 
they didn't do much of anything negatively either. They couldn't. In 
lOcarlson, Relations of U.S. and Sweden, p. 52; ~~darns Microfilm, 
Letterbook, Reel 139, To T.B. Adams, St. Petersburg, 14 June 1812; 
Consular Despatches - Stockholm, Vol. I, ·ro Sec. of State, Oerebro, 
18 May 1812, Stockholm, 18 June 1812; Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Letterbook of March, To Coolidge and Co., Gothenburg, 2 May 1812. 
llDiplomatic Despatches -Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, 
Copenhagen, 10 Feb. 1812. 
l2Ruppenthal, Journal of lliodern History, Vol. XV, p. 14. 
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May Erving reported that the Danes had already captured an .American 
vessel, the brig Orange, but he judged that there would be no further 
captures of American vessels that year. "They all call at Gothenburg, 11 
he said, "and take Bnglish or Swedish convoy ••• ul3 Iii th the excep-
tion of a tiny handful of cases, Erving proved to be correct. 
The problem of Danish seizures of American shipping had been 
solved by a detente between the United States and Danish governments 
and, at the same time, rendered academic by the fact that the French 
privateers drove all Americans into convoys, so Erving prepared to de-
part. He had admirably perfonned his duty. wwhen he left only one Amer-
ican case remained to be decided upon by the courts of Denmark.l4 
Erving wrote to the Secretary of State that the United States 
, 
government should establish a legation at Copenhagen headed by a charge 
d'affaires. "Really, my dear sir," he said, "the expences of suches-
tablishments should not be thought of for a moment. Very great inter-
ests may be sacrificed for a miserable saving of a few thousand dollars. 
A single note or a ••• smile or a bow have sometimes obtained more than 
would pay the expences of a legation for forty years ••• 71 15 
On 26 May Erving departed for Paris. He was replaced by John 
Forbes, returned to Copenhagen with the ambiguous diplomatic rank of 
"agent for the United States in all matters pertaining to the seizures 
and prize courts.nl6 
13Diplomatic Despatches -Denmark, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 
14 May 1812. 
14rbid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 12 April 1812. 
15rbid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 17 April 1812. 
l6rbid., To Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 31 :iiiay 1812. 
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When Erving left, seventeen American citizens at Copenhagen 
addressed to him the kind of letter that diplomats dream of receiving: 
11 From your first appearance among us, by the frank and 
manly manner in which you placed yourself at the head of 
our shepherdless flock, you gave us a name, and by the 
spirit of your early communications ••• you dafined and 
assBrted our rights and ensured to us that subsequent 
protection which was due to the fairness of our views 
and the neutrality of our commerce. 11 17 
In Russia "the neutrality of our commerce" continued to protect 
the diminished number of arriving American sail. The number of these 
American merchantmen was half that of the previous year. In total, 
only sixty-six American sail came to Kronstadt in 1812, but until the 
war between the United States and England cut off Russo-American trade 
most of the vessels entering at Kronstadt flew the American flag, as 
had been the case since 1808. 18 
The trains of sledges continued to leave st. Petersburg and 
Archangel for Vienna all through the winter. In spring wheels replaced 
the runners under the loads of colonial goods, and the trade went on. 
The prices in Vienna were holding up beautifully. The only question 
was how long would the trade go on before war between France and Russia 
cut it off. 
Through the winter and spring of 1812 France prepared for the 
invasion of Russia, building up stockpiles of supplies, gathering 
fleets of wagons and enormous herds of horses, and marching hundreds of 
17weekly Register, Vol. III, 31 Oct. 1812, p. 137. 
18consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, 
St. Petersburg, 15/27 Oct. 1812; illikhailowitch, Relations Diplomatiques, 
Vol. VI, Part II, p. 290. 
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thousands of French and satellite troops east to c~~p on the banks of 
the Neiman River, the boundary between Poland and Russia. 
Caulaincourt, now back at the side of Napoleon, used all his 
abilities of persuasion and logic to turn his ~mperor from the course 
he was taking. Caulaincourt remembered what Alexander had told him dur-
ing the crisis of the spring of 1811. In case of war with France, the 
Tsar had said, it is possible, even probable, that Russia shall be de-
feated. But that does not mean that you can dictate a peace. 111'he 
Spaniards have often been defeated," he continued, referring to France's 
bitter and fruitless embroilment with the guerillas of Spain, "and not 
so far away from Paris as we are, and have neither our climate nor our 
resources to help them. We shall take no risks. v~e have plenty of 
room; and our standing army is well organized ••• '' Re ended on a chill-
ing note: 11 • • • in such circumstances the victor is forced to accept 
the terms of the vanquished.nl9 
To this argument and others, which Caulaincourt, to his credit, 
repeated so often and forcefully that he temporarily lost favor with 
Napoleon, the Emperor answered that to force England to make peace it 
was necessary to force Russia to close her ports to English goods. For 
a year, he complained angrily, Russia had been admitting ~nglish goods 
under the American flag. 20 * 
*Those who think that Caulaincourt's hindsight might have been a good 
deal better than he said his foresight was are referred to Adams Micro-
films, Diary, Reel 31, p. 22, 10 March 1811, which gives reports of a 
Mr. Montreal's conversation that day with Caulaincourt. Caulaincourt, 
said Iviontreal, 11dwel t with great earnestness on the evils and the dan-
gers of a war with Russia; which he said would prove a second Spanish 
war. 11 
l9caulaincourt, With Napoleon in Russia, p. 5. 
20rbid. , p. 24. 
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On 9 April John Quincy Ad~11s went out before dinner to take his 
constitutional walk, characteristically in spite of the fact that it was 
snowing. Along the v•ay he met Tsar Alexander, who was also out walking. 
The two chatted for a few moments in the falling snow. Alexander said 
he judged it would be a very late spring. The late snows would mean 
high rivers and flooding in the lowlands. The conversation never got 
beyond the weather, and the two were soon on their respective ways. 
Adams noted in his diary that the Tsar's 11manner today was graver and 
less cheerful than I have usually seen him.u The news in the capital 
was that Alexander would be leaving to join his army in two days. 21 
The news was incorrect. On the 11th Alexander was still in St. 
Petersburg. He dined with the French ambassador that day. As always 
whe::1 they met, Lauriston brought up the subject of Jiussia 1 s admission 
of neutrals allegedly loaded with English goods. Alexander answered 
that Russia was a loyal member of the Continental System and was confis-
eating scores of false neutrals. He ended by saying, with visible emo-
tion: "I proclaim: I do not want to trade with i;ngland, I have prom-
ised that; but I do want to trade with the neutrals. To require the 
contrary, is to close the ports of Russia absolutely and take from her 
the means of existing." As Alexander pronounced these last phrases, his 
eyes filled with tears.22 
On 9 May Napoleon left Paris to take conunand of his army in 
Poland. 23 
---
21Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 356. 
22Mikhailowi tch, Relations Diplo_matiques, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 262-63. 
23rviahan, Influence of Sea Power, Vol. II, p. 351. 
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Vfuile Alexander and Napoleon approached the danouement of their 
Greek tragedy Adams and Harris continued their farce. 
By 1812 even Lauriston, who we can guess would be one of the last 
to learn the techniques of British smuggling, knew Harris for what he 
was. In January Lauriston was writing that, although he had great re-
spect for Adams's honesty, Harris was not to be trusted. The actions 
of Harris and the indiscreet boastfulness of English agents pointed un-
mistakably to collusion between the American consul and 6nglish smug-
glers. "I also believe," Lauriston reported to Paris, "that if the 
United States consul were anti-English, the Russian government could 
not avoid confiscating the vessels which he would show to be non-Ameri-
can."24 By some insane trick of fate, Levett Harris had become one of 
the most influential men in Europe! 
Adams went on like a cuckold husband, never suspecting - or, 
rather, suppressing his suspicions. 
In 1811 the Russian gover~~ent had seized five vessels flying the 
American flag: the Philadelphia Packet, Angeron~, Brothers, Monticello 
and F~ederick.25 In December, 1811, and 1~rch, 1812, American sailors 
from these vessels visited Adams to complain their captains would not 
pay them their wages. Adams explained that this was a matter for a 
consul to handle, and sent them to Harris. 
In May the matter came up again. It seems that the Russian 
government was quietlv restoring four of the five false American vessels 
24Mikhailowitch, Relations Diplomatiques, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 173, 187. 
25consular Despatches -St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, 
St. Petersburg, 4/16 May 1812. 
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to their owne~s. The seamen's wages were still not paid, and the 
captains of the false American sail were trying to coerce the unpaid 
sailors to stay on as members of the crews. 
The affair reached a crisis on 3 June when several American 
sailors from the rv~onticello came to see Adams and presented him with the 
same old complaints. Adams sent them off to Harris, and that srune day 
Harris called and read to Adams a letter from Mr. Sparrow, the English-
man who w'as Harris's consular agent at Kronstadt.26 Sparrow was the man 
who was supposed to be handling the affairs of the unfortunate sailors 
in question. His letter expressed marked disapproval of their cause, 
and Adruns, who felt the sailors to be innocent victims of swindlers and 
smugglers, strongly criticized it. Harris took Sparrow's side and soon 
he and Adams were shouting at each other about matters which had only 
distant connection with the affair at hand, but which had festered un-
spoken for months. Adam.s voiced (perhaps "yelled 11 is a better word) 
his conviction that many ships had come to Russia from England in dis-
guise in 1811, and that several of the most suspicious ships had ar-
rived addressed precisely to ~~. Mayer, Harris's business partner. Har-
ris refused to answer such imputations, and said that Adams had no juF 
risdiction over him. Harris knew his rights. The jurisdictions of 
minister and consul were independent of one another. "From this moment, 
sir, all relations between you and me have entirely ceased," finished 
Harris. Adams replied, "Perfectly content, sir. Your very humble 
servant, 11 and Harris left. 
26Adams, M~m~irs, Vol. II, p. 46. 
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Harris's calm quickly moved to repair the damage that Harris's 
anger had done. Later that very same day he wrote to Adar~. The next 
day he wrote again, and the next day, and the next. In the last letter 
he proposed that he come and talk with Adams. Adams, his pride molli-
fied by Harris's apology, answered that he would be glad to see him, and 
on the following day they met again. Harris further apologized and 
Adams said that he "was desirous of forgetting everything of an unpleas-
ant nature" that had passed between them. Harris showed his letters he 
had written on behalf of the unfortunate American seamen about whom the 
argument had begun. 
Forgetting the unpleasantness wasn't easy. In fact, it must have 
been nearly impossible. Before June was done sailors from the Monti-
cello called on Adams twice again with more complaints of non-payment 
of wages. 
On 17 June Adams sent Peter Cook, a penniless American seaman off 
the false American ~~er~ whom Adams had taken on as a servant, to 
Sparrow with a letter about the non-payment of wages to Cook and the 
seamen of the Monticello. On 6 July Cook returned with his wages and 
an assortment of bruises. His story was that Captain Marks of the 
Ange~~ had beat him and tried to force him to ship on the ~.f.~E~ 
again. Other sailors had told Ad~~s that Captain Marks had got Cook 
thrown in jail for a while. Sparrow's story was that Cook had arrived 
drunk and had made a great ruckus. Further details Sparrow did not 
supply. Adruns accepted Sparrow's version. Cook was a Negro and known 
to be a drinker. 
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Along with his wages and bruises, Cook brought a letter from 
Sparrow saying that the whole crew of the Monticello had been paid off. 
On 9 July Charles Drew of the Monticello appeared at Adams's house and 
proclaimed that only one man of his vessel had received his wages. 
Adams couldn't ignore Drew as easily as he had Cook. Drew was just a 
common seaman, but also a man of considerable intelligence and 
stubbornness. 
When, a bit later, Adams asked Harris about Drew's complaint, 
Harris produced an account sent him by Sparrow showing a payment of 
nearly three thousand rubles to the crew of the l\!onticello as a whole 
and 341 rubles, forty-four copecks to Drew in particular. Adams took 
account and showed it to Drew, who "solemnly protested and swore he had 
not received a copeck, and he indulged himself in reflections upon Spar-
row and Harris natural enough on such an occasion and which, though I 
did not encourage them, I could not blame". 
On 11 July Adams had from Sparrow an entirely new account of 
payments of wages to the Montic_e:llo's crew. Adams was satisfied. "I 
am very sure," said Adams to Harris, "that if it had not been for Drew, 
not a man of them would have received a ruble." Harris promised that 
the matter would be settled with no further trouble to Adams. (Perhaps 
it is pettish to wonder if Drew and his fellows ever did really receive 
their wages or not. They must have, or one of them, at least, would 
have found his way to Adams. Perhaps it is pettish to wonder, but 
then ••• )27 
27Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 327, 28 Dec. 1811, p. 356, 18 
March 1812, p. 369-70, 2 May 1812, p. 382, 3 June 1812, p. 383, 7 June 
1812, p. 385, 17 June 1812, p. 393-94, 9 July 1812, 11 July 1812; Let-
terbook, Reel 139, To Sparrow, St. Petersburg, 24 June/6 July 1812. 
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Ymy didn't AdamE follow up with an investigation of what was so 
blatantly collusion between the masters of the false American vessels 
and Sparrow and, probably, Harris? Adams's suspicions about Harris, 
which apparently had existed for months and perhaps years, must have 
. been inflamed by this affair of Cook and Drew and their poor fellow sea-
men. Vfuy did Adams, possibly the most conscientious United States pub-
lie servant of his day, let matters settle back to a highly unsavory 
status quo? 
John Quincy Adams was better equipped than most men to withstand 
the onslaught of tragedy, but he was also human. He was a Puritan, but 
not a stone statue. In the latter weeks of the summer of 1812, Adams 
did not devote the usual portion of his mind and energy to his duties 
as United States minister. 
Louisa Adams, his first daughter, his only daughter, was dying. 
She did so slowly, painfully, calling up resonances of agony in the 
hearts of her parents. Doctors could do nothing to help her. Their fi-
nal attempt to save her was to apply a drawing poultice to her entire 
bare scalp. It was supposed to draw the sickness from her. She cried 
frantically when it was applied and for as long thereafter as she had 
energy. On 15 September 1812 this first American ever born in Russia 
gratefully died.28 
Two days later she was buried in an English churchyard on the 
Wasili-Ostroh. The inscription on her gravestone read: 
"Louisa Catherine Adams: Bron 12 August 1811 
Died 15 September 1812. Aged 13 months and 3 days.n29 
----~~----------------28rbid., Diary, Reel 31, p. 413, 15 Sept. 1812. 
29Ibid., p. 413, 17 Sept. 1812, p. 488, 9 June 1813. 
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Louisa's was not the only death that distracted Adwns from Harris's 
speculations in the summer of 1812. She had yet three months to live 
when the wars of 1812 began and the mounting lists of casualties and 
atrocities reduced any sin Harris might commit to inconsequentiality. 
In England the economic crisis, aggravated by America's non-
intercourse and new embargo, had become nearly intolerable. Popular un-
rest, expressed by the merchants in petitions to Parliament and by the 
lower classes in riots, prodded the government toward some radical ameli-
orative action. At least, the commercial classes demanded, let us have 
trade with the United States. After infinite delay and with infinite 
reluctance the government acquiesced. On 16 June Lord Castlereagh an-
nounced to the House of Commons that the orders in council - the orders 
directing the British navy to seize all unlicensed neutral vessels on 
their way to the continent - would no longer apply to American shipping. 
Madison's policy was crowned with success. He had forced Britain to 
recognize America's neutral rights on the high seas. 
Knowing nothing of this, on 18 June the United States Senate, in 
response to Madison's message of 1 June calling for war with Great 
Britain to protect United States maritime rights, voted nineteen to 
thirteen in favor of war. The House had done likewise two weeks before. 
The Senators from the coastal states from Delaware north, the states 
which sent out the vessels and sailors this war was supposed to protect 
from violation, voted for peace, to no avail. The Yankee virgin was 
going to be rescued from the grasp of the British satyr whether she 
liked it or not. 
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In the evening of 23 June the armies of Napoleon began to cross 
the Neiman River into Russia. The invasion had begun. That evening 
Napoleon was galloping through a wheat field near the river. A rabbit 
started between the legs of his horse and Napoleon, whose seat was al-
ways poor, fell to the ground. He was not hurt and immediately sprang 
again into the saddle. The Prince of Neuchatel, a soldier who had 
served with Roehambeau in the American Revolution and who had been 
Napoleon's chief of staff in every campaign since the 1790's, turned 
to Caulaincourt, who was also there, seized his hand and said, "We 
should do better not to cross the Neiman. That fall is a bad omen."30 
30caulaincourt, With Napoleon in Russia, p. 45-46, 48, 403-04. 
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Chapter XIV 
Act III, Scene II: Hecatomb and Denouement 
When the news of the declaration of war against Great Britain 
reached New York and Boston and the other ports of the northeast, the 
merchants raised a wail of protest. How dare Madison start a war with 
the British navy? Their view was the same as that of John Quincy 
Adams, half a world away. "The only object for which we could engage 
in a war," he had written in May, "would be commerce, and from the mo-
ment war ~vould take place our connnerce >vould be annihilated." 1 And how 
dare Madison start his war in the middle of the North European ship-
ping season, when scores of American ships lay directly beneath the 
guns of Saumarez's fleet? 
Take, for instance, the Golden Age and Captain Fairfield, whose 
midadventures we followed in the last chapter. After the Golden Age's 
cargo of fish was confiscated at Naples, Fairfield loaded her with a 
cargo of wine, obtained her release and headed back for England. Wine, 
again, proved a drug on the English market, and after several frustra-
ting months at Plymouth, Fairfield decided to try elsewhere. On 3 July, 
two weeks after America's declaration of war but still several weeks 
before the news reached England, he wrote from Plymouth that he was tak-
ing the Golden Age to Russia in an English convoy. "The prospects," he 
said, "of obtaining a good price for the wine at St. Petersburg appear 
flattering." Last seen, the lamb was frolicking off to the Baltic with 
a pack of wolves.2 
lFord, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. IV, p. 69. 
2Reinoehl, "Impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon on the Crownin-
shield Family," p. 174-76. 
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At the first news of the war American merchants sent their fastest 
vessels to warn their captains and supercargoes of the danger. It was 
a race against the official dispatch vessels. If only the news of the 
war could reach the Americans in Saumarez's convoys before Saumarez 
himself learned of the war! 
Boston sent a pilot boat schooner, the Good Intent, Captain Russel, 
speeding out past Deer Island under a full press of sail, bound to the 
Baltic. The New York house of Minturn and Champlin sent out the pilot 
boat schooner Champlin. The existence of the embargo obliged her mas-
ter, Captain Summers, to declare to the harbor officials that her des-
tination was Eastport, Maine. Once outside the harbor he laid a course 
for Gothenburg and set every stitch of canvas weather would permit. 
Twenty-eight days out of Boston the Good Intent was captured by a 
Danish privateer and carried into Farsund, Norway.3 
Everything depended on the Champlin. The little schooner sped 
into the Skagarrak, white water purling at her bow. 
In the latter part of July as many as forty American ships lay in 
the roads of Gothenburg in British convoy. Neither the Americans nor 
their British escorts nor anyone in Gothenburg knew of the war between 
the United States and England. 
The American consul at Gothenburg was RichardS. Smith. In 1810, 
while still a few months short of his twenty-first birthday, Smith had 
shipped from Philadelphia as supercargo of the ship Eclipse, property 
of a firm in which his father was partner. The first port of call for 
the Eclipse was Long Hope Sound in the Orkneys, from which she took 
3Smith, Reminiscences, p. 60; Boston Gazette, 22 Oct. 1812, 19 Nov. 
1812; Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 409, 31 Aug. 1812. 
British convoy to Gothenburg. On the way she nearly fell into the 
hands of five Danish gun-brigs, the account of which you may find in 
Chapter Nine. 
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Well convinced bf the dangers of Danish capture, Smith decided the 
wisest plan was to deposit the Eclipse's cargo at Gothenburg, load the 
ship with iron and send her back home. He remained in Gothenburg with 
the cargo. The Eclipse cleared at the same time as the famous 1810 
convoy of 600. 
With convoys of hundreds moving in and out containing many vessels 
flying the American flag - some legally, some illegally - the American 
consul at Gothenburg was a very important man. However, that office 
was not one to which the American government paid much attention. The 
office had existed for many years, but the number of American vessels 
coming to Gothenburg had never been very large until 1809, and there-
fore the United States government had never taken the trouble to see 
that the American consul at Gothenburg be a qualified American citizen. 
As a result, a string of assorted foreign nationals held the title of 
American consul at Gothenburg. 
In the spring of 1811 the Americans at Gothenburg became 
dissatisfied with the acting American consul. It seems that he held the 
office only because he had worked for the former consul and married his 
widow. And he was an Englishman! The Americans at Gothenburg nominated 
one of their number, John Diamond of Philadelphia, as consul, and soon 
persuaded Speyer (the American agent at Stockholm, you will remember) 
to appoint him. But after three months Diamond left for home. 
The Americans then nominated Richard Smith and obtained Speyer's 
blessing for him. Smith had picked up the Swedish language and a good 
knowledge of Swedish customs since he arrived, and so was a logical 
choice, despite his youth. He was only twenty-two. 
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For all practical purposes, Smith continued as consul through the 
rest of 1811 and 1812. In November, 1811, a consul appointed by Wash-
ington, James Anderson, arrived in Gothenburg, but he aisliked the of-
fice, the salary and the Swedish climate so much that he rarely left 
his lodgings and had his meals brought to him. Smith continued to per-
form the duties of consul and took over the office again when Anderson 
left in the spring.4 
This office was an enormous responsibility for a young man with no 
diplomatic experience, but Smith seems to have handled himself well. 
When he announced that he intended to leave for home by July, 1812, 
twelve of the Americans at Gothenburg petitioned their Secretary of 
State for an official replacement, and in doing so implied high praise 
of Smith: 
"We respectfully beg leave to call the attention of the 
President to the political situation of this place which 
we have no hesitation in saying is, at this moment, the 
most important consulate in Europe. It is not an unusual 
sight to witness five to six hundred sail of vessels of 
different nations at anchor in the vicinity of this port. 
In fine, Gothenburg may be considered as the Grand Depot 
of the commerce of the North and the key to the continent. 
Of the neutrality of our flag the subjects of the bellig-
erent powers are anxious to avail themselves. An appli-
cation was made a short time since to Mr. Smith to pro-
stitu~e the seal of the United States to give currency to 
forgery, which was spurned with merited indignation. Ap-
plications of this nature would be daily, if they re-
ceived the smallest countenance. "*5 
*An interesting opium dream for the historian is to wonder what would 
have happened if Smith had been in Harris's shoes as American consul at 
St. Petersburg. 
4smith, Reminiscences, p. 53-56. 
5consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Gothenburg, 
24 May 1812. 
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Fortunately, Smith did not leave Gothenburg by July. 
In July of 1812 the Swedish government issued a law that all 
American vessels coming to Gothenburg must anchor in the quarantined 
harbor, fourteen miles down the estuary toward the sea, where their pa-
pers would be examined and notification of their arrival sent by boat 
to the proper health officer in Gothenburg. Smith, assiduous in his 
performance of consular duties, arranged with the master of the boat 
which shuttled between the quarantined harbor and the city that the 
news of American arrivals be brought to the American consul even before 
the health officer. Thus it happened that on the morning of 23 July 
1812, between five and six o'clock, a boy from that boat called on 
Smith with news of the pilot boat schooner Champlin, arrived in ballast 
from New York, bound, her papers said, for Eastport, Maine. 
Smith rushed from his lodgings and in less than an hour was in a 
skiff on his way to the quarantined grounds. 
The Swedish officer in charge there would not let Smith board the 
Champlin, but did allow him to talk to her captain from the skiff. Cap-
tain Summers, fearing that his news might get to the British before the 
Americans, refused to tell Smith anything, saying that he could only 
divulge his message to those to whom the owners of the Champlin had di-
rected him. Smith requested the Swedish officer to gon on shore so he -
Smith - could speak to Summers privately. The Swedish officer obliged. 
Smith then told Summers that there were forty-odd American sail in Brit-
ish convoy in Wingo Bay which would be seized immediately if the British 
received news of war between the United States and Britain before they 
did. I think, said Smith, that you have come with that news. 
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Captain Summers then told of the declaration of war, gave Smith 
despatches from his employers to Copenhagen and St. Petersburg, and 
Smith set sail for Gothenburg with, luckily, "a strong and fair wind" 
behind him. The Champlin cleared for Copenhagen as soon as possible. 
Once back in Gothenburg, Smith assembled in his office all the 
Americans he could contact, and told them the message the Champlin had 
brought. The news was a bombshell. Some of the Americans there were 
captains of the vessels lying in the roads in British convoy. They 
were crazy to get to their ships, but the "strong and fair wind'' - now 
almost gale force - which had carried Smith swiftly up from the quaran-
tined grounds was dead against any vessel that might try to sail down 
the harbor. Two or three of the Americans went by horse and carriage 
to Marstrand, a small port a few miles to windward, and took a boat out 
from there to the American ships. Before the next morning some forty 
American sail eased out of the anchored convoy and up under the protec-
tion of the Swedish shore batteries, "to the great surprize of the Brit-
ish officers, who wondered what had got into the Yankees that they had 
all gone up the river."6 
Immediately after the meeting of the Americans at Smith's office 
broke up, Smith dispatched letters to Speyer and Adams, and left for 
Carlshamn, the port nearest the island of Hano, where Americal sail re-
turning from Russia would be waiting for convoy. The journey was three 
hundred miles and took him two days and three nights. It was Sunday 
morning when he arrived in Carlshamn. 
As he had expected, there was a convoy gathering off the landward 
shore of Hano island, including three American vessels: the Caliban 
6Smith, Reminiscences, p. 60-64. 
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and Cuba of Boston and the Galen of New York. He hired a boat and was 
soon aboard the Caliban, introducing himself to her captain and super-
cargo and asking them to summon the masters of the other American ves~ 
sels in the convoy. They came, Smith made his terrible announcement -
and no one seemed very impressed! 
Smith, who hadn't let his eyes close for more than a few moments 
since the boy had come to his lodgings with news of the Champlin's ar-
rival, was too tired to try to argue with them, and requested a place 
to sleep on the Caliban. It was granted him, and he was asleep in a 
moment. At noon, as he requested, he was awakened. He rose quickly to 
re-emphasize to the gathered captains the danger in which their vesse1s 
lay. His arguments again made no impression. The captains explained 
that the United States government had not known of the suspension of 
the orders in council when it declared war, and that hostilities would 
cease just as soon as that news reached America. Therefore, why run 
from the British? 
Smith, undoubtedly exasperated that his great effort had been to 
no avail, gave up and decided to return to Gothenburg. He had done all 
humanly possible to safeguard American proper~y in the Baltic and its 
approaches. He had saved Americans hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
and as such should be remembered as a great folk-hero of the American 
consular s~ry~i~c~e~·~*--------------------------------
*Smith wrote his account of his stay in Sweden and his adventures after 
the arrival of the Champlin when he was a very old man. Some might 
think that the years that intervened between the events of 1812 and his 
writing of them might have acted as a lens to magnify his own exploits. 
However, the Boston Gazette, 16 Nov. 1812 and a letter from Forbes (Con-
sular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. II, To ?, Copenhagen, 5 Sept. 1812) 
corroborate Smith's later account on all the main points. 
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The only American at Hano who seemed impressed by Smith's news was 
Charles Story of Salem, supercargo of the Cuba. He asked if he could 
go to Gothenburg with Smith. This was not easy to accomplish, as Story 
had no passport, but Smith managed to smuggle him across Sweden as his 
servant. 
Story remained in Gothenburg only long enough to obtain absolute 
confirmation of the fact that hostilities had broken out between Ameri-
ca and Britain, and then he turned and raced back to Carlshamn. The 
convoy was already under way when he got there, but he succeeded in 
getting on board the Cuba, and confirmed Smith's news to her captain. 
Subsequently he went on board every American vessel in the convoy and 
told them, too, of hostilities between America and Britain. To the 
three American sail in the convoy when he left with Smith were now 
added the Halcyon and Cygnet of Boston, the William and Eliza of New 
Bedford, and the Edward of Newburyport. Although the wind was favora-
ble for escape several times, he could not persuade a single American 
vessel to run for a Swedish port. 
Off Darshead, on 12 August, the convoy met a British frigate and 
exchanged signals with her. The commanding officer of the convoy then 
sent prize crews on board the seven American vessels of his flock and 
informed their captains that their ships and cargoes were spoils of war. 
What accounts for the incredible reluctance of these Americans to 
save themselves? Their sad explanation after their capture, the same 
they had given Smith at Hano, was that they felt confident the war 
would end as soon as the news of the suspension of the orders in coun-
cil reached the United States. This seems rather a shaky prognosis to 
253 
wager one's ship and cargo on, especially when one could sit safely in 
a Swedish port until news came of either a return to peace or the be-
ginning of a real war. 
There is another possible explanation, which Smith heard after the 
capture of the seven American sail. Rumor had it that at least several 
of the seven vessels in question had British licenses to load hemp, 
duck and iron in Russia and carry them to Britain. Their masters 
thought these licenses protected their ships from capture.7 
The Champlin entered the harbor of Copenhagen on 26 July and 
spread the news of the war to the Americans there. The report brought 
by the Champlin was the first the continent of Europe had of America's 
declaration of war. Forbes dispatched the news to the American minis-
ter in Paris, Joel Barlow, and the French legation at Copenhagen sent a 
similar message speeding off to Napoleon, now deep inside Russia.8 
On 9 August the Champlin dropped anchor at Kronstadt and rushed 
the news of the war to the Americans on shore and in the harbor.9 
The Champlin had completed her assignment. She had warned the 
Americans at Gothenburg, Copenhagen and Kronstadt plus three American 
sail she had met in the Baltic sea of the war before Saumarez and his 
captains had any notification of it. What would otherwise have been a 
vast haul of Americans captured by the British in the Baltic was re-
duced to a tiny number to whom the Champlin could not get in time,* and 
*For instance, the Cato of Marblehead, Sukey Ann and Eliza Ann of Salem 
were captured off Hano, presumably while innocently seeking British con-
voy. (Smith, Reminiscences, p. 110). 
7smith, Reminiscences, p. 65-70, 109-10. 
8consular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. II, To ?, Copenhagen, 4 Sept. 
1812, 5 Sept. 1812. 
9Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 136, p. 405, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 21 Aug. 1812. 
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a few more who foolishly trusted the British lion more than events 
proved to justify. Captain Summers, his crew and his swift little 
schooner deserve a commemorative plaque in every marine underwriter's 
office in the United States. Rarely has so small a group of me~ and so 
small a vessel saved American merchants so much money. 
Madison and the War Hawks had brought American participation in 
the 1812 Baltic shipping season to a sudden halt. But the Americans 
and their ships which were in the Baltic when the news of the war ar-
rived didn't evaporate. They remained, huddled into the ports of Rus-
sia, Sweden and Denmark, 
As of 22 August thirty-five American vessels lay in Kronstadt, 
like fish hiding in some submarine gully from the fisherman's net. 
Levett Harris estimated that about three and a half million dollars 
worth of colonial goods, brought by American ships and still American 
property, was stored in Russia. The stagnation of trade brought on by 
the French invasion meant that this American property would stay right 
where it was, rotting in the warehouses.lO 
Kronstadt had by no means a majority of the American sail stranded 
in the Baltic. Smith reported that, as of 18 August, Gothenburg had 
thirty-two American sail.ll On 5 September Forbes reported that there 
were twelve American vessels hiding at Copenhagen, and, according to 
the last news he had received, seven at Carlscrona, three at Hano, two 
at Carlshamn, and one each.at Nyberg and Kiel.12 On 25 September 
lOconsular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, 
10/22 Aug. 1812, 15/27 Oct. 1812. 
llsmith, Reminiscences, p. 110. 
12consular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, Copen-
hagen, 5 Sept. 1812. 
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Speyer reported three American vessels at Stockholm.l3 One of these 
three was the tragi-comic Golden Age, which had somehow extricated her-
self from the English convoy and scurried into Stockholm.l4 The Golden 
Age had more lives than a cat. None of them, unfortunately, was happy. 
The Champlin naturally had no opportunity to warn Americans at 
Archangel. There the bearer of the ill tidings was the ship Glide of 
Salem, which arrived at Archangel on 10 August with news that the dec-
laration of war on England had passed the House of Representatives. 
The wildly optimistic could hope that the declaration was rejected by 
the Senate. Captain Tucker of the Glide unloaded his ship and began to 
prepare her for a winter at Archangel.lS 
A number of American vessels which had sailed from Archangel just 
before the Glide arrived or whose masters decided to run for home and 
trust to luck escaped capture. The North Atlantic is a good bit larger 
and easier to hide in than the Baltic. Several, however, were captured 
by the British: the Friendship and Dido of Salem, and the Joseph, bound 
to New York.l6 The American ship Antelope, bound from London to Arch-
angel, was also captured, though she lived up to her name and the Brit-
ish had to chase her thirty-five miles up a Norwegian fiord to get 
her.l7 
13consular Despatches - Stockholm, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Stockholm, 
25 Sept. 1812. 
14Reinhoel, "Impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon on the Crown-
inshield Family," p. 190. 
lSBoston Gazette, 22 Oct. 1812; Salem Gazette, 23 Oct. 1812 
16salem Gazette, 20 Nov. 1812; Essex, Log of ship Friendship, 1811-12, 
Letter of Captain Stanley, Plymouth, 2 Oct. 1812. 
17salem Gazette, 23 Oct. 1812. 
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Others, too meek, slow or wise to try to slip past the British, 
stayed at Archangel. As of 13 January, nine American vessels were at 
Archangel, all hauled up for the winter.l8 
All in all, there were at least one hundred and five American 
vessels stranded in the Baltic and at Archangel by the war. That meant 
something in the vicinity of one thousand Americans exiled in Russia, 
Sweden and Denmark, like fish left flopping on the beach by neap tide. 
Through no fault of their own, these Americans had been placed in 
an intolerable situation, a situation which left them open to all sorts 
of temptations. A bit of hanky-panky with the British could mean a 
safe passage home. Strict loyalty to one's own government could only 
mean profitless exile for one's ship for the duration of the war. And 
maintaining strict loyalty to the Madison administration was not an easy 
thing for American seamen to do. 
Madison's rather pro-French policy had always been unpopular among 
Americans in the Baltic. Richard Smith, certainly a loyal American, 
had castigated Madison in 1811 for glossing over the faults of the 
French "while every fault of England is magnified and depicted in the 
strongest colors, in order to excite the resentment of the people."l9 
What he had to say about Hadison after the news of the war reached the 
Baltic is fortunately unavailable. 
This dislike of Madison took the edge off the loyalty these 
stranded Americans had for their nation, and the British suspension of 
the orders in counci! divested most of them of their chief motive for 
18consular Despatches - Archangel, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Archangel, 
1/13 Jan. 1813. 
19scott, Franklin D., ed., "President Hadison' s Foreign Policy - The 
Views of an American Merchant Abroad in 1811," The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. XVI (December, .1944), p. 295. 
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disliking the British. Even Adams, a member of Madison's own party and 
certainly a man of unquestionable patriotism, could see no necessity 
for the war after the suspension of the orders in council.20 Forbes 
wrote from Copenhagen that the influence of the United States declara-
tion of war among resident Americans "is naturally much lessened by the 
belief, cherished and most industriously inculcated by England, that 
the revocation of their orders in council will produce immediate paci-
fication as soon as known in the United States." He could find no Amer-
ican disposed to accept a letter of marque sent up to Denmark from the 
American minister Barlow at Paris because "The opinion here is that be-
fore any prizes can be condemned, we shall have a peace and a mutual 
restitution of prizes. "21 
Is it any wonder that many Americans were ready to make mutually 
convenient arrangements with the British? Harris, who certainly was 
the American official best qualified to speak on American collusion 
with the British, predicted on 22 August that many Americans "will en-
devour to obtain freights to England and thence get protection to the 
United States. 11 22 
Britain did her best to encourage these arrangements. On 31 July 
1812 the British government issued an order which directed "the com-
manders of His Majesty's ships of war and privateers to detain and 
bring into port all ships and vessels belonging to the citizens of the 
United States of America ... except such a~ m~~ furnished with 
20Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 139, To Gray, St. Petersburg, 15 
Oct. 1812, To John Adams, St. Petersburg, 5 Nov. 1812. 
2lconsular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, Copen-
hagen, 4 Sept. 1812, 24 Sept. 1812. 
22consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 10/22 Aug. 1812. 
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British licenses, which vessels are allowed to proceed according to the 
tenor of such licenses."23 
Many American ships which came to Russia in 1812 were sailing on 
English account, as it seems their masters freely admitted.24 These A-
merican ships simply completed their contracts. American sail hiding 
behind British licenses continued to arrive in English ports for months 
after the war began. Many of them were permitted to clear for home. 
The shipping news sections of Boston, New York, Salem, etc. newspapers 
all through the latter months of 1812 and even well into 1813 are full 
of reports of American vessels voluntarily entering British ports and 
sailing out scot-free. Take for instance the Swift, Captain Howland. 
In July she was in Archangel. In December in Liverpool. In the last 
week of January, 1813, she arrived in Boston, loaded with two hundred 
tons of salt, crates, hardware and dry goods, whose origin the customs 
agent must have strained to ignore.25 Or the case of the brig Factor, 
Captain Beal, of Newburyport, which entered Boston harbor on 1 February 
1813, having come from Archangel via London.26 Or the corvefte Thomas, 
which cleared Archangel the 22nd of September 1812 and arrivfd in New 
York in early January, having stopped at London on the way.27 Or the 
ships Frederick and Catherine-Jane of New York, Eunice of Charleston, 
Arabella nf Boston, and Brutus of Weathersfield (?), which sailed on 28 
23cobbett's Political Register, Vol. XXII, 22 Aug. 1812, p. 254-54. 
Italics are mine. 
24consular Despatches - Archangel, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Archangel, 
1/13 Jan. 1813. 
25Boston Gazette, 1 Oct. 1812, 1 Feb. 1813. 
26rbid., 4 Feb. 1813. 
27Ibid., 11 Jan. 1813. 
259 
August 1812 from Wingo Sound with licenses for England.28 And so on 
and so on. Only fear of boring the reader unnecessarily brings this 
list to a close. 
On 22 August 1813 there had been thirty-five American vessels at 
Kronstadt. By 27 October the number had shrunk to seventeen.29 Where 
the other eighteen went seems quite obvious. 
No cries of treason greeted these vessels as they came sailing 
home from the ports of the enemy. The attitude of America's northeast 
was strongly anti-war and increasingly pro-British. British blockading 
squadrons off New England were able to procure supplies from the very 
shores they were blockading. As for the Yankee.attitude toward British 
licenses, perhaps the story of the ship Aurora sufficiently illuminates 
the subject. The ~urora, supposedly an American vessel bound for a neu-
tral port, was captured by a New York privateer and sent into a Rhode 
Island port. Judge Howell, district judge for Rhode Island, condemned 
her because she was sailing under protection of a British license, 
which, he said, denationalized the Aurora and her cargo. The reaction 
of a local newspaper was one of horror: 11 .If the sentence of this 
Judge Howell is not reversed, our commerce is annihilated. The corrupt 
prize courts of Norway can do nothing worse."30 
Not all American sail caught in Russian and Scandinavian ports by 
the war were lucky enough to have British licenses. The two pilot boat 
schooners that had been sent out from the United States to warn 
28rbid., 16 Nov. 1812. 
29consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 15/27 Oct. 1812. 
30Boston Gazette, 15 Feb. 1813. 
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Americans in the Baltic of the war certainly had no licenses, but they 
did have something nearly as good: speed. 
On her way back from Kronstadt the Champlin joined the Good Intent, 
its fellow Paul Revere, as a Danish captive. The two of them, however, 
were soon released, and they showed a clean pair of heels to the whole 
British navy. The Good Intent arrived at Sandwich, Cape Cod, in Novem-
her of 1812. There is some mystery about the Champlin. One report 
says she safely put into Ocracock, North Carolina. Another says she 
was cast away between Cape Fear and Cape Lookout on the same coast. In 
either case, her crew and passengers all got ashore safely.31 
Other American ships without licenses did not dare follow the 
example of the Champlin and Good Intent. Those two were swift dispatch 
schooners, built and rigged for speed, not applebowed merchantmen built 
for spaciousness and rigged for slow dependability. The average 
stranded American merchantman could never hope to elude British cruis-
ers in the Baltic. The underwriters of Boston, who certainly knew the 
odds, demanded thirty to forty per cent to insure the voyage of a mer-
chantman home from Russia.32 
Some of these stranded American ships were sold for a pittance to 
local merchants. The exquisitely misnamed Golden Age ended that way.33 
Others possibly were hired by local interests and sailed under the pro-
tection of foreign flags.34 Some just sat where they were and didn't 
venture out to sea until the end of the war. 
31Ibid., 19 Nov. 1812; Consular Despatches -Copenhagen, Vol. II, To 
Sec. of State, Copenhagen, 5 Sept. 1812. 
32soston Gazette, 15 Feb. 1813. 
33consular Despatches - Stockholm, Vol. I, Register of the Golden Age. 
34Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 465, 25 March 1813. 
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The plight of the crews of the ships that were exiled for the 
duration of the war was not a happy one. The officers of the ships 
could afford to pay for passage to the United States, and many of them 
did. Some of the officers had to stay in the Scandinavian and Russian 
ports through the war to look after their employers' property. There 
were at least sixteen of these lonely souls left in St. Petersburg in 
July, 1813, because that number invited Adams to celebrate the Fourth 
of July with them. (He declined "chiefly because it was Sunday.")35 
These men and their fellows at Gothenburg, etc., were separated from 
their families and homes, but we may guess that otherwise they lived 
rather well. 
The common American seamen had no such easy lot. In all the ports 
of which we have information - Kronstadt, Archangel, Gothenburg and Co-
penhagen - the stranded American seamen were forced to accept either a 
sharp diminishment of their wages, or, in most cases, were fobbed off 
with just a few months' pay or perhaps none at all. In every port the 
poor rascals, something over six hundred in total number, became wards 
of the resident American consul. It was his responsibility to buy them 
enough provisions, clothing and shelter to keep them alive, and to help 
them procure either passage home or a berth on some foreign ship. 
Berths for several hundred were found on Portuguese ships, Swedish 
ships, etc. At Archangel many of the stranded Americans signed on Brit-
ish vessels. In Copenhagen, Saabye, finally stirred from his lethargy, 
sent eighty to France to man privateers fitting out there under the A-
merican flag. 
35Ibid., p. 497, 4 July 1813. 
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For all of this, however, scores of American apparently stayed in 
Denmark, Sweden and Russia until the end of the war - or forever, for 
all we know. The whole story of the Americans stranded in North Europe 
in 1812 is a forlorn tribute to the effectiveness of British domination 
of the sea lanes between the Baltic and the United States.36 
Only a tiny number of American vessels sailed in the Baltic or 
thereabouts after the first year of the War of 1812. They came under 
foreign colors, as in the case of the schooner Eliza Ann. Captain 
Charles Clasby, of Nantucket, which imprudently sailed into Archangel 
harbor in 1813 with a Portuguese flag fluttering from her mast.37 Or 
they were privateers. The United States sent three privateers to har-
ass the trade routes between England and North Europe. The first was 
the True Blooded Yankee, a privateer fitted out in France which cap-
tured eight English vessels on a cruise in the first half of 1813, two 
of which she sent into Norwegian ports.38 The other two were the Rat-
tlesnake, Captain Maffet, of Philadelphia, and the Scourge, Captain Ni-
coll, of Stratford, Connecticut. They were very successful, taking 
twenty-four English vessels sailing to and from Archangel in 1813, twen-
ty-two of which were sent into Drontheim, Norway.39 The exploits of 
these three American privateers in the Norwegian Sea must have proved 
quite an embarassment to the British navy. 
36smith, Reminiscences, p. 70-71; Consular Despatches - Archangel, Vol. 
I, To Sec. of State, Archangel, 1/13 Jan. 1813, 26 Jan./7 Feb. 1814; 
Consular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. Pe-
tersburg, 20 Feb. 1813; Consular Despatches - Gothenburg, Vol. I, To Sec. 
of State, Copenhagen, 25 Feb. 1814. 
37consular Despatches - Archangel, Vol. I, To Sec. of State, Archangel, 
18/30 Nov. 1814. 
38consular Despatches - Copenhagen, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, Copenhag-
en, 30 June 1813. 
39coggesha11, George, History of the American Pr~vateers and Letters of 
Marque during our War with England i~ the Years 1812, '13 and '14 (New 
York: 1856), p. 219-25. 
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The only other vessels flying the American flag in the seas around 
North Europe were those to which the British deigned to grant special 
licenses. These vessels were very few in number. One was the United 
States frigate John Adams, carrying the party of Americans which was 
sent to Russia to negotiate a peace treaty with Britain under the eye 
of Tsar Alexander. Another was the Caroline, Captain Ridgeway, granted 
permission by the British admiral in the Chesapeake to carry dispatches 
from the Russian minister in the United States to Alexander's court. 
She, however, never even got away from Charleston, South Carolina. An 
English sloop of war and a privateer cut her out of Charleston harbor 
and brought her into the Bahamas, where a prize court condemned her 
when it was discovered that her owners had directed Captain Ridgeway to 
sell her cargo of cotton and rice, and even the vessel herself as soon 
as he reached the Baltic.40 
Another ship granted a special permit was the Hannibal, property 
of Mr. Astor of New York. She was furnished with a British license au-
thorizing her to take a cargo to the Baltic and even to carry back an-
other cargo, all in consideration of the special passenger she conveyed 
to Europe. Her passenger was General Moreau, famous French soldier who 
had fled to America when his part in a conspiracy against Napoleon's 
life was uncovered in 1804. The British wanted him back in Europe, 
hoping that his presence in the armies fighting Napoleon would under-
mine the morale of the French soldiers and perhaps encourage their de-
fection. In July of 1813 the Hannibal arrived at Gothenburg. Moreau 
disembarked and, after spending a few days with his old comrade Berna-
dotte, left to join Alexander as the Tsar's first aide-de-camp. On 27 
40rhe Weekly Register - Supplement to Volume V, p. 161-62. 
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August 1813 he was with Alexander before Dresden. A French cannonball 
smashed into Moreau's legs and killed the horse he rode. The next day 
his legs were amputated and a few days later he died. His body was 
carried to St. Petersburg and buried with all honors. Seemingly the 
whole world had conspired to tempt Moreau from his safe American home 
and carry him a quarter of the way around the world to keep a terminal 
appointment with Napoleon.41 
While all these odds and ends were rattling around in the void of 
what used to be Russo-American trade, vastly more important events were 
coming to pass in the lands to the west and south of the Baltic. Napo-
leon's enormous Grand Army, 600,000 strong, swung through Russia like a 
battleaxe through a feather mattress. Every encounter with the Russian 
army brought Napoleon another victory. Finally, on 7 September 1812, 
the Russian army stood at Borodino and fought as if it had no thought 
of further retreat. Losses on both sides were tremendous - Caulain-
court's own brother was killed leading his men42 - but when the battle 
ended the Russians fell back again. On the 14th the Grand Army occu-
pied Moscow, the ancient mothercity of Russia. 
Americans, searching for a market for their mountainous stores of 
unsold colonial goods in Russia, had sent large quantities of sugar, 
coffee, cotton, etc., to interior cities. Thus there was American 
property in Moscow when the French entered. Mr. Treadwell, and American 
merchant, had 100,000 rubles worth of cotton in the hands of a Moscow 
41Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 532; Ford, Writings of J.Q. Adams, Vol. 
IV, p. 520-21, 524; Adams Microfilm, Letterbook, Reel 138, p. 68, To 
Sec. of State, St. Petersburg, 28 Aug. 1813, p. 70, To Beasley, St. Pe-
tersburg, 31 Aug. 1813. 
42caulaincourt, With Napoleon in Russia, p. 99-100. 
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merchant by the name of Muller. An American merchant may even have 
been in Moscow during the French occupation. Adams mentions in his di-
ary a Mr. Baer who was there. Adams never says Baer was not an Ameri-
can and always mentions him in relation to Americans staying in St. Pe-
tersburg. 
Baer, American or not.,. was in Moscow looking after his property on 
the night of 15 September. Like Caulaincourt, who slept in the Kremlin 
that night, he must have started from sleep to see the red glow of fire 
reflecting from the wall of his bedroom. Small fires, thought to be ac-
cidental, had been breaking out now and then ever since the French en-
tered the city, but nothing like this one. The fire began in.the north 
portion of the city, The wind, which was from the north, drove the 
fire toward the center of the city. As the wind backed around toward 
the west, a separate and equally huge fire sprang up in the west por-
tion of the city. The next day it was rumored that the Russians had 
deliberately and methodically set fire to the city, hoping thus to rob 
the Grand Army of winter quarters. 
When the fire was done, a good part of Moscow was charred ruin. 
Mr. Baer had but smoldering remnants of his goods, Mr. Treadwell had 
the same of his cotton, and the French had a new and discomforting 
realization of the strength of Russian determination to expel the in-
vader.43 
In the middle of October the retceat from Moscow began. Shortly 
after, the Russian winter, somewhat late this year, arrived, and the 
Grand Army found itself in a country deserted of everything but invul-
nerable clouds of Cossack horsemen, snow. ice. and a cold so frigid 
43Ibid., p. 114-20; Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 458, 16 Feb. 
1813, p. 498, 9 July 1813. 
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that it seemed blasphemy against what a Corsican thought were the 
inviolate laws of nature. 
On 13 January 1813 John Quincy Adams attended a Te Deum in St. 
Petersburg in celebration of the total expulsion of Napoleon's army 
from Russia.44 Napoleon had invaded Russia at the head of a force of 
600,000 men. Barely 100,000 remained when the army sta5gered out of 
Russia. And even then their pain was not over. The Russians did not 
give up the pursuit, but, joined by France's rebellious allies, drove 
after them, deeper and deeper into Napoleon's Europe, ultimately to 
Paris itself. 
The Russian victories brought great joy to many in the United 
States, in spite of the minor fact that Russia was an ally of Great 
Britain, a nation with which America.•.was at war. Opponents of Madison 
and the war were especially happy to dwell on the details and signifi-
cance of Russia's triumph. Robert Goodhue Harper, arch-Federalist 
from Baltimore, gave a ringing speech thanking Russia for her victo-
ries because, he said, otherwise "enlightened patriotism" would "com-
pel us to grieve over our own victories, which, but for those achieved 
by the arms of Alexander, would be but so many steps toward our own 
ruin," i.e., the defeat of England and the extension of French hegemony 
over the entire North Atlantic community.45 
Boston, as one would expect, excelled in praising Russia's 
victories. The day of 25 March 1813 was set aside for a festival to 
"solemnize the glorious and important events which the Almighty has 
44Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 31, p. 446, 13 Jan. 1813. 
45walsh, Robert, Jr., ed., Correspondence Respecting Russia, (Philadel-
phia: William Fry, 1813), p. 27. 
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vouchsafed to bring to pass in Russia." The celebration began at 
King's Chapel, where the crowded pews were regaled with prayers, reci-
tations, choruses - the Hallelujah Chorus was particularly well re-
ceived - and a discourse by the Rev. Dr. James Freeman. (Freeman was a 
member of the Yankee clergy who were so pro-Russian that Cobbett, the 
British journalist, called them the "Cossack Priesthood.")46 Dr. Free-
man's address was woven all of Biblical passages, the whole being an 
analogy to the history of the United States and Europe since 1790 or 
so. In it the Federalist presidents, Washington and John Adams, rated 
together as "King Solomon" and the Republican presidents, Jefferson and 
Madison, rated together as a "bramble bush." In a flurry of quotations 
which would confound most divinity students, Freeman next moved to 
Europe and managed to have Napoleon - "the King of the South" - invade 
the realm of Tsar Alexander - "the King of the North" - who, with the 
help of "the destroying angel," drove the invader off and defeated him. 
Freeman ended with "Sing hallelujah! for the Lord God Omnipotent 
reigneth," and burst into tears. 
At four in the afternoon the subscribers to the festival and their 
guests assembled in the Exchange Coffee House. Harrison Gray Otis pre-
sided. Attending were many of the leading merchants of Boston, the 
justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Secretary and the 
Treasurer of the State, etc., etc. 
President Kirkland of Harvard asked the blessing of Heaven on the 
gathering and then the dinner was quickly consumed in anticipation of 
what was to follow. What followed was a speech by Otis, a speech by 
the Russian consul which he, for fear that his Russian accent would be 
46cobbett's Political Register, Vol. XXVI, to Dec. 1814, p. 737. 
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too thick for Bostonian ears, had Otis read, then a succession of 
toasts such as "The Cotmnonwealth of Massachusetts: may the fire of its 
patriotism, like the flames of Moscow, expel what is French, and burn 
southward and westward, until it consumes all but native influence, 11 
and then a number of odes praising the Russians to such familiar tunes 
as "Ye Mariners of England" and "Cotmnerce and Freedom." 
Possibly the most popular ode of the evening was one called 
"Boney's Retreat" written by a lad of fifteen to the tune of "Yankee 
Doodle." It ended in a stanza of praise for individual Russian gener-
als that must have been a supreme test for the Yankee tongue: 
"Smolensko's Prince then let us toast 
with Winteistein and Platoff 
Brave Beningsen, and Tchitichagoff, 
Winzingerode, Tormazoff. 
No longer to Napoleon's views 
May ~ so vilely pander, 
But join the Cossacks in their cry, 
Hourra~ for Alexander. 
Hourra! Hourra! then let us cry, 
Hourra! then, now or never, 
For Alexander's conquered all 
And Boney's dished forever. 11 47 
Another American poet wrote on Napoleon's disastrous retreat from 
Moscow. This poet was Joel Barlow, prince of the Hartford Wits and au-
thor of the famous "The Vision of Columbus. 11 
In 1811 Madison had appointed Barlow minister to France. His task 
was to settle the confusion about Napoleon's suspension of the Milan 
and Berlin Decrees, to obtain indemnities for French spoilation of 
47sketch of Church Solemnities at Stone ChaEel and Festival at the Ex-
change, Thursday, March 25, 1813, in Honour of the Russian Achievements 
over their French Invaders (Boston: Munroe and Francis, 1813); Foote, 
Henry W., ed., "Celebration of Russian Victories in Boston in 1813, and 
Discourse read by Dr. Freeman," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Histor-
ical Society, Vol. XVII (March, 1881), p. 379-87. 
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American shipping, and to assure that there would be normal trade 
relations with France in the future. 
In Paris Barlow received the same run~around that diplomats from 
the United States had been receiving in that city since the Revolution. 
The difficulties and delays in his negotiations were doubled after the 
invasion of Russia, because then all the necessary communications to 
Napoleon had to travel from Paris to Wilno and thence to Napoleon some-
where in the depths of Russia. This situation was exactly to Napoleon's 
liking for he didn't want to settle with the United States, but only to 
keep Barlow dangling and the United States in the war against England. 
By the fall of 1812 Barlow's and Madison's exasperation became so 
great that the French government feared that America's war effort a-
gainst England might be affected. The French Foreign Minister wrote 
from Russia expressing Emperor Napoleon's regrets for the delays and in-
viting Barlow to come to Wilno: "When you arrive at Wilno. . .we may, 
sir, conclude, without delay, an arrangement so desirable, and so con-
formable to the mutually amicable views of our two governments. 11 48 
Wilno was 1400 miles away in the midst of a country torn by war. 
It was October and winter was near. Barlow was 58 years old. On Tues-
day, 27 October 1812, he and his nephew, Thomas Barlow, climbed into a 
carriage and began the ride to Russia. 
As they neared Russia evidence of the war could be seen. Joel 
Barlow wrote from Koenigsburg of meeting on the road "those moving monu-
ments of the wisdom of war - the hundreds of wagonloads of invalid sol-
diers returning from Russia. coyered with glory, rags and mud. 11 49 
48woodress, James, A Yankee's Odyssey, the Life of Joel Barlow (Phila-
delphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1958), p. 298. 
49Todd, Charles Burr, Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, LL . .O. (New York: 
G.P. Putnam Sons, 1886), p. 276. 
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On 18 November the Barlows arrived in Wilno. It was a strange 
town, the streets full of soldiers and camp followers, the better quar-
ters full of diplomats and high officials living, drinking wine, hold-
ing dances, in general as if completely oblivious that the Grand Ar~y 
was dying a few hundred miles to the east. 
A week or so after the Barlows arrived, the Russians caught 
Napoleon's frozen, starved army at the Beresina River, about 150 miles 
to the east of Wilno, smashed it into bloody fragments and drove the 
fragments into wild flight. 
On 4 December a courier reached Wilno with the dreadful news. The 
Barlows and every other foreigner in the city who could beg a carriage, 
ride, or even walk, rushed to pack a few necessities and flee the im-
pending onslaught of the Russians. The next day, 5 December, the Bar-
lows joined the wild rush west. 
The second night out from Wilno the temperature dropped to thirteen 
or fourteen degrees below zero. In the nights that followed, the Amer-
icans learned that that temperature was to be normal. They traveled 
constantly, living on frozen bread and wine. 
A few days after the Barlows left Wilno a flurry of hoofbeats 
brought them up out of the depths of their furs to see a nondescript 
vehicle sweep past pulled by fresh horses. Huddled within was the Em-
peror Napoleon, racing back to Paris to gather together a new army to 
replace the one he left in Russia. 
On 17 December the Americans reached Warsaw. The wreckage of the 
Grand Army was streaming through the city. Thomas Barlow, Joel's neph-
ew, noted that, "We see many colonels without a man of their regiments 
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left." The French, he went on, "have lost nearly all of their horses, 
and most of them have been eaten by the army."50 
On the 18th the Barlows left Warsaw. Shortly after Joel Barlow 
fell ill of "inflammation of the lungs." He was soon so ill that, de·· 
spite the Cossacks, the party had to stop at Zarnowiec, a little vil~ 
lage near Cracow. Joel Barlow died there on 24 December 1812. 
Thomas Barlow intended to have the body of his uncle embalmed and 
carried to Dantzig, where a ship could take it to America to be buried 
in the soil of home. But the presence of Cossacks, to whom everyone 
not a Cossack was a Frenchman, in the neighborhood made further delay 
dangerous, perhaps suicidal. 
Joel Barlow, poet and diplomat, was buried at Zarnowiec, Poland, 
where his remains still lie. 
Some time in the last month of his life, Joel Barlow, deeply moved 
by the horror around him, wrote a poem entitled "Advice to a Raven in 
Russia," from which the following selection is made: 
"Imperial scavenger~ but now you know, 
Your work is vain amid these hills of snow. 
His* tentless troops are marbled through with frost 
And change to crystal when the breath is lost. 
Mere trunks of ice, tho limb'd like human frames, 
And lately warm'd with life's endearing flames. 
They cannot taint the air, the world impest, 
Nor can you tear one fiber from their breast. 
No! from their visual sockets as they lie, 
With beak and claws you cannot pluck an eye. 
The frozen orb, preserving still its form, 
Defies your talons as it braves the storm, 
But stands and stares to God, as if to know 
In what curst hands he leayes his world belqw."51 
*Napoleon's 
50lbid., p. 281. 
51Adams, History of U.S., Vol. VI, p. 245-66; Todd, Life and Letters of 
Barlow, p. 275-83; Woodress, A Yankee's Odyssey, p. 276-305. The poem 
11Advice to a Raven in Russi~11 may be found on p. 338-39 of Hoodress or p. 
47-49 of Matthiessen, F .0., ed., The Oxford Book of American Verse (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950) 
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Hostilities never reached St. Petersburg, and there diplomats 
could play their queer game without being interupted by the cold, fam-
ine, or Cossacks. The pro-American policy of the Russian government 
survived without faltering the news that the United States was waging 
war against Russia's chief ally, England. The last thing Alexander 
wanted was for England to crush America and bring that wayward colony 
back into her sphere of influence. Alexander knew well that a firm 
friendship between his nation and England v10uld only last as long as 
Napoleon ruled in France. Once Napoleon's power was broken, Russia 
would have to return to her policy of encouraging maritime rivals to 
Britain or submit to being Britain's economic vassal. 
Thus it was that on 21 September 1812, when the fires of Moscow 
still smoldered, Count Rumiantsev asked John Quincy Adams if the gov-
ernment of the United States would, ,object to an offer by the Russian 
government to mediate the war between the United States and Great Brit-
ain. Adams, of course, had no instructions on how to react to such an 
offer, but he sensibly answered that he thought his government would 
not object.52 When the news of the offer reacted Washington, Madison, 
who was discovering Canada not quite as ripe for American conquest as 
had been advertised, accepted and dispatched James Bayard and Albert 
Gallatin to St. Petersburg on the frigate John Adams. They, along with 
John Quincy Adams, were to act as America's peace negotiators. They 
reached St. Petersburg in July of 1813 and were very cordially received. 
Britain, however, feared that Russia would be biased in favor of 
the United States. In September of 1814, for instance, Prime Minister 
52Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 402. 
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Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, "I fear the Emperor of Russia is half 
an American. . 11 53 Liverpool 1 s government refused Alexander 1 s offer 
of mediation. Later the offer was made again, and refused again. 
Britain suggested direct negotiations between herself and the 
United States. Madison agreed, and Ghent in the Netherlands was chosen 
as the city in which the peace negotiations would take place. The dip-
lomats Madison had sent to St. Petersburg turned about and left for 
Ghent. On 28 April 1814, John Quincy Adams followed them.54 He had 
been in Russia four and a half years. 
The negotiations at Ghent proved to be long and hard. Adams and 
his confreres discovered that wars are much easier to start than to end. 
But in December of 1814 the peace was finally signed and the passage of 
American vessels to and from Russia again became possible. 
When the ice cleared in the Gulf of Finland in the spring of 1815 
there were sixteen American vessels in Kronstadt harbor. They had lain 
there throughout the entire duration of the Wars of 1812. Moscow had 
burned, Washington had burned, Europe had finally rid herself of the in-
cubus of Napoleon, and Jackson had belatedly triumphed at New Orleans 
while these sixteen sat peacefully in Kronstadt, as if exiled from the 
normal course of time as well as from their home ports. 
Forty-three other American sail came to Kronstadt that year, 
making a total of fifty-nine American sail in the port in 1815.55 Rus-
so-American trade picked up right where it left off. Russians produced 
53Mahan, A.T., Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1905), Vol. II, p. 423-24. 
54Adams, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 603. 
SSconsular Despatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. II, To Sec. of State, St. 
Petersburg, 4/16 Jan. 1816. 
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things Americans wanted. The trade went on, but never again - or not, 
at least, until World War II - was the procession of merchantmen::from 
the United States to Russia as important as between 1807 and 1812, as 
important as in those terrible years between the rape of Copenhagen and 
the gutting of Moscow, when the world trembled to find itself turning 
on an axis that ran from the docks of Boston, United States of America, 
to the waterfront.:of Kronstadt, Russia. 
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Postscript on a Little Man 
When John Quincy Adams left Russia in the spring of 1814 to go to 
Ghent, he went by way of Reval rather than Kronstadt because the latter 
port was still closed by ice. In Reval Adams met Diedrich Rodde, the 
American vice-consul there by appointment of Levett Harris. Rodde com-
plained to Adams that he and his brother had been treated badly by 
Harris, so badly, in fact, that Rodde told Adams all he could about 
Harris's peculations, even though in making the revelation he put him-
self in a bad light too. 
Diedrich Rodde said that he and his brother, who was American 
vice-consul at Riga, also by appointment of Harris, had agreed to pay 
Harris pensions of one thousand and five thousand rubles a year respec-
tively, plus half the profits they made on American vessels and cargoes. 
In return, they had received their appointments as consuls. The Roddes' 
current trouble with Harris stemmed from the fact that, although there 
had been no American business to do in either Reval or Riga in 1812 or 
1813, and although the Rodde properties in Riga had been destroyed dur-
ing the defense of that city against the French, Harris demanded his 
pensions. 
Diedrich Rodde also stated that between 1807 and 1812 Harris 
received as high as 70,000 rubles apiece for ratifying as authentic pa-
pers of counterfeit American vessels. This money he shared with cer-
tain Russian officials, particularly those who were members of the Neu-
tral Commission, the approval of which was also essential before a 
questionable vessel could enter a Russian port.l 
lAdams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 32, p. 102-103, 13 May 1814. 
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The matter of Harris's malpractice as a public servant did not 
come up again until 1818, when Harris, by that time a private citizen 
back in the United States, applied to President Monroe to be employed 
in the public service again. At approximately the same time two Ameri-
can merchants, the brothers W.C. and J.D. Lewis, of which W.D. Lewis 
and perhaps his brother, too, had been resident merchants in St. Peters-
burg during Harris's consulate there, began publicly to accuse Harris 
of having prostituted his office for personal gain. (Bad feeling be-
tween Harris and the Lewises probably dates as far back as at least 
1811, for in that year Adams's diary mentions a merchant named Lewis in 
St. Petersburg as being an enemy of Harris.) In 1821 Harris sued W.D. 
Lewis for libel. 
John Quincy Adams, now Secretary of State, found himself again 
embroiled in the aromatic affairs of Levett Harris. Adams remonstrated 
with President Monroe against ever taking Harris back into the public 
service and was also obliged to give the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
where the trial of Harris v. W.D. Lewis was held, a deposition discred-
iting Harris. 
The trial proved an embarrassment to both Adams and Harris. 
Harris tried to weaken the influence of Adams's testimony by reference 
to Adams's former indulgence of his (Harris's) actions while in Russia. 
Also, according to Adams, Harris tried to "bully or buy off my testi-
mony through the intervention of the President." 
By this time Adams, of course, realized what a dereliction of duty 
and sin of omi.ssion his apathy toward Harris's machinations in Russia 
had been. In his diary Adams wrote an explanation of why he hadn't 
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taken action in 1814 when Rodde had exposed Harris. The reasons were 
four in number. One, Rodde's story had been told him in confidence. 
Two, most of the witnesses to Harris's guilt had shared with Harris in 
the spoils of that guilt, and therefore would probably testify falsely. 
Three, "The proof was far distant and precarious and I was going for an 
indefinite time to be far distant from the proof and the place where it 
was to be produced." Four, the Anglo-American war of 1812 was still 
going on in 1814, which cut off all American trade with Russia. The 
peace that would follow that war would legalize all American and all 
British trade with Russia. There was no longer nor would there again 
be any motive for smuggling. If Harris would never again be able to 
dabble in that pastime, why not let him continue as consul? 
The trial brought Harris little satisfaction. The weight of 
testimony was so great in favor of Lewis's accusations that Harris's 
lawyers, the best in Philadelphia, admitted that their client had made 
a fortune in Russia, but explained it by saying that his intercessions 
with the Russian government in favor of certain vessels seeking en-
trance had been in his capacity as a merchant, not as the United States 
consul. 
At the end of the trial the court awarded Harris one hundred 
dollars damages. Harris had sued for $50,000. Lewis prided himself on 
having won a moral victory. 
In 1821 Adams made his final judgment of Levett Harris, his 
constant companion and colleague during four and a half gray years in 
Russia: 
"Harris is one of those mixed characters who, with some very 
good qualities and great address, has not the firmness to 
withstand the temptation of profitable venality. His 
situation at St. Petersburg and the situation of the 
times, gave him both temptation and opportunity such as 
perhaps was never presented to any other public officer 
of the United States; and he availed himself of it pre-
cisely to the extent which he thought he could do and 
escape detection. He made a princely fortune by sell-
ing his duty and his office at the most enormous 
prices. "2 
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2semis, S~el Flagg, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), n. 169; Adams, Mem-
oirs, Vol. IV, p. 282-83, Vol. V, p. 328-29; Ford, Writings of J.Q. 
Adams, Vol. VI, p. 346-47; Adams Microfilm, Diary, Reel 32, p. 80, 28 
March 1814. 
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AMERICA, RUSSIA, HEMP, AND NAPOLEON 
Russo-American Trade, 1783-1814 
(Library of Congress No. Mic. 61 ) 
Alfred w. Crosby, Jr., Ph.D. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1961 
Major Professor: Robert E. Moody, Professor of Histocy 
Trade between the United States and Russia has never been given 
much attention by American historians, particularly by those American 
historians specializing in studies of our early national period. There-
fore, he who would do research on early Russo-American commerce must 
pore over the manuscript consular and ministerial reports of the American 
State Department archives, the Massachusetts Historical Society microfilms 
of the diary and letters of John Quincy Adams, and the manuscript log, 
letter and account books of the Peabody Museum and Essex Institute of 
Salem, Massachusetts. 
In the early national period of the United States no field of eco-
nomic endeavor except agriculture was of greater importance to our young 
republic than our overseas trade. The merchant marine was one of the 
most important tools in the creation of American economic viability and 
in the reinforcement of the political independence so recently won. Our 
merchant marine a.n:i our navy could not have operated without Russian im-
ports: iron, sailcloth and -most important of all - hemp and hemp cordage. 
In the age of sail, hemp was as critically important as is oil today, for 
hemp cordage was the ligaments and nerves of the sailing ship. 
Some hemp was raised in the United States, but of such poor quality 
that when exposed to brine or to salt spray it quickly deteriorated. 
Most hemp used on American ships was grown in Russia. 
Russo-American trade was also important in the history of Russia and 
Europe as a whole. Russia was an ally of Napoleon when he created his 
Continental System by forbidding his empire and allies to trade with the 
British. However, Russia's best market was Britain and Britain's best 
source of essential naval stores was Russia. 
At the same time, Americans were discovering that the economic warfare 
between France and Britain was making the ports of all of Europe directly or 
nearly directly under Napoleon's control ver,y dangerous for American ship-
ping. Even the usually peaceful Danes, for instance, seized several hundred 
American merchantmen between 1807 and the outbreak of the War of 1812. It 
was inevitable that lussia, the continental European nation farthest from 
Napoleon's center of power, would become one of our most important trading 
partners. In 1811, for example, one tenth of all America• s exports went to 
Russia. 
It was also inevitable that many Americans would engage in smuggling 
goods to and from Russia fer the British. And it was inevitable that Britons 
would disguise their own merchantmen with American flag• and papers, and con-
tinue direct trade with Russia under false colors. 
Thus it was that from 1808 through 1812 the foreign flag most commonly 
seen in Russia's Baltic and White Sea ports was the Stars and Stripes. In 
the summer of 1811, for instance, a hundred vessels flying the American 
nag lay in Kronstadt harbor at one time. 
Napoleon sent demand after demand to Tsar Alexander I to halt all trade 
with American vessels. ~ Americans, the Corsican claimed, were either 
British or sailing on British account. From 1809 through the winter of 1812 
Napoleon's ambassadors to Russia, Caulaincourt and Lauriston, fought America's 
minister to Russia, John Quincy Adams, for Alexander's favor. Adams won, 
because Alexander knew that the bulk of Russia's foreign trade was now being 
carried in American bottoms. To sever trade relations with the United 
States would have had a disastrous effect on Russia's already staggering 
economy. 
Probably Russia's lax enforcement of the Continental System against 
shipping flying the American colors was as important as any other single 
factor in convincing Napoleon that he must invade Russia, and therefore 
in bringing the French Einpire to wreck upon the white reefs of the Russian 
winter of 1812. 
